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The Distinction Problem of Self-Deception 
by 
CHAN Chi Yin 
Master of Philosophy 
 
The essential task of the investigation of self-deception is nothing more than 
establishing the boundary of it, herein known as the distinction problem of 
self-deception. Such a boundary is necessary for distinguishing the phenomenon of 
self-deception from other similar phenomena, especially wishful thinking, and sheds 
light on the future research of other theoretical questions posed by the phenomenon. 
Although philosophers have reached a vague consensus on certain necessary elements 
involved in the phenomenon of self-deception, there is no general agreement on their 
details, leading to a lack of canonical literature regarding the question of what makes 
self-deception a unique phenomenon.  
 
In this thesis, I begin by attempting to re-establish the initial definition of 
self-deception by illustrating the vague consensus in the current discussion of 
self-deception. Then, several representative views are examined to uncover the 
reason(s) for their failure to capture the distinction between self-deception and other 
kinds of irrationality. These findings are then used to clarify what the basic structure of 
self-deception should be. Finally, I develop an account revealing that the distinction 
problem is related to the study of the necessary attitude(s) involved in self-deception. 
My analysis shows that a special kind of instability inherent in the necessary attitude(s) 
involved in self-deception is the key to establishing self-deception as a distinctive case 
of motivated irrationality.  
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INTRODUCTION:  SELF-DECEPTION  AS  A  KIND  OF  HUMAN  IRRATIONALITY  
It  is  widely  accepted  that  ordinary  people  are  generally  rational  beings  who  can  
think,  talk,  act,  and  acquire  knowledge  or  understanding  based  on  or  being  agreeable  to  
reason.  The  definition  of  “rationality”  or  “being  rational,”  however,  could  be  a  very  
controversial  topic  of  debate.  For  the  purpose  of  introducing  the  idea,  an  intuitive  
approach  for  discussing  this  definition  might  suffice  for  the  moment.  It  seems  to  most  
people  that  our  reasons  to  believe  and  for  action  should  be  grounded  in  what  the  world  
is,  namely,  the  truth,  at  least  in  a  rough  sense.  Given  that  people  usually  assume  that  
“evidence”  would  indicate  “truth”  (in  a  rough  sense),  we  might  say  the  initial  idea  of  
being  “rational”  is  to  do  things  based  on  what  the  available  evidence  suggests.  This  
idea  is  also  concurred  on  by  many  philosophers.  For  example,  Russell  (1996)  asserts  
that  when  we  decide  whether  to  believe  in  a  particular  proposition,  we  have  “the  moral  
duty  of  veracity,”  which  “consists  of  two  coequal  precepts:  ‘believe  truth,’  and  ‘shun  
error’”  (p.  769).  In  order  to  fulfill  this  duty,  we  ought  to  “[g]ive  to  any  hypothesis  
which  is  worth  [our]  while  to  consider  just  that  degree  of  credence  which  the  evidence  
warrants”  (Russell,  1996,  p.  770).   
  
Nevertheless,  there  are  times  when  normal  people  do  not  seem  to  obey  this  
evidentialist  way  of  behaving.  The  following  scenario,  suggested  by  Van  Leeuwen  
(2007)  and  referred  to  by  me  as  the  case  of  “an  overrated  son,”  should  not  sound  
strange  to  most  people:   
  
Suppose  your  friend’s  son  is  underperforming  in  school,  doesn’t  read  a  lot,  
and  doesn’t  get  the  jokes  that  most  kids  his  age  get.  Suppose  also  your  
friend  insists  that  his  son  is  “very  smart”  and  in  fact  “smarter  than  most  
1  
  
other  kids  his  age.”  Knowing  your  friend  almost  never  lies  and  certainly  
wouldn’t  to  you,  and  knowing  him  to  be  no  fool  in  general,  you  see  that  
he’s  deceiving  himself.  (p.  420)  
  
Let  us  assume  that  your  friend  is  not  making  a  random  mistake  and  should  have  the  
ability  to  acknowledge  the  contradicting  evidence.  In  this  scenario,  on  the  one  hand,  it  
looks  like  your  friend  somehow  successfully  came  to  believe  that  “my  son  is  very  
smart”  –  after  all,  this  is  what  he  verbally  endorses.  On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  
impossible  that  your  friend,  who  should  be  normally  rational,  would  acquire  such  an  
unwarranted  belief  in  the  face  of  strong  (but  not  conclusive)  evidence  to  the  contrary.  
Since  it  is  quite  obvious  that  your  friend  has  a  personal  stake  in  the  matter,  you  
(pre-theoretically)  suspect  that  he  deliberately  ignores  the  unwelcoming  evidence  and  
makes  himself  believe  in  the  unwarranted  belief  –  as  Van  Leeuwen  (2007)  describes,  
your  friend  might  be  self-deceiving .  So,  it  is  fair  to  say  this  case  of  “an  overrated  son”  
looks  like  a  typical  example  that  we  would  (pre-theoretically)  refer  to  as  a  case  of  
human  irrationality,  namely,  self-deception .   
  
We  have  therefore  arrived  at  one  of  the  puzzling  subject  matters  of  
philosophical  debates.  There  has  been  a  big  controversy  surrounding  the  topic  of  
self-deception.  What  is  it  to  be  self-deceived?  If  it  is  what  the  name  suggests,  
self-deception  appears  to  be  knowingly  making  oneself  believe  what  one  takes  to  be  
false.  How  could  a  generally  “rational”  person  deliberately  make  herself  believe  
something  that  she  recognizes  as  false?  Does  a  self-deceived  subject  acquire  an  
unwarranted  belief  or  a  certain  kind  of  irrational  state  that  can  roughly  play  the  role  
played  by  “belief”?  How  could  we  decide  whether  a  particular  case  should  be  a  
2  
  
“paradigm”  example  of  self-deception?  What  is  the  difference  between  self-deception  
and  other  seemingly  similar  phenomena?   
  
Maybe  we  could  deny  that  there  is  such  a  kind  of  irrationality.   The  subject  in  1
the  case  of  “an  overrated  son”  is  merely  trying  to  lie  to  others  without  engaging  in  an 
irrational  mental  action  or  process.  The  advantage  of  this  assertion  is  obvious  –  we  can  
get  rid  of  those  theoretical  puzzles  seemingly  stemming  from  “self-deception.” 
Nevertheless,  the  disadvantage  is  that  we  may  deny  a  real  phenomenon.  These  are  all  
familiar  stories  that  most  of  us  might  have  occasionally  engaged  in.  Consider  a  friend  
who  claims  that  he  believes  in  his  partner’s  faithfulness  even  though  convincing  
reasons  have  led  everyone  else  to  believe  otherwise,  or  a  businesswoman  who  insists  
that  she  will  be  successful  again  despite  kind  suggestions  grounded  in  good  evidence  
from  others  to  cut  losses.  Based  on  our  real-life  experience,  we  cannot  simply  agree  
that  such  a  “self-deceiving”  situation  is  nothing  more  than  just  lying  to  others.  
Accordingly,  we  do  not  have  to  defend  the  case  of  “an  overrated  son”  as  a  
(theoretically)  genuine  case  of  self-deception  in  order  to  argue  for  the  existence  of  
“self-deception,”  since  the  evidence  for  believing  so  is  pervaded  in  our  daily  mental  
life.  
  
How  should  we  account  for  self-deception  and  the  questions  stemming  from  
this  phenomenon?  If  the  phenomenon  behind  “self-deception”  is  a  genuine  one  and 
hence  a  genuine  subject  of  study,  the  most  fundamental  work  would  be  to  establish  the  
1  Some  might  argue  that  self-deception  is  a  kind  of  rationality.  I  will  not  deny  such  a  
possibility,  but  I  am  not  going  to  investigate  it  either,  as  the  literature  tends  to  consider  
self-deception  as  a  kind  of  irrationality  (see  section  1.2.2  for  more  details).   
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boundary  of  it  (or  the  application  of  the  term  “self-deception”).  By  drawing  this  line,  
we  could  reach  a  general  agreement  on  what  it  means  to  be  self-deceived  and  suggest  
certain  paradigm  cases  for  providing  a  solid  base  for  further  discussion.  However,  as  
Funkhouser  (2009)  points  out:   
  
It  would  be  nice  if  theorists  interested  in  self-deception  could  start  with  an  
agreed  upon  understanding  of  the  phenomenon  –  what  it  even  means  to  be  
self-deceived  and  what  are  some  of  its  paradigm  examples  –  and  then 
proceed  from  that  starting  point  to  address  the  various  theoretical  problems  
that  it  appears  to  pose.  But,  it  should  come  as  no  surprise  to  any  philosopher  
with  any  experience  that  there  is  no  such  shared  understanding  of  what  it  
means  to  be  self-deceived.  (p.  1)  
  
Undoubtedly,  theorists  who  attempt  to  give  a  detailed  account  of  self-deception  turn  
out  presenting  pictures  that  are  very  different  from  each  other  (as  we  will  see  in  section  
1.1).  Despite  this,  since  these  suggested  theories  (are  supposed  to)  target  the  same  kind  
of  phenomenon,  there  must  be  some  commonalities  among  them.  Hence  the  primary  
question  of  studying  self-deception  becomes  whether  there  exists  a  common  ground  in  
the  current  discussion,  and  whether  this  consensus,  if  present,  is  enough  for  
establishing  the  boundary  of  self-deception.  
  
Ideally,  this  boundary  should  provide  adequate  guidance  to  separate  
“self-deception”  from  not  only  different  kinds  of  rationality  but  also  other  types  of  
irrationality.  Philosophers  who  are  interested  in  this  study  (like  Szabados  (1973))  find  it  
more  challenging  to  decide  what  makes  self-deception  different  from  other  nearby  
phenomena  than  what  makes  it  an  irrational  phenomenon.  Yet,  most  philosophers  (for  
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instance,  Nelkin  (2002))  still  turn  to  focus  on  providing  a  detailed  analysis  of  
self-deception  while  hoping  that  the  issue  of  dividing  self-deception  from  other  kinds  
of  irrationality  could  be  solved  fortuitously  by  what  they  suggest.  However,  I  consider  
it  to  be  an  impulsive  move  to  account  for  self-deception  in  detail  without  first  
distinguishing  its  distinctive  feature(s).  As  mentioned  before,  the  first  step  should  be  to  
determine  whether  there  is  a  common  ground  in  the  current  discussion  of  
self-deception,  which  could  provide  clues  on  the  next  step.  
  
The  purpose  of  this  thesis  is  to  establish  a  firm  foundation  for  future  research  
on  the  phenomenon  of  self-deception.  I  will  show  that,  in  order  to  draw  the  boundary  
of  self-deception,  we  need  more  than  a  vague  consensus  on  its  general  features,  as  
presented  in  the  current  literature.  Specifically,  a  special  kind  of  instability  inherent  in  
the  necessary  attitude(s)  concerning  p  involved  in  self-deception  can  help  us  to  set  up  
the  line  between  self-deception  and  other  nearby  phenomena.   
  
This  thesis  will  consist  of  three  parts.  In  chapter  1,  I  will  present  an  overview  of  
the  current  discussion  on  self-deception  and  introduce  the  various  points  of  view  
available.  Then,  I  will  illustrate  the  “vague  consensus”  on  the  initial  idea  of  
“self-deception”  in  the  literature  and  explain  why  it  is  not  enough  to  serve  as  a  basis  for  
further  analysis.  In  chapter  2,  I  will  examine  different  solutions  to  the  issue  with  the  
assumption  that  self-deception  should  be  a  unique  kind  of  irrationality.  We  will  see  this  
examination  will  eventually  lead  us  to  reconsider  how  we  should  specify  the  
combination  of  the  awareness  of  the  available  evidence  and  the  necessary  attitude(s)  
concerning  p  accurately.  Based  on  this,  in  chapter  3,  I  will  clarify  the  basic  structure  of  
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self-deception,  which  will  give  us  an  idea  of  viewing  “self-deception”  in  a  new  fashion.  
It  will  be  demonstrated  that  the  combination  can  be  understood  as  an  integrated  entity 
that  is  unstable  in  character,  and  the  idea  of  “the  necessary  attitude(s)  concerning  p ”  
also  calls  for  a  new  understanding.  More  importantly,  my  analysis  will  show  that,  by  
laying  emphasis  on  the  unstable  nature  of  the  necessary  attitude(s),  a  promising  
solution  to  the  issue  can  be  drawn.   
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CHAPTER  I  -  THE  PREPARATORY  WORK  FOR  THE  STUDY  OF  THE  
DISTINCTION  PROBLEM  
1.1  The  current  discussion  of  self-deception  
The  literature  on  the  phenomenon  of  self-deception  is  a  complex  mixture  of 
views  that  are  quite  different  from  each  other.  Philosophical  analyses  of  self-deception  
could  be  separated  into  two  main  groups:  intentionalist  and  non-intentionalist.   As  2
Lynch  (2009)  illustrates,  theoretical  differences  between  the  groups  “can  be  traced  in  
large  part  to  two  different  approaches  to  how  the  concept  of  self-deception  should  be  
properly  analysed,  usefully  distinguished  by  Alfred  Mele,”  which  can  be  called  the  
“lexical  approach”  and  the  “empirical  approach”  (p.  126).   Moreover,  there  are  also  3
 significant  disagreements  on  the  details  of  self-deception  within  the  groups.  
  
1.1.1  Intentionalism/traditionalism  
Traditionally,  philosophers  take  the  lexical  approach  to  start  their  investigation  
on  self-deception,  which  leads  them  to  establish  “a  definition  of  deception  from  the  
interpersonal  case  and  [use]  it  to  deduce  the  meaning  of  ‘self-deception’”  (Lynch,  
2009,  p.  127).   Since  there  is  a  deceiver  intentionally  getting  a  victim  to  believe  a  4
2  Nevertheless,  as  Lynch  (2009)  notes,  many  philosophers  “take  up  mixed  positions”  between  
these  two  groups  (p.  126).  See  Galeotti  (2012)  as  an  example  of  a  mixed  strategy.     
3  As  Mele  (n.d.)  suggests,  there  is  a  third  approach  called  the  “theory-guided”  approach  (para.  
5).  If  we  take  the  third  approach  to  investigate  self-deception,  “the  search  for  a  definition  is  
guided  by  common-sense  theory  about  the  aetiology  and  nature  of  self-deception”  (Mele,  n.d.,  
para.  5).  But  Mele  (n.d.)  does  not  specify  the  common-sense  theory,  nor  is  it  easy  to  see  
whether  he  has  an  example  of  this  approach  in  his  mind.  
4  As  Lynch  (2009)  notes,  “these  two  approaches  are  somewhat  idealized,  and  it  can  be  difficult  
to  find  a  philosopher  who  explicitly  and  exclusively  adopts  one”  (p.  126).  Therefore,  we  should  
not  assume  that  intentionalists  are  required  to  adopt  the  lexical  approach  exclusively.  A  more  
precise  description  would  be  that  they  largely  rely  on  the  lexical  formula  and  the  interpersonal  
model  generated  by  it.   
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proposition  that  p  while  knowing  or  believing  truly  that  not -p  in  a  standard  case  of  
interpersonal  deception,  the  lexical  formula  of  self-deception  should  be  as  follows:   
  
When  A  deceives  himself,  A  intentionally/deliberately  causes  himself  to  
believe  something  he  knows/suspects  is  false.  (Lynch,  2009,  p.  128)  
  
Based  on  the  interpersonal  model,  they  infer  that  there  are  three  necessary  elements  in  
a  real  case  of  self-deception:  a  true  belief  that  not -p ,  an  intention  to  deceive  oneself  that  
p ,  and  a  false  belief  that  p .  Owing  to  the  intentional  nature  of  the  suggested  model,  
proponents  of  this  model  are  often  referred  to  as  “intentionalists.”  
  
Despite  the  consensus  on  how  to  start  the  investigation,  intentionalists  disagree  
on  how  to  address  these  three  elements.  Hence  different  versions  of  intentionalism  
exist,  which  can  be  divided  into  two  subgroups.  Some  intentionalists  insist  that  
self-deceived  subjects  are  required  to  hold  the  belief  that  p  while  also  believing  that  
not -p  simultaneously  (Davidson,  2004b;  Rorty,  1988).  Yet,  as  Lynch  (2009)  notes,  “it’s  
not  obvious  why  the  lexical  derivation  as  it  stands  would  necessarily  imply  this  
[requirement]”  (p.  128).  Therefore,  it  is  not  surprising  to  see  that  the  others,  such  as  
Sorensen  (1985),  argue  that  the  two  central  beliefs  can  be  held  by  the  subject  
consecutively.   
  
Furthermore,  disagreement  arises  within  the  two  subgroups  as  well.  In  the  first  
subgroup,  for  example,  different  opinions  exist  on  how  exactly  the  simultaneous  model  
can  be  accommodated  in  a  single  agent’s  mind.  Some  philosophers  follow  the  idea  of  
“partitions  in  the  mind”  proposed  by  Dennett  in  1992,  which  argues  that  “the  mind  is  
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not  a  unified  system  but  rather  a  problematically  yoked-together  bundle  of  partly  
autonomous  systems”  (as  cited  in  Rorty,  1988,  p.  17).  These  systems  are  sub-agencies  
co-existing  in  the  mind,  which  are  capable  of  belief,  desire,  and  intention  but  not  
“accessible  to  each  other  at  all  times,”  and  therefore  the  two  contradictory  beliefs  will  
be  held  separately  by  different  “possessors”  (Ibid.).  In  contrast,  Davidson  (2004b)  
rejects  such  a  strong  position  and  proposes  a  relatively  modest  version:  “there  can  be  
boundaries  between  parts  of  the  mind”  and  these  “boundaries  are  not  discovered  by  
introspection;  they  are  conceptual  aids  to  the  coherent  description  of  genuine  
irrationalities”  (p.  211).  In  this  sense,  “we  should  not  necessarily  think  of  the  
boundaries  as  defining  permanent  and  separate  territories”  (Davidson,  2004b,  p.  211).  
Instead,  they  are  temporary  tools  that  a  self-deceived  subject  uses  for  keeping  her  false  
belief  that  p  apart  from  the  true  belief  that  not- p  (Ibid.).   
  
1.1.2  Non-intentionalism/revisionism  
In  the  other  group,  that  is,  non-intentionalism,  the  situation  is  even  more  
complex.  Rather  than  the  lexical  approach,  philosophers  in  this  group  rely  more  
heavily  on  the  empirical  approach.  As  described  by  Mele  (1987),  by  following  the  
empirical  approach:   
  
One  starts  by  gathering  and  constructing  cases  that  would  generally  be  
described  as  self-deception,  and  then  attempts  to  develop  an  analysis  of  
self-deception  on  the  basis  of  a  consideration  of  this  material.  The  meaning  
of  ‘self-deception’  is  determined  by  the  cases,  which  are  therefore  the  most  




As  a  result,  these  philosophers  take  into  account  “how  ordinary  people  actually  use  the  
expression  ‘self-deception’”  and  move  away  from  the  lexical  formula  proposed  by  
intentionalists  (Lynch,  2009,  p.  127).  By  rejecting  the  formula,  they  refuse  to  adopt  an  
intentional  picture  of  self-deception  –  thus  the  name  “non-intentionalists.”  There  are  
two  families  of  views  that  can  be  considered  non-intentionalism:  “deflationary”  
approaches  and  “non-doxastic”  approaches.  Both  of  them  suggest  that  self-deception  is  
an  unintentional  causal  mechanism,  and  numerous  accounts  are  announced  based  on  
this  initial  idea.   
  
1.1.2.1  Deflationary  approaches  
Mele’s  (2001)  deflationary  account,  one  of  the  most  well-known  versions  of  
deflationism,  suggests  that  the  jointly  sufficient  conditions  for  “ entering  self-deception  
in  acquiring  a  belief  that  p ”  are:   
  
1. The  belief  that  p  which  S  acquires  is  false.  
2. S  treats  data  relevant,  or  at  least  seemingly  relevant,  to  the  truth  value  of  p  
in  a  motivationally  biased  way.  
3. This  biased  treatment  is  a  non-deviant  cause  of  S ’s  acquiring  the  belief  
that  p .  
4. The  body  of  data  possessed  by  S  at  the  time  provides  greater  warrant  for  
[not -p ]  than  for  p .  (p.  50-51)  
  
In  order  to  understand  the  idea  more  clearly,  consider  the  case  of  “Beth”  suggested  by  
Mele  (2012):  
  
Beth  is  a  twelve-year-old  whose  father  died  recently.  Owing  partly  to  her  
desire  that  she  was  her  father‘s  favorite,  she  finds  it  comforting  to  attend  to  
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memories  and  photographs  that  place  her  in  the  spotlight  of  her  father‘s  
affection  and  unpleasant  to  attend  to  memories  and  photographs  that  place  a  
sibling  in  that  spotlight.  Accordingly,  she  focuses  her  attention  on  the  
former  and  is  inattentive  to  the  latter.  This  contributes  to  Beth’s  coming  to  
believe  –  falsely  –  that  she  was  her  father’s  favorite  child.  In  fact,  Beth‘s  
father  much  preferred  the  company  of  her  brothers,  a  fact  that  the  family  
photo  albums  amply  substantiate.  (p.  5)  
  
In  short,  Mele  (2001,  2012)  proposes  that  if  a  subject  has  a  desire  that  p  and  then  
acquires  a  false  belief  that  p  in  a  motivationally  biased  way ,  we  will  be  justified  to  
recognize  that  the  subject  is  deceiving  herself.   
  
Although  other  deflationists  concur  with  Mele  (2001,  2012)  on  the  rejection  of  
contradictory  beliefs,  their  explanation  of  the  data  gathered  from  the  (alleged)  cases  of  
self-deception  varies,  hence  producing  pictures  of  self-deception  that  are  quite  different  
from  Mele’s.  Both  Audi  (1982)  and  Rey  (2009),  for  example,  disagree  with  Mele’s  
answer  to  the  doxastic  question  of  self-deception.  Audi  (1982)  proposes  that  a  standard  
case  of  self-deception  should  be  described  as  follows:  
  
S  is  in  self-deception  with  respect  to  p  if  and  only  if  
(1) S  unconsciously  knows  that  not -p  (or  has  reason  to  believe,  and  
unconsciously  and  truly  believes,  not -p );  
(2) S  sincerely  avows,  or  is  disposed  to  avow  sincerely,  that  p ;  and   
(3) S  has  at  least  one  want  which  explains  in  part  both  why  the  belief  that  
not -p  is  unconscious  and  why  S  is  disposed  to  disavow  a  belief  that  not -p ,  
and  to  avow  p ,  even  when  presented  with  what  he  sees  is  evidence  against  




Using  Audi’s  (1982)  account,  the  best  way  to  explain  the  case  of  “Beth”  would  be  that  
Beth  unconsciously  knows  that  she  was  not  her  father‘s  favorite  child  (not- p ),  but  she  
is  motivated  to  avow  that  “I  was  my  father’s  favorite  child”  ( p )  because  of  a  
corresponding  want(s) .   
  
On  the  other  hand,  a  few  deflationists  come  up  with  new  ideas  on  both  the  
doxastic  question  and  the  motivational  issue  of  self-deception.  Funkhouser’s  (2005)  
second-order  belief  view,  for  example,  proposes  that  the  sketch  of  an  analysis  of  
self-deception  should  be  as  follows:   
  
An  agent  is  self-deceived  at  time  t  if  and  only  if:  
1. The  agent  at  t  possesses  sufficient  evidence  to  warrant  a  belief  that  not -p .  
2. The  agent  at  t  believes  that  not -p .  
3. However,  the  agent  at  (and  since  sometime  before)  t  desires  to  believe  that  
p .  
4. This  desire,  by  prompting  characteristic  deceptive  strategies,  causes  the  
agent  to  believe,  at  t ,  that  she  believes  that  p .  
5. The  agent  at  t  does  not  believe  that  she  believes  that  not -p .  (p.  308-309)  
  
Based  on  Funkhouser’s  (2005)  view,  in  the  case  of  “Beth,”  apart  from  holding  the  
evidence-warranted  belief  that  she  was  not  her  father‘s  favorite  child  (not- p ),  Beth  also  
acquires  a  false  second-order  belief  concerning  p ,  namely  the  belief  that  “I  believe  that  
I  was  my  father’s  favorite  child,”  because  of  a  desire  to  believe  so .  The  difference  in  
Audi’s  (1982)  and  Funkhouser’s  (2005)  version  of  deflationism  is  a  typical  example  of  




1.1.2.2  Non-doxastic  approaches   
According  to  Archer  (2013),  non-doxasticism  is  a  relatively  recent  view  that  is  
“simply  assumed  for  the  sake  of  argument  that  the  self-deceived  person  does  not  
possess  both  purported  beliefs”  (p.  266).  Yet,  we  should  notice  that,  apart  from  directly  
denying  the  attribution  of  the  two  central  beliefs  to  self-deceived  subjects,  proponents  
of  non-doxasticism  can  choose  to  propose  a  more  modest  claim  that  “it  is  genuinely  
indeterminate  what  they  believe  with  respect  to  p ”  (Funkhouser,  2009  p.  15).  Although  
the  proponents  might  have  the  same  (or  at  least  similar)  opinion  on  the  doxastic  issue  
of  self-deception,  they  are  presenting  almost  incompatible  perspectives  on  the  study  of  
self-deception,  as  illustrated  by  a  comparison  of  Archer’s  (2013)  and  Funkhouser’s  
(2009)  view  in  the  following.   
  
By  limiting  the  subject  of  study  to  isolated  “paradigm”  cases  proposed  by  
herself,  Archer  (2013)  argues  that  “[there  is]  no  explanatory  need  to  attribute  the  
self-deceived  person  either  their  undesired  or  their  desired  belief”  since  we  can  appeal  
to  psychological  categories  other  than  “belief,”  such  as  suspicion  and  anxiety,  for  
explaining  self-deception  (p.  267).  Consider  the  “desperate  husband”  case  suggested  by  
Archer  (2013):   
  
[T]he  husband  begins  to  suspect  that  his  wife  may  be  having  an  affair  and,  
immediately,  his  defences  go  up.  He  strongly  desires  to  believe  that  his  wife  
is  faithful  to  him.  The  combination  of  this  desire  and  his  suspicion  explains  
why  he  begins  to  avoid  information  in  favor  of  his  feared  conclusion  and  
seek  out  evidence  against  it,  and  distort  any  evidence  he  finds.  Engaging  in  
such  biased  evidence  gathering,  he  prevents  himself  from  coming  to  hold  
his  undesired  belief  that  his  wife  is  having  an  affair.  Even  so,  there  is  
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significant  disquiet  in  his  mind  regarding  the  issue:  he  is  anxious  that  it  not  
be  the  case  that  his  wife  is  having  an  affair,  he  has  niggling  doubts  about  the  
information  he  already  has,  but  he  hopes  that  it  is  not  the  case  that  she  is  
unfaithful  to  him.  Nonetheless,  his  niggling  doubts  and  suspicions  prevent  
him  from  attaining  the  belief  that  it  is  not  the  case  that  his  wife  is  having  an  
affair.  (p.  279)  
  
Unlike  deflationists  such  as  Mele  (2001,  2012),  Archer  (2013)  agrees  with  Funkhouser  
(2005)  that  the  motivation  for  self-deception  should  be  a  desire  to  believe.  More  
importantly,  Archer  (2013)  suggests  that  different  affective  attitudes  (such  as  suspicion  
and  hope)  will  prevent  the  involved  subjects  from  attaining  both  the  contradictory  
beliefs  (which  concern  p  and  not- p ).   
  
On  the  other  hand,  Funkhouser  (2009)  targets  a  particular  type  of  self-deception  
–  “deeply  conflicted  self-deception”  –  in  which  there  is  “non-trivial  tension”  between  
one’s  actions,  responses,  or  emotions,  etc.  (p.  4).  Funkhouser  (2005)  presents  “Nicole”  
as  a  paradigm  example  of  deeply  conflicted  cases:   
  
Nicole  possesses  much  evidence  that  her  husband  Tony  is  having  an  affair  
with  her  friend  Rachel.  Nicole’s  other  friends  have  reported  to  her  that  
Tony’s  car  is  often  seen  parked  in  Rachel’s  driveway,  at  times  when  he  
claims  to  be  with  his  male  friends.  Tony  has  lost  sexual  interest  in  Nicole,  
and  other  suspicious  behavior  provides  sufficient  evidence  for  Nicole  to  be  
more  than  skeptical.  Yet  she  laughs  off  the  concerns  of  her  girlfriends,  and  
thinks  to  herself  that  Tony  is  certainly  a  faithful  husband.  (“After  all,  I  am  
still  an  intelligent,  charming,  and  attractive  woman  –  certainly  more  so  than  
Rachel!”)  Yet,  in  the  evenings  when  Tony  claims  to  be  with  his  male  
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friends,  Nicole  avoids  driving  by  Rachel’s  house  –  even  when  it  requires  
her  to  drive  out  of  her  way .  (p.  302)  
  
Funkhouser  (2009)  contends  that  conflicting  cases  like  this  manifest  the  limit  of  
the  folk-psychological  concept  of  “belief”  and  force  us  to  reconsider  how  an  account  of  
belief  should  be  developed  (p.  4).  Specifically,  Funkhouser  (2009)  suggests  that  a  
subject’s  beliefs  consist  of  their  status  with  respect  to  various  “regarding-as-true  
stances,”  which  can  be  classified  into  at  least  seven  categories,  such  as  theoretical  
reasoning,  behavior,  internal  reports,  and  emotion  (p.  6-9).  When  “all  the  plausible  
candidates  for  weighing  the  different  regarding-as-true  stances  [towards  p ]  converge  on  
the  same  result,”  we  can  easily  tell  whether  a  subject  believes  in  p  (Funkhouser,  2009,  
p.  11).  But  there  are  also  complex  cases  in  which  there  can  be  conflicting  
regarding-as-true  stances,  such  as  the  case  of  “Nicole.”  Since  no  privileged  weighting  
should  be  given  to  any  regarding-as-true  stance,  we  have  no  reason  to  think  that  a  
determinate  answer  concerning  whether  Nicole  believes  that  “Tony  is  a  faithful  
husband”  ( p )  can  be  provided  (Funkhouser,  2009,  p.  10-11).  
  
The  seemingly  contradicting  views  of  Archer  (2013)  and  Funkhouser  (2009)  is  
noteworthy  because,  while  Archer  (2013)  claims  that  we  can  perfectly  account  for  
self-deception  by  appealing  to  psychological  categories  other  than  belief,  Funkhouser  
(2009)  holds  a  negative  attitude  towards  the  power  of  folk  psychology.  However,  this  is  
not  where  their  paths  diverge,  since  Funkhouser  (2009)  aims  at  showing  the  limit  of  
“belief”  but  not  of  all  psychological  categories.  The  real  difference  between  them  lies  
in  their  consideration  of  the  role  played  by  emotions  in  our  daily  life.  Specifically,  
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Archer  (2013)  emphasizes  the  causal  role  of  different  emotions  played  in  the  
constitution  of  actions,  while  Funkhouser  (2009)  believes  that  emotions  are  only  
responses  (or  reactions)  towards  various  objects  (including  people  or  events)  (p.  8).   To  5
be  more  precise,  Funkhouser  (2009)  contends  that  emotions  should  merely  “count  as  
regarding-as-true  stances  [towards]  a  proposition”  but  not  causes  of  other  actions  (p.  
8).  In  this  sense,  Archer’s  (2013)  and  Funkhouser’s  (2009)  non-doxastic  pictures  of  
self-deception  are  contradictory.   
  
The  previous  discussion  is  just  the  tip  of  the  iceberg  in  the  sea  of  the  
unreasonably  wide  range  of  accounts  that  are  (seemingly)  incompatible  with  each  
other.  Some  philosophers,  such  as  Lynch  (2012)  and  Van  Leeuwen  (2007),  worry  that  
the  variety  of  accounts  of  self-deception  might  lead  us  to  mistakenly  discuss  
phenomena  that  are  actually  of  different  types.   Nevertheless,  as  will  be  discussed  in  6
the  following,  a  vague  consensus  on  the  initial  definition  of  self-deception  can  still  be  
reached  with  the  help  of  the  theories  of  self-deception  available  in  the  literature.   
  
1.2  Re-establishing  self-deception:  the  vague  consensus  
The  diversity  of  the  literature  brings  up  the  question  of  whether  there  is  a  
common  ground  shared  by  the  different  theories  currently  available  in  the  study  of  
self-deception.  Van  Leeuwen’s  (2007)  answer  to  this,  which  I  concur,  is  that  “there  is  
5  Funkhouser  (2009)  might  admit  that  emotions  would  be  manifested  in  reflex  reactions  such  
as  screaming  loudly  while  feeling  scared.  Hence  emotions  are  somehow  related  to  observable  
behaviors.  However,  I  assume  that  Funkhouser  (2009)  would  deny  that  emotions  can  play  a  
significant  role  in  the  deliberation  and  planning  of  actions.  
6  This  would  not  be  a  problem  if  “self-deception”  were  not  an  independent  notion.  It  is  possible  
that  the  real  phenomenon  behind  “self-deception”  could  overlap  with,  or  be  the  same  as,  the  
one  behind  another  notion.  
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lack  of  consensus  about  specific  details  of  self-deception  amid  vague  consensus  about  
some  of  its  critical  components”  in  the  literature.   
  
The  “lack  of  consensus”  has  been  illustrated  in  section  1.1.  The  “vague  
consensus,”  according  to  Van  Leeuwen  (2007),  is  that  “self-deception”  refers  to  a  real  
phenomenon  with  three  “critical  components”:   
  
There  is  fairly  general  consensus  in  the  literature  that  self-deception  exists.  
So  we  might  think  that  deny  the  phenomenon  went  out  with  the  days  of  
hard-nosed,  literalistic  ordinary  language  conceptual  analysis.  [...]  First,  it  is  
widely  agreed  that  some  motivational  attitude  is  constitutively  involved  in  
causing  self-deception;  I  shall  call  this  the  deceptive  element .  Second,  it’s  
uncontroversial  that  the  self-deceiver  has  to  have  some  sort  of  access  to  
information  that  would  justify  believing  the  doxastic  alternative.  Third,  it  
seems  agreed  that  the  product  of  self-deception  is  some  cognitive  attitude,  
where  a  cognitive  attitude  is  one  that  can  be  evaluated  as  true  or  false  –  as  
opposed  to  conative  attitudes,  like  desires.  (p.  421-422)  
  
Yet,  it  should  be  emphasized  that  Van  Leeuwen’s  (2007)  view  is  not  representative  of  
all  theorists,  nor  should  it  be  presupposed  that  most  theorists  agree  that  the  result  of  the  
self-deceiving  process  is  a  cognitive  attitude  which  has  a  truth  value.  Apart  from  Van 
Leeuwen  (2007),  Funkhouser  (2009)  also  proposes  a  preliminary  idea  of  this  “vague  
consensus”:  
  
[This]  is  widely  accepted:  self-deception  is  some  kind  of  motivated  
irrationality,  in  which  the  self-deceiver  fails  to  handle  the  evidence  
available  to  her  appropriately.  Controversy  arises  when  we  try  to  specify  the  
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nature  of  this  motivation  and  the  resulting  doxastic  state  of  successful  
self-deception.  (p.  2)  
  
However,  it  is  noteworthy  that  Funkhouse  (2009)  somehow  takes  for  granted  that  most  
theorists  admit  that  self-deception  should  produce  a  certain  doxastic  state  as  its  
product.   
  
Here,  with  both  of  these  views  in  mind,  I  propose  the  “vague  consensus”  shared  
by  (at  least)  the  large  majority  of  the  theorists  interested  in  self-deception,  which  is  also  
the  initial  theoretical  description  of  self-deception  for  the  purpose  of  the  current  study,  
to  be  as  follows:   
  
Self-deception  is  a  real  kind  of  motivated  (human)  irrationality ,  which  is  
constituted  by  the  combination  of  three  basic  elements.  These  elements  are  
“motivation,”  “access  to  information,”  and  “unwarranted  attitude.”  
  
I  am  going  to  explain  more  details  of  this  description.  But  it  should  be  noted  
that  the  present  task  is  abstracting  the  foundational  assumption  underlying  (at  least)  the  
large  majority  of  the  theories  available  in  the  literature,  and  thus  forming  a  (vague)  
consensus  as  the  basis  for  the  study.  Consequently,  I  will  avoid  emphasizing  on  one  
particular  theory  or  hastily  providing  a  detailed  analysis  of  self-deception.  
  
1.2.1  A  real  phenomenon  
Considering  the  large  number  of  theorists  working  on  self-deception,  it  is  fair  to  
say  that  there  is  at  least  a  widespread  assumption  in  the  literature  that  self-deception  is  
a  real  phenomenon.  However,  can  available  theories  really  give  support  to  such  an  
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assumption?  Instead  of  examining  the  theories  one  by  one,  we  may  directly  look  at  the  
two  main  approaches  –  the  “lexical  approach”  and  the  “empirical  approach”  –  once  
again  and  see  whether  they  could  offer  some  insights  into  the  matter.   
  
Some  philosophers  point  out  that  those  theorists  who  adopt  the  lexical  approach  
usually  end  up  suggesting  accounts  that  make  people  skeptical  about  self-deception  
(Borge,  2003;  Mele,  n.d.).  Recall  that  proponents  of  the  lexical  approach  consider  the  
self-deceiving  process  to  be  an  intentional  one  in  which  an  involved  subject  who  
believes  that  not-p  comes  to  acquire  a  belief  that  p .  Borge  (2003)  illustrates  that  this  
interpretation  of  self-deception  generates  the  paradox  of  self-deception:  
  
What  puzzles  us  in  purported  cases  of  self-deception  is  the  idea  that  the  
deceiver  and  the  deceived  are  supposed  to  be  one  and  the  same  person.  The  
very  idea  of  self-deception  prima  facie  suggests  that  self-deception  must,  at  
least  to  a  certain  degree  be  analogous  to  interpersonal  deception.  If  there  is  
not  an  intentional  or  conscious  attempt  from  some  agent  to  mislead  or  
misinform,  then  there  is  no  deception.  If  this  deception  is  not  conducted  
reflexively  by  the  agent  in  question,  then  the  deception  is  not  intrapersonal  
but  interpersonal  or  between  a  person  and  a  deceptive  environment,  and  
there  is  no  self  deceiving  itself.  The  problem  is  that  even  though  the  notion  
of  self-deception  is  part  of  our  folk  psychology,  the  folk-psychological  
notions  of  “belief,”  “deception,”  and  “self”  seem,  on  closer  inspection,  to  
rule  out  the  very  possibility  of  self-deception.  How  can  you  trick  yourself  to  
believe  something  you  do  not  believe?  Folk  psychology  seems  to  lack  the  
resources  for  explaining  what  goes  on  in  the  cases  that  we  call  
self-deception.  (p.  4)    7
7  As  Mele  (2001)  argues,  this  interpretation  also  generates  the  “static  paradox”  of  whether  it  is  
a  psychologically-possible  state  of  mind  for  someone  to  hold  contradictory  beliefs  (p.  6-7).  I  




This  concern  can  also  be  referred  to  as  the  “dynamic  paradox”  originally  suggested  by  
Mele  (2001):   
  
On  the  one  hand,  it  is  hard  to  imagine  how  one  person  can  deceive  another  
into  believing  that  p  if  the  latter  person  knows  exactly  what  the  former  is  up  
to,  and  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  trick  can  be  any  easier  when  the  
intending  deceiver  and  the  intended  victim  are  the  same  person.  On  the  
other,  deception  normally  is  facilitated  by  the  deceiver's  having  and  
intentionally  executing  a  deceptive  strategy.  If,  to  avoid  thwarting  one's  
own  efforts  at  self-deception,  one  must  not  intentionally  execute  any  
strategy  for  deceiving  oneself,  how  can  one  succeed?  The  challenge  is  to  
explain  how  self-deception  in  general  is  a  psychologically  possible  process.  
(p.  8)  
  
Borge  (2003)  notices  that  intentionalists  typically  tend  to  “give  up  the  idea  of  
the  self  as  a  fully  rational  integrated  system”  by  going  with  the  partitioned  view  of  
mind  in  order  to  solve  the  paradox  (p.  4-5).  Hence  Borge  (2003)  argues  that  those  
views  that  appear  to  take  the  lexical  interpretation  seriously  “have  the  so-called  
paradox  of  self-deception  re-emerging  at  some  other  level  of  analysis”  (p.  1).  Borge  
(2003)  takes  Davidson’s  1986  work  as  an  example,  which  suggests  that  there  are  
temporary  boundaries  for  separating  the  self  into  different  sub-units  in  the  mind,  
“mak[ing]  it  possible  for  one  sub-unit  to  sincerely  believe  that  p ,  while  causing  another  
unit  to  believe  that  contrary”  and  hence  no  dynamic  paradox  reminds  (as  cited  in  p.  
4-5).  Nonetheless,  Borge  (2003)  questions  if  the  partitioned  view  could  save  the  lexical  




But  the  self-deception  was  supposed  to  be  self-induced.  And  if  that  were  so,  
then  must  not  the  boundaries  have  been  drawn  by  a  monitoring  unit,  
whether  that  be  the  self  or  the  deceiver  sub-unit,  which  somehow  sees  that  
without  such  a  boundary  the  person  would  believe  a  contradiction?  But  then  
that  unit  must  in  turn  have  combined  the  two  contradictory  beliefs  for  it  to  
see  the  need  for  a  boundary  and  the  paradox  of  self-deception  re-emerges.  
Now  what  if  there  is  “always  already”  a  boundary  that  can  be  exploited?  If  
“exploited”  means  that  the  deceiver  sub-unit  purposefully  exploits  the  
already  existing  boundary,  then,  again,  that  unit  must  combine  the  two  
contradictory  beliefs  in  order  to  see  that  it  needs  to  take  advantage  of  an  
already  existing  boundary  to  reach  its  goals.  If  “exploits”  merely  means  that  
there  is  a  cognitive  process  leading  up  to  the  two  contradictory  beliefs  and  
that  process  could  not  have  been  possible  without  the  boundary,  then  there  
is  deception  taking  place  but  no  deceiver.  (p.  5)  
  
Since  the  intentional  model  of  self-deception  offered  by  the  lexical  approach  (in  a  strict  
sense)  seems  to  be  paradoxical  and  thus  suggests  an  impossible  phenomenon,  Borge  
(2003)  concludes  that  intentionalism  eventually  gives  support  to  the  claim  that  “there  is  
no  such  thing  as  self-deception”  (p.  1).    8
  
On  the  other  hand,  Mele-type  theories,  that  is,  those  based  mainly  on  the  
empirical  approach,  can  easily  bypass  the  issue  of  whether  self-deception  is  a  real  
phenomenon,  because  “Mele’s  methodology  takes  the  legitimacy  of  people’s  
customary  use  of  ‘self-deception’  for  granted  and  just  asks  what  goes  on  in  the  cases  so  
8  However,  intentionalists  might  also  investigate  the  lexical  definition  of  self-deception  with  
“little  relevance  to  our  understanding  [of]  ordinary  self-deception,  just  as  the  lexical  analysis  of  
self-teaching  has  little  relevance  for  our  understanding  of  ordinary  self-teaching”  (Lynch,  2009,  
p.  131).  The  invisible  hand  account  of  self-deception  proposed  by  Galeotti  (2012)  and  the  
agentive  non-intentionalist  theory  suggested  by  Lynch  (2017)  are  examples  of  such  a  way  of  
investigation.   
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referred  to”  (Lynch,  2009,  p.  129).  Consequently,  supporters  of  the  empirical  approach  
could  safely  assume  the  existence  of  self-deception,  since  the  term  would  not  be  an  
empty  one  as  long  as  people  are  using  it  in  their  daily  life.   
  
1.2.2  A  motivated  (human)  irrationality   
In  saying  that  self-deception  is  a  motivated  (human)  irrationality,  the  focus  
should  be  placed  on  the  keywords  “being  motivated”  and  “irrationality.”  The  idea  of  
“being  motivated,”  if  taken  literally,  means  “being  caused  by  a  reason(s).”  Owing  to  
this  interpretation,  “motivation”  should  be  closely  related  to  this  feature  since  it  is  
referred  to  as  “a  reason  for  behaving  in  a  certain  way.”  More  details  of  the  idea  of 
“motivation”  will  be  presented  in  the  next  section.  “Irrationality,”  when  associated  with  
human  behavior,  is  normally  referred  to  as  “the  quality  of  being  unreasonable  or  
lacking  sound  reasoning”  or  “the  fact  that  something  is  influenced  or  caused  by  an  
action  or  thought  that  is  unreasonable.”   Recall  the  introduction,  in  which  the  initial  9
idea  of  “what  it  is  to  be  rational”  was  presented.  It  is  easy  to  see  the  idea  of  “being  
unreasonable”  is  usually  defined  in  an  evidentialist  way.  The  question,  then,  arises:  do  
the  theorists  of  self-deception  think  about  the  idea  of  “being  rational/irrational”  in  this  
way?   10
  
9  Certain  kinds  of  cognitive  processes  or  mental  functions,  such  as  reasoning  and  formation  of  
belief/knowledge,  are  supposed  to  be  involved  in  the  phenomenon  of  “irrationality,”  since  it  is  
nonsensical  to  blame  someone  (or  something)  without  any  mental  ability  for  being  irrational.  
10  Note  that  considering  that  the  idea  of  “irrationality”  which  is  specifically  referred  to  in  the  
“vague  consensus”  is  constituted  by  the  combination  of  three  basic  elements  as  previously  
mentioned,  therefore,  this  combination  has  to  reflect  a  certain  kind  of  irrational  nature.  The  
details  of  the  basic  elements  will  be  discussed  in  the  coming  sections.   
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It  will  be  demonstrated  in  the  following  that  theorists  who  study  the  
phenomenon  of  self-deception  concur  with  the  initial  idea  of  “being  rational”  that  has  
been  mentioned  earlier.  I  have  briefly  explained  this  initial  idea,  yet  an  elaboration  of  it  
might  be  quite  useful.  The  initial  idea  of  “being  rational”  is  an  evidentialist  one.  In  the  
eyes  of  ordinary  people,  being  rational  requires  deliberating  and  taking  actions  
(including  thinking,  decision  making,  talking,  acquiring  beliefs  or  knowledge,  etc.)  in  a  
way  that  agrees  with  or  is  based  on  the  truth  (at  least  in  a  rough  sense).  Regarding  the  
idea  of  “truth,”  people  usually  assume  that  something  (such  as  a  hypothesis,  a  
proposition,  and  a  belief)  could  be  taken  as  true  if  it  is  in  accordance  with  (or  is  
grounded  in)  logic  or  an  adequate  reason(s) .  The  notion  of  logic  is  generally  accepted  
to  be  “the  principles  of  valid  inference”  or  “the  methods  of  human  thought”  by  both 
laymen  and  theorists.  On  the  other  hand,  “evidence”  could  serve  as  “adequate  reason”  
under  ordinary  circumstances  for  many  people.  For  example,  to  see  whether  the  given  
hypothesis  “it  rained”  ( h )  is  true,  you  would  look  outside  the  window  and  see  if  the  
ground  is  wet.  In  this  case,  wet  ground  is  the  evidence  for  h .  Consequently,  to  be  
rational  is  (at  least)  to  deliberate  and  take  actions  in  a  way  that  follows,  or  is  based  on,  
what  the  evidence  supports.    11
  
11  “Evidence”  is  normally  considered  as  consisting  of  observable  entities  or  events,  beliefs,  
memories,  etc.  For  example,  I  observed  a  man  with  long  hair  taking  things  without  paying  for  
them  ( e 1 ).  Then  e 1   is  the  evidence  for  “this  man  with  long  hair  is  a  thief”  ( h ).  Let  us  say  I  take  
e 1   to  be  true  and  thus  hold  a  belief  that  h .  A  few  days  later  when  I  saw  the  man  with  long  hair  
being  arrested  by  the  police  ( e 2 ),  I  thought  to  myself  “he  is  arrested  probably  because  of  
stealing!”  In  this  situation,  my  guess  is  grounded  in  my  belief  that  h  (or  the  memory  that  “I  
observed  a  man  with  long  hair  taking  things  without  paying  for  them”)  and  e 2 .  Some  
philosophers,  such  as  Williamson  (2002,  p.  194-200),  refuse  to  take  “evidence”  as  being  
composed  of  (perceptual)  experiences,  and  wonder  if  we  need  evidence  for  “evidence.”  See  
Williamson  (2002)  for  further  discussion  on  questions  like  “what  should  count  as  ‘evidence’”  
and  “what  is  the  evidence  for  ‘evidence.’”  But  these  are  out  of  the  scope  for  this  study,  and  will 
be  adopted  an  intuitive  interpretation.   
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Many  philosophers  share  this  intuitive  perspective  on  the  relations  between  
“rationality,”  “believing  something  to  be  true,”  and  “evidence.”  For  example,  in  
epistemology,  there  are  evidentialists,  such  as  Feldman  and  Conee  (2004),  who  state  
that  “the  epistemic  justification  of  a  belief  is  determined  by  the  quality  of  the  believer's  
evidence  for  the  belief”  (p.  84).  More  precisely:   
  
Doxastic  attitude  D  toward  proposition  p  is  epistemically  justified  for  S  at  t  
if  and  only  if  having  D  toward  p  fits  the  evidence  S  has  at  t .  (p.  84)  
  
Some  theorists,  like  Kelly  (2002),  directly  point  out  that  the  rationality  of  our  
belief-forming  activities  is  determined  by  whether  they  are  grounded  in  the  evidence  
we  possess:  
  
Our  paradigm  of  an  irrational  belief  is  not  that  of  a  belief  which  predictably  
leads  to  the  frustration  of  the  believer’s  goals,  but  rather  that  of  a  belief  
which  is  held  in  the  face  of  strong  disconfirming  evidence.  An  athlete  who  
has  an  overwhelming  amount  of  evidence  that  she  is  unlikely  to  do  well,  
and  bases  her  belief  that  she  is  unlikely  to  do  well  on  that  evidence,  would  
seem  to  qualify  as  a  rational  believer  –  even  if  her  rational  belief  frustrates,  
in  foreseeable  and  predictable  ways,  her  goal  of  doing  well.  (p.  165)  
  
Even  though  the  findings  of  the  various  theories  of  self-deception  differ  
markedly  (as  discussed  in  section  1.1),  almost  all  of  them  express  an  evidentialist  view  
of  rationality  as  they  emphasize  that  self-deception  is  a  kind  of  irrationality  because  the  
involved  subjects  do  not  act  in  accordance  with,  or  based  on,  what  the  available  
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evidence  supports.   For  example,  Davidson  (2004),  a  proponent  of  intentionalism,  12
claims:   
  
The  irrationality  of  the  resulting  state  consists  in  the  fact  that  it  contains  
inconsistent  beliefs;  the  irrational  step  is  therefore  the  step  that  makes  this  
possible,  the  drawing  of  the  boundary  that  keeps  the  inconsistent  beliefs  
apart.  (p.  211)  
  
Accordingly,  in  the  intentionalist  model  of  self-deception,  this  phenomenon  is  
irrational  because  the  involved  subjects  intentionally  make  it  possible  that  they  can  
believe  in  a  false  (or  at  least  unwarranted)  proposition  ( p ).  Given  that  the  evidence  they  
possess  is  already  enough  for  them  to  obtain  a  belief  that  not- p  (namely  the  true  or  at  
least  evidence-warranted  proposition),  they  should  have  a  strong  epistemic  reason  not 
to  do  so.   
  
Likewise,  non-intentionalists  also  draw  special  attention  to  the  irrationality  of  
self-deception  by  emphasizing  specific  actions  of  the  involved  subjects  that  are  not  
taken  in  an  evidentialist  way.  We  might  take  Archer’s  (2013)  non-doxastic  view  as  an  
example:   
  
[T]he  nondoxasticist  can  readily  explain  the  irrationality  involved  in  
self-deception  without  appealing  to  either  belief:  self-deception  is  
(epistemically)  irrational  simply  insofar  as  it  involves  biased  evidence  
gathering,  and,  in  some  cases,  a  failure  to  believe  what  the  evidence  one  
possesses  supports.  (p.  280)  
  
12  “Being  available”  means  “being  available  to  the  subject  involved  in  self-deception”  but  not  
“being  available  to  the  impartial  observers.”  
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Archer  (2013)  views  self-deception  as  irrational  because  the  evidence-gathering  
involved  in  it  is  taken  forward  in  an  anti-evidentialist  way  from  the  very  beginning.  
That  is  to  say,  self-deceived  subjects  try  to  acquire  knowledge  by  distorting  the  
available  evidence  instead  of  referring  to  what  the  evidence  naturally  implies.  In  
addition,  Archer  (2013)  mentions  that  there  might  be  cases  of  self-deception  in  which  
the  subjects  possess  enough  evidence  for  deducing  that  not-p ,  but  somehow  fail  to  
acquire  a  belief  that  not-p  (p.  280).  In  these  cases,  since  the  given  disbelief  is  not  
(epistemically)  justified  by  the  available  evidence,  it  is  fair  to  say  the  involved  subjects  
act  contrary  to  what  the  available  evidence  suggests,  and  thus,  are  irrational.   
  
In  short,  there  is  a  general  agreement  in  the  literature  of  self-deception,  namely,  
this  phenomenon  is  assumed  to  be  epistemically  irrational.  The  reasons  provided  by  the  
literature  are  also  consistent  with  our  intuitive  idea  of  being  irrational,  as  well  as  the  
philosophical  criteria  of  epistemic  irrationality  that  have  been  suggested  elsewhere.   
  
1.2.3  The  motivation-element  
As  mentioned  in  the  previous  section,  the  term  “motivation”  could  be  
understood  as  “a  reason  for  behaving  in  a  specific  way.”  If  self-deception  is  assumed  to  
be  a  kind  of  motivated  irrationality,  it  would  imply  that  there  is  a  motivation(s)  for  this  
phenomenon,  which  serves  to  reveal  the  irrational  nature  of  it.  For  this  purpose,  the  
“motivation”  for  self-deception,  herein  termed  the  “motivation-element,”  could  not  be  




To  this  end,  it  is  useful  to  first  discuss  whether  any  behavior  caused  by  a  
motivation(s)  must  be  (epistemically)  irrational.  In  reality,  a  large  majority  of  human  
behaviors  are  considered  to  be  motivated,  including  those  that  are  generally  regarded  as  
examples  of  human  rationality,  such  as  logical  reasoning  and  formations  of  
(epistemically  rational)  belief.  For  example,  there  are  quite  a  few  philosophers  who  
propose  that  “(epistemically  rational)  beliefs”  actually  aim  at  the  truth  (Owens,  2003;  
Pedrini,  2012;  Wedgwood,  2002).  This  truth-oriented  nature  of  “believing  (rationally)”  
(or  “formations  of  (epistemically  rational)  belief”)  suggests  that  this  type  of  human  
rationality  can  also  count  as  a  kind  of  motivated  behavior,  and  the  motivation  for  it  
would  be  an  aim  of  representing  the  truth.   Given  this,  it  is  evident  that  the  13
motivation-element  without  any  specification  could  fail  to  highlight  the  irrational  
nature  of  self-deception.   
  
The  simplest  way  to  solve  the  motivational  issue  would  be  to  differentiate  
between  motivations  on  the  basis  of  being  (epistemically)  rational  or  not,  though  this  
would  demand  a  meaning  for  a  motivation  to  be  rational.  The  literature  reveals  that  
13  Some  philosophers  argue  that  there  are  beliefs,  such  as  religious  beliefs,  that  are  not  
intrinsically  aimed  at  truly  representing  what  the  “world”  is.  For  example,  Noordhof  (2009)  
writes:  
[T]here  are  those  who  self-consciously  take  their  belief  in  God  to  involve  a  leap  in  
faith  not  supported  by  the  evidence.  They  may  also  appreciate  that  their  belief  in  
God  stems  from  the  way  their  motivational  states  influence  their  belief-forming  
processes.  They  are  happy  to  recognize  this  because  fundamentally  they  approve  
of  their  belief  in  God.  It  seems  to  them  psychologically  and  spiritually  the  right  
thing  to  believe.  Indeed,  the  possibility  of  treating  the  evidence  relating  to  God's  
existence  as  just  evidence  to  be  assessed  in  disinterested  terms  seems  to  fail  to  
capture  the  importance  of  this  belief  for  them.  (p.  60-61)  
Although  there  are  philosophers  who  doubt  whether  we  can  believe  in  God  (Rey,  2009),  let  us  
assume  that  religious  “beliefs”  are  indeed  beliefs.  Yet,  we  should  notice  that  even  though  
(epistemically  rational)  beliefs  should  aim  at  the  truth,  this  “aiming-at-the-truth”  needs  not  be  a  
necessary  constituent  of  all  kinds  of  “belief.”  The  presence  of  the  “aiming-at-the-truth”  might  




theorists  who  are  interested  in  self-deception  typically  consider  the  motivational  issue  
by  adopting  an  evidentialist  approach,  which  is  unsurprisingly  consistent  with  how  
they  see  the  irrationality  of  self-deception  as  a  whole  (as  discussed  in  section  1.2.2).  
Despite  the  disagreement  on  the  precise  content  of  this  “motivation,”  they  consider  the  
motivation-element  to  be  a  certain  agential  or  subjective  reason(s)  that  consists  of  
motivational  attitude(s),  such  as  desire  (Archer,  2013;  Davidson,  2004b;  Funkhouser,  
2005;  Galeotti,  2012;  Mele,  2001;  Nelkin,  2002;  Pedrini,  2012).  I  will  discuss  more  on  
this  in  section  2.2.  
  
Nevertheless,  it  is  imperative  to  note  that  the  presence  of  this  
motivation-element  is  only  a  necessary  but  not  sufficient  condition  for  counting  a  
certain  case  as  an  example  of  (successful)  self-deception.  Consider  a  case  in  which  a  
subject  has  a  subjective  reason  for  believing  in  a  false  proposition  that  p ,  yet  she  
simply,  or  perhaps  reluctantly,  acknowledges  that  not- p .  If  we  do  not  stress  the  
importance  of  the  other  two  elements,  this  given  subject  will  also  count  as  engaging  in  
an  irrational  phenomenon.  Since  one  needs  not  necessarily  engage  in  self-deception  
because  of  one’s  want,  the  “motivation-element”  should  not  be  considered  as  the  only 
decisive  feature  of  self-deception.  
  
1.2.4  The  access-to-information-element  
As  mentioned  in  section  1.2.2,  theorists  take  an  evidentialist  approach  in  
dealing  with  the  issue  of  “irrationality”  and  assume  that  self-deception  is  irrational,  
because  those  involved  subjects  fail  to  behave  in  a  way  that  is  consistent  with,  or  based  
on,  what  the  available  evidence  implies.  Let  p  stands  for  the  proposition  that  the  
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ongoing  self-deception  is  about.  Such  an  assumption  requires  us  to  admit  that  those  
involved  subjects  must  have  access  to  information  about  whether  p  or  not- p ,  or  we  just  
set  up  an  unfair  situation,  where  the  subjects  cannot  behave  in  an  evidentialist  way 
from  the  very  beginning.  I  propose  to  name  this  feature  as  the  
“access-to-information-element.”  
  
Similar  to  the  motivation-element,  certain  restrictions  are  required  on  the  
specification  of  this  access-to-information-element  for  the  irrationality  of 
self-deception  to  be  revealed.  For  this  purpose,  theorists  typically  try  to  specify  the  
nature  of  the  “information”  (namely  the  available  evidence)  and  that  of  “access,”  
respectively.   
  
Theorists  agree  that  the  available  evidence  should  not  provide  greater  warrant  
for  p  than  for  not- p ,  otherwise  one  has  no  reason  at  all  to  engage  in  self-deception  with  
respect  to  p .  Thus,  there  are  two  possibilities  concerning  the  nature  of  this  available  
“evidence”:  either  it  provides  greater  warrant  for  not- p  than  for  p  or  it  is  ambiguous  
(that  is,  the  evidence  in  favor  of  p  is  neither  greater  nor  weaker  than  the  evidence  in  
favor  of  not- p ).  Given  that  intentionalists  contend  that  self-deceived  subjects  should  
hold  contradictory  beliefs,  they  are  required  to  choose  the  first  option.  After  all,  if  the  
available  evidence  can  be  ambiguous,  it  will  be  incomprehensible  why  self-deceived  
subjects  hold  a  belief  that  not- p  (while  a  belief  that  p  is  generated  through  the  
self-deceiving  process).  On  the  other  hand,  not  all  non-intentionalists  think  that  
self-deceived  subjects  must  hold  a  belief  that  not- p ,  but  most  of  them  also  take  the  first  




As  for  the  nature  of  such  access,  the  large  majority  of  theorists  propose  that  it  
should  be  internal  access  in  the  sense  that  it  has  to  be  represented  by  the  attribution  of  a  
certain  attitude(s)  in  one’s  mind.  Since  theorists  insist  that  the  available  evidence  must  
not  overall  support  p ,  most  of  them  agree  that  self-deceived  subjects  should  have  a 
particular  attitude(s)  that  can  reveal  some  appraisal  of  this  situation,  despite  different  
views  on  whether  they  are  conscious  of  this  attitude(s).  The  minority,  like  Mele  (2001)  
and  Nelkin  (2002),  claims  that  this  access  is  merely  an  existing  method  or  opportunity  
of  figuring  out  the  natural  implication  of  the  available  evidence.  In  view  of  this  
disagreement,  I  prefer  not  to  hastily  assume  that  such  access  must  be  encoded  in  one’s  
conscious  mind  for  the  time  being.  I  will  discuss  whether  a  conscious  appraisal  is  
required  in  the  model  of  self-deception  in  section  2.3.1.   
  
It  should  be  noted  that,  despite  the  above-mentioned  restriction  on  the  
access-to-information-element,  merely  having  such  access  would  not  make  things  
irrational.  As  with  the  motivation-element,  having  such  access  is  only  a  prerequisite,  
but  not  the  only  crucial  condition,  for  engaging  in  an  epistemically  irrational  cognition.   
  
1.2.5  The  unwarranted-attitude-element  
Recall  there  are  three  elements  constituting  the  irrationality  of  self-deception,  as  
mentioned  in  section  1.2.  Apart  from  the  two  elements  mentioned  in  the  previous  
paragraphs,  theorists  also  reach  a  consensus  that  an  unwarranted  attitude(s)  towards  p  
is  necessarily  involved  in  self-deception  while  the  acquisition  or  maintenance  of  which 
is  grounded  in,  or  at  least  related  to,  the  cognitive  process  involved  in  the  phenomenon.  
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For  this  study,  I  will  refer  to  this  feature  the  “unwarranted-attitude-element,”  and  I  will  
also  call  it  the  “necessary  attitude(s)”  when  I  consider  that  unwarranted  attitude(s)  
towards  p  in  particular,  though  it  has  also  been  termed  the  product  of  self-deception  by  
some  theorists  (like  Van  Leeuwen  (2007)).  And,  the  cognitive  process  involved  in  
self-deception  will  be  termed  the  “self-deceiving  process.”  
  
In  the  lexical/intentionalist  model,  one  cannot  be  considered  to  have  
successfully  self-deceived  until  there  is  an  acquisition  of  an  unwarranted  belief  that  p  
(namely  the  necessary  attitude),  which  is  generated  through  the  self-deceiving  process.  
From  the  non-intentionalists’  viewpoint,  a  reason  for  adopting  the  idea  of  the  
“unwarranted-attitude-element”  is  that  there  is  a  need  to  attribute  an  unwarranted  belief  
that  p  to  self-deceived  subjects  for  explaining  their  behavior  (Mele,  2001,  2012).  
However,  as  discussed  in  section  1.1,  some  non-intentionalists  think  that  the  necessary  
attitude(s)  should  not  be  considered  as  a  doxastic  one.  For  example,  while  Audi  (1982)  
claims  that  we  can  explain  one’s  behavior,  which  seemingly  suggests  a  belief  that  p ,  by  
the  attribution  of  a  disposition  to  avow  that  p ,  Archer  (2013)  contends  that,  other  than  
beliefs,  different  kinds  of  psychological  attitudes  can  also  serve  the  explanatory  need.  
Further  details  will  be  mentioned  in  section  2.4.   14
  
Nevertheless,  we  need  to  note  that  even  if  one  obtains  such  an  unwarranted  
attitude(s)  towards  p  because  of  a  particular  cognitive  process,  we  cannot  be  sure  that  
one  engages  in  a  process  of  irrational  cognition.  Suppose  you  wonder  whether  p  or  
14  Some  might  wonder  if  a  disposition  to  avow  and  psychological  attitudes  other  than  beliefs  
could  serve  as  the  necessary  attitudes  involved  in  self-deception,  as  their  acquisitions  or  
maintenances  do  not  seem  to  necessarily  depend  on  the  occurrence  of  the  self-deceiving  
process.  I  will  talk  about  this  issue  in  section  2.4.1  and  section  2.4.2.  
31  
  
not-p ,  and  an  expert  tells  you  “ p .”  Since  you  think  the  expert  should  be  reliable,  you  
come  to  believe  that  p .  Unfortunately,  the  expert  is  wrong,  and  thus,  you  caused  
yourself  to  believe  a  false  proposition.  However,  you  did  not  mean  to  mislead  yourself,  
as  your  false  belief  that  p  is  properly  grounded  in  the  evidence  you  possess.  As  such,  
you  did  not  engage  in  a  certain  kind  of  irrationality  –  you  merely  made  a  mistake.  As  
with  the  previous  two  elements,  although  the  “unwarranted-attitude-element”  should  be 
treated  as  one  that  plays  a  decisive  role  in  the  constitution  of  the  irrationality  of  
self-deception,  this  element  on  its  own  is  not  enough  to  address  the  irrational  issue.   
  
1.3  Bringing  about  the  distinction  problem  
As  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  despite  the  importance  of  investigating  the  
difference(s)  between  self-deception  and  other  kinds  of  irrationality,  herein  termed  the  
distinction  problem ,  this  issue  has  mostly  been  left  out  of  the  literature.   Now,  with  15
the  “vague  consensus”  on  the  initial  definition  of  self-deception  in  mind,  we  can  
consider  whether  it  is  enough  to  draw  the  boundary  of  “self-deception”  by  referring  to  
such  an  interpretation  only.  To  this  end,  it  is  imperative  to  ensure  any  theory  or  case  
that  fits  the  requirements  posed  by  the  “vague  consensus”  would  not  lead  us  to  mistake  
another  phenomenon  for  self-deception.  However,  the  worry  is  that  sometimes  it  might  
not  be  that  easy  to  rule  out  some  cases  that  are  (pre-theoretically  or  theoretically)  
considered  to  be  examples  of  other  kinds  of  irrationality  (especially  those  of  wishful  
thinking)  by  merely  referring  to  the  “vague  consensus.”   
  
15  Philosophers  often  try  to  dismiss  hostile  views  by  judging  whether  they  miss  the  target  
phenomenon.  The  same  thing  also  happens  in  the  literature  of  self-deception.  But  theorists  
usually  tend  not  to  treat  the  distinction  problem  as  an  independent  issue.   
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To  illustrate  the  idea,  let  us  first  consider  the  case  of  “Beth”  once  more.  Recall  
that  Beth  comes  to  believe  that  she  was  her  father‘s  favorite  child  ( p )  because  of  a  
certain  desire,  although  the  evidence  she  possesses  should  suggest  otherwise  (not- p ).  
Since  the  case  of  “Beth”  meets  all  of  the  criteria  posed  by  the  “vague  consensus,”  it  can  
be  concluded  that  Beth  has  probably  deceived  herself.   
  
Similar  cases  can  be  found  in  various  philosophical  debates.  One  of  these  is  the  
case  of  “one-sided  love”  suggested  by  Szabados  (1973):   
  
Suppose  that  a  young  man  is  passionately  in  love  with  Miss  X.  He,  
naturally  enough,  yearns  to  be  loved  in  return.  She  smiles  at  him  on  
occasion,  chats  about  the  topics  in  the  course  they  both  attend  and  even  
invites  him  (among  many  others)  to  tea  and  cookies.  He  jumps  to  the  
conclusion  that  his  love  for  her  is  being  reciprocated.  In  spite  of  moments  
of  gloom  involving  thoughts  of  unrequited  love,  he  is,  he  tells  his  friend,  
convinced  that  she  loves  him  too.  (p.  203)  
  
The  young  man  is  motivated  by  his  desire  and  comes  to  a  far-fetched  conclusion  that  
Miss  X  loves  him  ( p )  while  impartial  observers  should  find  that  Miss  X  just  treats  him  
the  same  way  as  she  treats  others.  Has  this  young  man  “deceived”  himself?  This  
question  cannot  be  easily  answered.  We  can  tell  that  the  young  man  is  motivated  to  
engage  in  an  irrational  cognition,  and  hence,  acquires  the  unwarranted  belief  that  p  
despite  a  lack  of  supporting  evidence.  Admittedly,  since  the  available  evidence  does  
not  suggest  that  Miss  X  hates  the  young  man,  we  do  not  have  to  admit  that  the  young  
man  possesses  conclusive  evidence  for  concluding  that  not- p .  Nevertheless,  there  is  no  
reason  to  think  that  the  access-to-information-element  necessarily  entails  such  a  strict  
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requirement  on  the  nature  of  the  available  evidence.   Thus,  the  only  explicit  difference  16
between  Beth  and  the  young  man  is  that  Beth’s  unpleasant  feelings  show  signs  that  she  
is  likely  to  be  aware  that  the  evidence  she  has  probably  provides  greater  warrant  for  
not- p  than  for  p .   Then  again,  the  “vague  consensus”  does  not  require  that  17
self-deceived  subjects  must  somehow  be  aware  of  such  a  situation.  Based  on  the  
criteria  posed  by  the  “vague  consensus,”  this  case,  like  “Beth,”  could  also  be  
considered  as  an  example  of  self-deception  in  some  sense.  In  reality,  though,  Szabados  
(1973)  categorizes  the  case  of  “one-sided  love”  as  an  instance  of  wishful  thinking.  This  
prompts  us  to  ponder  whether  the  “vague  consensus”  needs  to  be  further  refined.  
  
Here  we  shall  briefly  look  at  what  the  definition  of  wishful  thinking  is  in  order  
to  set  the  tone  for  this  study.  As  opposed  to  self-deception,  defining  wishful  thinking  is  
a  much  less  controversial  issue  in  philosophical  debates,  since  most  philosophers  
accept  that  we  could  explain  it  by  referring  to  its  psychological  definition.  In  
psychology,  wishful  thinking  is  to  form  a  belief  in  accordance  with  what  one  desires  or  
wishes  to  be  true  instead  of  the  evidence  (Bastardi,  Uhlmann,  &  Ross,  2011,  p.  731;  
VandenBos  &  American  Psychological  Association,  2015,  p.  1159).  Accordingly,  
philosophers  usually  take  wishful  thinking  to  be  a  kind  of  motivated  irrationality  in  
16  Although  the  available  evidence  is  typically  supposed  to  provide  greater  warrant  for  not- p  
than  for  p  in  self-deception,  we  do  not  have  to  require  that  it  has  to  be  conclusive.  Given  that  
sometimes  it  is  hard  to  decide  whether  the  evidence  is  just  ambiguous  in  certain  cases,  it  is  
difficult  to  distinguish  whether  a  given  case  should  count  as  self-deception  by  looking  at  what  
evidence  the  involved  subject  possesses.  I  believe  that  the  available  evidence  in  the  case  of  
“Beth”  could  also  be  considered  as  ambiguous  in  some  sense.  Admittedly,  we  tend  to  say  the 
evidence  possessed  by  Beth  is  probably  not  that  ambiguous,  or  she  would  not  have  such  
unpleasant  feelings  while  appraising  it.  
17  The  young  man  may  sometimes  be  worried  whether  his  love  is  unrequited.  Yet,  there  is  no  
sign  that  such  feelings  are  causally  related  to  the  evidence  he  possesses.  Since  it  is  quite  natural  
for  people  to  have  such  feelings  when  they  care  about  the  issue  at  hand,  this  needs  not  be  
evidence  that  the  young  man  is  aware  of  any  definite  contrary  evidence.  
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which  an  involved  subject  acquires  a  belief  that  p  because  of  a  desire  or  wish  that  p .  
For  instance,  Davidson  (2004b)  writes:   
  
A  minimal  account  of  wishful  thinking  makes  it  a  case  of  believing  
something  because  one  wishes  it  were  true.  [...]  [W]ishful  thinking  is  often  
irrational,  for  example  if  we  know  why  we  have  the  belief  and  that  we  
would  not  have  it  if  it  were  not  for  the  wish.  (p.  205)  
  
Undoubtedly,  some  might  try  to  argue  that  the  case  of  “one-sided  love”  does  
not  look  like  an  example  of  self-deception.  Yet,  I  believe  most  of  us  would  agree  that  
the  definition  of  wishful  thinking  can  be  compatible  with  the  “vague  consensus”  on  the  
initial  idea  of  “self-deception”  –  this  is  exactly  the  reason  why  theorists  often  compare  
self-deception  with  wishful  thinking  while  analyzing  self-deception.  In  view  of  such  
compatibility,  some  theorists  doubt  that  the  phenomenon  behind  “wishful  thinking”  
could  be  identical  to  the  one  behind  “self-deception.”  But  many  theorists  still  contend  
that,  despite  several  crucial  commonalities  between  the  two,  self-deception  is  a  unique  
phenomenon  different  from  wishful  thinking,  or  at  most  is  a  special  branch  of  it  
(Davidson,  2004b;  Galeotti,  2012;  Graham,  1986;  Pedrini,  2012;  Porcher,  2012;  
Scott-Kakures,  2012;  Szabados,  1973).  Consequently,  I  find  that  at  least  three  questions  
are  yet  to  be  answered  despite  the  “vague  consensus”  already  being  established:   
➢ Should  we  insist  that  self-deception  is  different  from  wishful  thinking?   
➢ If  the  answer  is  yes,  what  is  the  difference(s)  between  self-deception  and  
wishful  thinking?   
➢ Is  it  enough  to  study  the  distinction  problem  by  merely  focusing  on  the  
comparison  between  self-deception  and  wishful  thinking?   
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In  this  sense,  it  follows  that  a  further  discussion  on  the  initial  definition  of  
self-deception  is  needed  if  we  were  to  completely  resolve  the  distinction  problem.   
  
In  the  following  discussion,  I  will  assume  that  there  is  a  distinctive  feature(s)  
which  makes  self-deception  independent  of  other  kinds  of  motivated  irrationality,  
especially  wishful  thinking,  and  then  investigate  whether  this  assumption  would  lead  to  
absurdity  or  contradiction.  As  mentioned  earlier,  most  theorists  tend  to  directly  work  
on  a  detailed  analysis  of  self-deception  without  characterizing  its  distinctive  feature(s),  
yet  many  proposals  for  how  to  further  specify  the  definition  of  self-deception  can  still  
be  found  in  the  current  discussion  (although  most  of  they  are  not  aimed  at  solving  the  
distinction  problem  initially).   
  
Before  we  start  examining  the  proposals,  concise  clarification  of  the  study  of  
the  distinction  problem  will  be  useful.  First,  some  might  argue  that  the  mentioned  
assumption  could  be  problematic  because  it  might  eventually  force  us  to  jump  to  a  
conclusion  that  there  must  be  strict  boundaries  between  self-deception  and  other  nearby  
phenomena  without  giving  a  solid  justification.  However,  having  an  assumption  does  
not  necessarily  mean  we  are  trying  to  prove  that  it  is  true.  Rather,  the  plan  here  is  to  
determine  whether  the  conclusion  reached  from  the  assumption  would  contradict  the  
assumption  itself.   
  
Second,  there  might  also  be  a  concern  about  setting  an  unnecessary  
restriction(s)  on  the  diversity  of  “self-deception”  by  specifying  the  distinctive  
feature(s)  of  it.  Many  philosophers  emphasize  that  self-deception  comes  in  so  many  
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varieties  that  they  need  to  be  divided  into  at  least  two  main  types:  “straight”  and  
“twisted”  (Funkhouser,  2005,  p.  397;  Galeotti,  2016,  p.  91;  Mele,  2001,  p.  4;  Nelkin,  
2002,  p.  393).  Funkhouser  (2005)  even  proposes  that  there  should  be  at  least  one  more  
type  of  self-deception,  namely,  “indifferent  self-deception”  or  “apathetic  
self-deception”  (p.  298).  Nevertheless,  recall  that  the  distinction  problem  is  crucial  for  
philosophers  who  are  interested  in  self-deception,  and  this  problem  can  not  be  solved  
without  further  restricting  the  scope  of  “self-deception.”  In  this  sense,  what  we  need  to  
worry  about  is  not  whether  the  specification  of  the  distinctive  feature(s)  of  
self-deception  is  necessary,  but  how  not  to  include  unnecessary  things  in  this  
specification.  A  method  to  achieve  this  would  be  to  ensure  enough  generality  to  
capture  the  diversity  of  self-deception  with  this  principle:  the  study  of  the  distinction  
problem  must  not  be  limited  to  any  particular  type  or  isolated  case  of  “self-deception.” 
  Hence  in  the  discussion  that  follows,  I  will  not  exclude  any  alleged  case  of  18
self-deception  that  meets  the  requirements  suggested  by  the  “vague  consensus,”  unless  
there  is  a  good  reason  for  doing  so.    
18  Quite  a  few  philosophers  only  focus  on  a  particular  set  of  alleged  “paradigm”  cases  while  
studying  “self-deception.”  For  example,  Archer  (2013)  suggests:  
[T]here  is  so  much  disparity  in  cases  of  self-deception  that  a  unified  account  of  
the  phenomenon  may  be  difficult  to  provide.  Does  this  mean  that  we  are  forced  to  
admit  that  we  can  only  pass  comment  on  a  case-by-case  basis?  I  do  not  think  it  
does.  Rather,  my  strategy  will  be  to  isolate  ‘paradigm’  cases  of  the  phenomenon  





CHAPTER  II  -  EXAMINING  RECENT  SOLUTIONS  TO  THE  DISTINCTION  
PROBLEM  
2.1  The  current  solutions  to  the  distinction  problem  
The  essential  task  of  the  investigation  into  self-deception  is  nothing  else  than  
establishing  its  boundary.  As  mentioned  previously,  there  are  significant  commonalities  
shared  by  the  large  majority  of  views  on  self-deception,  and  thus  a  hypothesis  for  the  
initial  definition  of  “self-deception”  exists,  namely  the  “vague  consensus.”  If  we  accept  
this  initial  definition  of  self-deception  as  the  starting  point  for  our  study,  our  next  step  
will  be  to  decide  whether  it  can  accomplish  the  essential  task.  By  comparing  alleged  
cases  of  self-deception  and  alleged  cases  of  wishful  thinking,  we  can  see  that  the  
“vague  consensus”  might  fail  to  provide  an  obvious  reason  why  we  should  separate  
“self-deception”  from  “wishful  thinking.”  Therefore,  if  we  want  to  consider  
self-deception  to  be  a  unique  kind  of  irrationality,  the  distinction  problem  could  
re-emerge.  To  be  precise,  the  worry  is  that  the  “vague  consensus”  alone  might  not  be  
enough  for  ensuring  that  any  theory  or  case  that  fits  the  requirements  posed  by  it  would  
not  lead  us  to  mistake  another  phenomenon  for  self-deception.  Could  it  be  that  the  
worry  is  merely  superfluous?  Whether  the  answer  is  “yes”  or  “no,”  lines  of  
argumentation  or  justifications  are  needed  for  dispelling  the  concern.   
  
As  we  have  seen  in  section  1.2,  apart  from  being  a  real  phenomenon,  the  
phenomenon  of  self-deception  is  assumed  to  consist  of  three  elements,  which  together  
reveal  the  irrational  nature  of  it.  If  this  hypothesis  fails  to  specify  what  makes  the  
phenomenon  of  self-deception  different  from  other  nearby  phenomena,  and  hence,  
cannot  serve  as  a  satisfactory  solution  to  the  distinction  problem,  we  will  have  to  revise  
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the  hypothesis.  There  are  two  options  for  doing  this:  either  imposing  a  further  
restriction(s)  on  the  three  elements  or  proposing  that  the  framework  should  contain  a  
fourth  (or  even  more)  element.  The  main  focus  of  the  following  examination  will  be  on  
the  first  option,  as  the  current  discussion  tends  to  concern  it,  but  I  will  also  discuss  the  
second  option  in  section  2.5.   
  
As  mentioned  before,  most  current  works  on  self-deception  focus  on  working  
out  a  detailed  account  of  it,  that  is,  to  directly  describe  the  exact  content  of  different  
elements  involved  in  the  phenomenon,  without  locating  the  distinctive  feature(s)  of  
self-deception.  But,  even  so,  the  diverse  views  in  the  literature  still  (coincidentally)  
provide  us  with  a  myriad  of  choices  on  how  to  further  limit  the  scope  of  the  application  
of  “self-deception.”  In  the  upcoming  sections,  I  am  going  to  examine  different  
solutions  mentioned  in  the  literature  in  five  major  categories:  
  
○ Motivation  
○ Access  to  information  
○ An  unwarranted  attitude(s)  
○ Options  outside  the  framework  
○ The  combination  of  access  to  information  and  an  unwarranted  attitude  
  
The  discussion  will  be  conducted  with  the  assumption  that  there  is  at  least  one  
distinctive  feature  that  can  mark  the  dividing  line  between  self-deception  and  other  
types  of  motivated  irrationality,  especially  wishful  thinking.  In  case  a  solution  suggests  
a  feature  also  possessed  by  another  phenomenon  similar  to  self-deception,  I  shall  
consider  it  to  be  a  failure.  The  aim  here  is  to  heuristically  provide  a  promising  direction  
39  
  
for  solving  the  distinction  problem,  and  shed  light  on  how  to  construct  the  basic  model  
of  self-deception.   
  
2.2  Motivation  
There  are  at  least  three  representative  ways  of  characterizing  the  content  of  the  
operative  motivational  state  involved  in  the  phenomenon  of  self-deception:   19
  
(A)A  desire  that  p  (Galeotti,  2016;  Mele,  2001,  2012)  
(B) An  intention  to  deceive  oneself  that  p  (Bermúdez,  2000;  Davidson,  2004;  
Sorensen,  1985)  
(C) A  desire  to  believe  that  p  (Archer,  2013;  Funkhouser,  2005;  Nelkin,  2002)  
  
Based  on  the  lexical  formula  of  self-deception  generated  from  the  idea  of  interpersonal  
deception,  intentionalists,  such  as  Davidson  (2004b),  argue  that  the  motivation  that  
primarily  causes  the  phenomenon  of  self-deception  should  be  an  intention  to  deceive  
oneself  that  p  (where  “ p ”  stands  for  a  particular  unwarranted  proposition  that  the  
self-deception  is  about).  On  the  other  hand,  non-intentionalists,  who  refuse  to  accept  
the  intentional  picture,  propose  that  a  certain  kind  of  desire  would  be  sufficient  for  
playing  the  role.  On  non-intentionalists’  view,  there  are  two  candidates  for  this  
operative  desire:  some  non-intentionalists,  like  Mele  (2001,  2012),  take  the  
world-focused  approach  and  think  that  the  involved  motivation  is  a  desire  that  p ,  while  
19  We  should  note  that  none  of  these  proposals  implies  that  emotions  must  not  have  a  role  in  
the  phenomenon  of  self-deception.  Some  theorists,  like  Galeotti  (2016),  argue  that  
self-deception  probably  starts  with  a  motivation  that  is  emotionally  overloaded  (by  fear  and  
anxiety).  In  other  words,  emotions  work  as  a  “switch  on  button”  for  activating  a  subjective  
reason  to  function  as  the  operative  motivation  involved  in  self-deception.  Also,  Mele  (2003)  
contends  that  emotions  can  sometimes  be  causes  of  the  motivation  of  self-deception,  and  
hence,  affect  the  hypothesis  targeted  by  it.  
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others,  like  Archer  (2013),  follow  the  self-focused  approach  and  suggest  that  it  should  
be  a  desire  to  believe  that  p .   
  
To  determine  whether  any  of  these  proposals  could  help  us  to  draw  the  
boundary  between  self-deception  and  wishful  thinking,  we  will  need  to  study  the  
operative  motivational  state  of  wishful  thinking.  As  mentioned  in  section  1.3,  it  is  
generally  accepted  that  in  a  case  of  wishful  thinking,  a  wishful  thinker  forms  a  belief  
that  p  because  of  her  desire  that  p .  In  this  sense,  proposal  (A)  shall  be  marked  as  failed.  
The  two  remaining  proposals  will  be  investigated  in  the  following  sections.  
  
2.2.1  An  intention  to  deceive  oneself  that  p  
Intentionalists,  like  Davidson  (2004b),  accept  the  idea  that  self-deception  could  
count  as  a  kind  of  wishful  thinking  due  to  the  many  common  aspects.  However,  since  
wishful  thinking  does  not  require  any  intentional  intervention  by  the  involved  subject,  
self-deception  is  at  most  a  special  branch  of  it  (Davidson,  2004b,  p.  207).  It  should  be  
noted  that  simply  doing  things  intentionally  with  the  result  that  one  is  deceived  is  
different  from  intentionally  making  oneself  be  deceived,  because  the  former  should  be  
characterized  as  merely  making  a  mistake.  As  Davidson  (2004b)  writes:   
  
[S]elf-deception  requires  the  agent  to  do  something  with  the  aim  of  
changing  his  own  views  […]  it  is  not  self-deception  simply  to  do  something  
intentionally  with  the  consequence  that  one  is  deceived,  for  then  a  person  
would  be  self-deceived  if  he  read  and  believed  a  false  report  in  a  




Accordingly,  the  idea  is  that  in  cases  of  self-deception,  the  involved  subjects  are  
required  to  intend  the  “self-deceitful”  project  that  causes  the  acquisition  of  the  
necessary  attitude(s).  Therefore,  for  intentionalists,  the  motivation  involved  in  
self-deception  should  be  an  intention  to  deceive  oneself  that  p .   
  
The  intentional  proposal  seems  to  be  very  attractive.  The  problem,  though,  is  
that  it  is  grounded  in  the  interpersonal  model,  which  leads  to  the  two  famous  paradoxes  
identified  by  Mele  (2001),  namely,  the  static  paradox  and  the  dynamic  paradox.  The  
static  paradox  is  produced  because  the  model  appears  to  introduce  an  impossible  state  
of  mind  by  suggesting  that  the  involved  subject  should  hold  contradictory  beliefs  at  the  
same  time  (Mele,  2001,  p.  6-7).  The  dynamic  paradox  is  also  generated  because  the  
subject  must  be  both  aware  and  unaware  of  the  “self-deceitful”  project  for  being  the  
executor  of  the  plan  and  also  the  victim  of  it,  which  also  seems  like  an  unachievable  
state  of  mind  (Mele,  2001,  p.  8).  The  bigger  obstacle  for  accepting  the  proposal  is  the  
dynamic  paradox  since  it  is  directly  related  to  the  motivational  issue.  
  
Intentionalists  typically  try  to  avoid  the  paradoxes  by  “partitioning”  in  different  
senses.  Some,  such  as  Bermúdez  (2000)  and  Sorensen  (1985),  claim  that  a  single  agent  
can  be  separated  into  different  temporal  divisions,  while  others,  such  as  Davidson  
(2004b)  and  Rorty  (1988),  argue  in  favor  of  the  idea  of  psychological  parts  in  the  mind.  
Although  the  two  options  look  different,  both  of  them  express  the  same  underlying  
idea,  that  is,  these  divisions  or  parts  allow  one  to  play  the  role  of  the  deceiver  and  the  




Those  who  adopt  the  strategy  of  “temporal  partitioning”  admit  that  it  is  not  
possible  to  be  concurrently  the  executor  and  the  victim  of  a  self-deceitful  plan.  But  this  
does  not  imply  that  self-deception  is  impossible  when  it  is  usually  extended  over  time.  
Sorensen  (1985)  points  out  that  many  of  our  daily  activities  are  “scattered  events,”  
such  as  cooking,  eating,  and  writing  an  essay,  and  hence,  there  is  no  surprise  that  
self-deception  may  happen  in  stages  over  a  long  period  of  time  (p.  67).  Bermúdez  
(2000)  also  claims  that  the  acquisition  of  a  belief  is  usually  a  long-term  process  and  “it  
seems  likely  that  the  further  on  one  is  in  the  process,  [...]  the  more  likely  one  will  be  to  
have  lost  touch  with  the  original  motivation”  (p.  314).  Hence  when  a  subject  intends  to  
bring  it  about  that  she  obtains  a  belief  that  she  knows  to  be  false,  she  can  take  
advantage  of  this  feature  of  belief  formation.  We  might  consider  the  case  of  “rich  life”  
suggested  by  Scott-Kakures  (2012)  as  a  demonstration:  
  
Sammy  [...]  has  no  real  friends,  no  lovers,  no  hobbies  or  other  avocations.  
Sammy  knows  that  colleagues  and  acquaintances  derive  great  satisfaction  
from  these  things.  [...]  Sammy’s  family  has  a  depressingly  systematic  
history  of  early  on-set  Alzheimer’s  disease.  [...]  He  now  embarks  upon  a  
complex  strategy  designed  to  bring  it  about  that  he  come,  later  in  life,  to  
believe  that  he  has  led  a  life  rich  in  human  connections.  He  fills  many  
notebooks  detailing  imagined  friendships,  loveaffairs  and  travels.  He  offers  
a  bounty  to  those  he  engages  via  social  media  who  send  photographs,  
postcards,  and  letters,  and  other  memorabilia  detailing  imagined  intimacies  
with  him.  He  secures  the  services  of  a  trustee  who  will  make  certain  that  the  
relevant  materials  are  delivered  when  likely  to  prove  effective.  There’s  no  
real  barrier  to  our  imagining  that  this  strategy  could  succeed  in  the  way  
Sammy  foresees.  We  can  imagine  that,  many  years  later,  as  he  sits  in  bed  at  
an  Alzheimer’s  center,  he’s  asked  by  an  inquisitive  volunteer  if  he  has  many  
friends  or  has  traveled  to  exotic  places.  [...]  Seeing  the  many  boxes  marked 
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“friends”  and  “travels,”  [...]  He  is  delighted  to  discover  that,  as  he  now  
comes  to  believe,  he  has  led  a  life  that  touched  (and  was  touched  by)  so  
many  others.  (p.  21-22)  
  
A  subject  may  intentionally  create  evidence  in  favor  of  the  unwarranted  proposition  
that  p  at  T 1 .  When  the  subject  later  forgets  her  self-deceitful  intention  as  well  as  the  
original  belief  that  not -p  at  T 2   and  tries  to  figure  out  whether  p  or  not -p  by  looking  at  
the  available  evidence  (which  has  already  been  manipulated),  she  will  then  come  to  
acquire  a  false  belief  that  p .   
  
The  psychological  strategy  has  already  been  covered  in  section  1.1.1  and  1.2.1,  
but  a  brief  recapitulation  of  this  strategy  might  be  useful.  Intentionalists  who  adopt  this  
strategy  think  that  self-deception  should  be  a  case  of  irrationality  in  which  a  part  of  the  
“self”  tries  to  deceive  another  part  of  the  “self.”  Some  proponents  of  this  idea,  such  as  
Rorty  (1988),  take  a  strong  position  and  assume  that  there  are  autonomous  
sub-agencies  that  can  have  beliefs,  desires,  and  intentions.  There  is  also  a  relatively  
modest  version  suggested  by  Davidson  (2004b),  which  proposes  that  there  can  be  
boundaries  between  different  parts  of  the  mind.  Both  versions  point  to  the  possibility  
that  a  single  agent  can  be  divided  into  plural  sub-agents.   
  
Let  us  assume,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  all  these  strategies  are  feasible.  As  
Galeotti  (2012)  concludes,  intentionalists  try  to  induce  indirectness  or  opacity  in  the  
phenomenon  of  self-deception,  that  is  to  say,  they  try  to  solve  the  paradoxes  brought  by 
the  intentional  model  of  self-deception  by  undermining  its  intentional  feature.  




If  success  hinges  upon  intentionally  causing  myself  to  deceive  myself  
unintentionally,  it  is  not  at  all  easy  to  see  what  these  other  mechanisms  and  
processes  could  be  if  not  the  non-intentional  motivational  and  affective  
mechanisms  described  by  deflationists.  (p.  31)  
  
If  the  success  of  self-deception  depends  on  whether  one  can  intentionally  make  oneself  
self-deceive  unintentionally,  it  seems  that  we  should  reject  the  intentional  model  
completely  and  take  the  non-intentional  approach.  After  all,  there  are  intentionalists,  
like  Davidson  (2004b),  who  think  that  “a  desire  to  believe  that  p ”  is  typically  present  in  
the  phenomenon  of  self-deception  (p.  207).  Bermúdez  (2000)  also  seconds  this  idea  
and  acknowledges:   
  
The  wishful  thinker  acquires  that  belief  that  p  because  they  want  it  to  be  the  
case  that  p .  The  self-deceiver,  in  contrast,  will  usually  want  it  to  be  the  case  
that  p  –  but  will  also  want  it  to  be  the  case  that  they  believe  that  p .  (p.  312) 
  20
  
Admittedly,  both  Bermúdez(2000)  and  Davidson  (2004b)  do  not  agree  that  a  
desire  to  believe  that  p  can  activate  the  formation  of  the  necessary  attitude(s)  without  
being  mediated  by  an  intention  to  deceive  oneself  that  p .  Nevertheless,  if  intentionalists  
have  to  appeal  to  a  specific  feature  that  would  eventually  be  undermined  anyway,  it  
will  not  make  sense  to  make  such  a  move  in  the  first  place.  It  seems  that  the  intentional  
proposal  eventually  leads  us  to  consider  the  desire-to-believe  proposal,  which  will  be  
discussed  in  the  next  section.   
20  I  do  not  intend  to  argue  that  the  difference  between  self-deception  and  wishful  thinking  lies  
in  the  motivational  issue.  I  merely  try  to  show  that  the  intentionalist  picture  of  self-deception  




2.2.2  A  desire  to  believe  that  p  
Some  theorists,  such  as  Funkhouser  (2005),  contend  that  by  taking  the  
self-focused  approach  in  dealing  with  the  motivational  issue  of  self-deception,  we  can  
offer  a  unified  explanation  of  how  the  different  varieties  of  self-deception  are  
prompted.  As  I  have  mentioned  in  section  1.3,  many  theorists  suggest  that  the  
phenomenon  often  occurs  in  two  forms,  which  can  be  called  “straight”  and  “twisted”  
(Funkhouser,  2005,  p.  397;  Galeotti,  2016,  p.  91;  Mele,  2001,  p.  4;  Nelkin,  2002,  p.  
393).  Straight  cases  are  those  that  we  are  familiar  with  –  the  case  of  “Beth”  is  a  
standard  example  of  this  type,  in  which  Beth  comes  to  believe  the  desirable  (albeit  
unwarranted)  proposition  that  “I  was  my  father‘s  favorite  child”  ( p ).  On  the  contrary,  
according  to  Mele  (2001),  “people  are  self-deceived  in  believing  something  that  they  
want  to  be  false  (and  do  not  also  want  to  be  true)”  in  twisted  cases  (p.  4).  This  means  
that  the  involved  subjects  acquire  the  unwarranted  belief  that  p  (or  the  like)  although  
the  state  of  affairs  corresponding  with  p  is  supposed  to  be  undesirable  to  them.  As  an  
example  of  twisted  self-deception,  consider  the  case  of  “Joey”  conceived  by  
Funkhouser  (2005):  
  
Joey  is  a  jealous  man.  Objective  observers  are  convinced  that  it  is  highly  
unlikely  that  his  wife  Marcia  is  having  an  affair.  But  Joey  says  otherwise,  
often  calling  her  names  that  shock  his  friends.  They  tell  him  that  he  has  no  
reason  to  think  that  she’s  sneaking  off  to  see  another  guy  whenever  she  
visits  with  her  female  friends.  They  say  that  her  recently  increased  sex  drive  
is  probably  not  an  act  to  cover  her  guilt.  But  Joey  violently  protests.  
Unsurprisingly,  Joey  does  not  like  to  be  proven  wrong  and  refrains  from  




Although  a  world-focused  desire  can  successfully  play  a  role  in  motivating  
straight  cases,  it  looks  like  it  cannot  explain  why  one  engages  in  twisted  cases.  
Nonetheless,  Funkhouser  (2005)  argues  that  there  is  still  commonality  to  both  straight  
and  twisted  cases  with  regard  to  the  motivational  issue.  In  particular,  Funkhouser  
(2005)  points  out  that  self-deceived  subjects  in  different  types  of  cases  usually  engage  
in  avoidance  behavior,  which  looks  to  suggest  that  they  desire  to  believe  that  p  
regardless  of  the  truth-value  of  p .   In  this  sense,  to  provide  a  unified  account  of  21
motivation,  we  would  be  required  to  acknowledge  that  the  operative  motivational  state  
of  self-deception  is  a  desire  to  believe  that  p .   
  
Additionally,  Funkhouser  (2005)  notes  that  the  desire-to-believe  proposal  
implies  a  third  type  of  self-deception,  namely,  “indifferent”  or  “apathetic  
self-deception,”  in  which  there  is  no  way  for  a  world-focused  motivation  to  take  a  role  
(p.  298).  As  Funkhouser  (2005)  explains:  
  
One  example  is  self-deception  prompted  by  peer  pressure.  We  often  have  
desires  (more  generally:  motivations)  to  be  like  those  around  us.  Common  
examples  include  desires  to  dress  and  talk  like  our  peers.  Sometimes  we  
even  have  desires  to  believe  as  those  around  us  believe.  Just  as  it  can  be  
awkward  to  be  the  oddball  in  dress  or  speech,  it  is  sometimes  awkward  to  
hold  a  minority  belief.  And  one  could  be  motivated  to  self-deception  by  
having  a  desire  to  believe  what  one’s  peers  believe,  while  being  indifferent  
21  According  to  Funkhouser  (2005),  avoidance  behavior  is  “the  sophisticated  behavior  of  
avoiding  evidence  that  not-p  in  a  way  that  shows  the  agent  already  possesses  sufficient  
information  that  not- p ”  (note.  5).  The  performance  of  this  behavior  is  typically  aimed  at  
maintaining  the  necessary  attitude  involved  in  the  phenomenon.   
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to  the  truth  or  falsity  of  what  is  believed.  The  belief  is  simply  desired  for  its  
utility.  (p.  298-299)  
  
  However,  there  is  a  reason  to  reject  the  very  motivation  for  suggesting  such  a  
self-focused  desire.  Making  reference  to  cases  of  psychiatric  delusion  (which  is  
undoubtedly  a  kind  of  unmotivated  phenomenon)  found  in  Volume  IV  of  the  American  
Psychiatric  Association’s  Diagnostic  and  Statistical  Manual  of  Mental  Disorders  
(DSM-IV),  Mele  (2007)  argues  that  at  least  some  alleged  twisted  cases  “are  best  
explained  not  by  the  kind  of  biasing  characteristic  of  self-deception,  but  instead  by  the 
presence  of  cognitive  deficits”  (p.  164).   Moreover,  the  case  of  “Joey”  and  cases  22
similar  to  it  are  consistent  with  the  description  of  the  “jealous  type  of  delusional  
disorder”  that  is  recorded  in  DSM-IV,  which  implies  that  psychologists  probably  agree  
that  such  cases  should  be  classified  as  one  type  of  delusion  (Mele,  2007,  p.  171).  
Numerous  studies  also  show  that  of  those  who  seem  to  be  affected  by  such  a  kind  of  
jealousy,  almost  all  have  another  psychotic  symptom(s)  (Mele,  2007,  p.  172-173).  If  at  
least  some  standard  examples  of  “twisted  case”  should  probably  count  as  a  kind  of  
unmotivated  phenomenon  (namely  mental  disease)  instead  of  a  type  of  self-deception,  
could  it  be  that  the  idea  of  “twisted  case”  is  redundant  from  the  very  beginning?  If  so,  
the  biggest  motivation  for  adopting  the  desire-to-believe  proposal  is  eliminated.  
  
Yet,  as  mentioned  in  section  1.3,  we  should  try  not  to  exclude  any  alleged  case  
or  type  of  self-deception  so  easily.  Hence  let  us  assume  that  twisted  cases  should  be  
included  in  the  analysis  of  self-deception.  Despite  this  assumption,  the  literature  further  
22  For  patients  who  suffer  from  cognitive  deficits,  they  have  the  experience  that  contains  some  
untruthful  or  abnormal  ideas  as  part  of  its  content  and  lose  the  ability  to  suspend  this  
experience  (Kiran  and  Chaudhury,  2009;  Mele,  2007).  
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reveals  two  reasons  why  it  is  unnecessary  to  introduce  the  “desire-to-believe”  to  the  
model  of  self-deception.  First,  as  Galeotti  (2016)  argues,  even  if  we  admit  that  twisted  
cases  are  examples  of  self-deception,  we  can  perfectly  explain  why  those  necessary  
attitudes  involved  are  so  different  from  those  involved  in  straight  cases  without  
rejecting  the  world-focused  strategy.  Galeotti  (2016)  contends  that  “self-deceivers  
usually  display  confirmatory  bias  that  is  the  mental  habit  to  look  for  confirmation  of  
one’s  hypothesis”  in  straight  cases  (p.  96).  But  in  a  twisted  case,  the  involved  subject  
instead  conjures  up  “worst-case  scenarios”  and  is  therefore  very  likely  to  be  affected  by  
a  special  bias  called  “probability  neglect”  (Galeotti,  2016,  p.97-98).  Hence  “without  a  
final  disproof  she  will  be  caught  by  the  false  and  adverse  belief  that  [not- p ]”  (Ibid.).  As  
Galeotti  (2016)  writes:  
  
In  principle,  worst-case  scenarios  are  improbable  events,  representing  only  
one  extreme  of  a  whole  range  of  possibilities,  yet  it  seems  that  once  the  
scenario  has  been  conjured  up,  the  low  probability  is  discounted,  and  the  
subject’s  fear  and  anxiety  are  reassured  only  by  conclusive  evidence  
showing  the  scenario  false.  Thus  while  S  [who  engages  in  a  straight  case]  
lowers  the  threshold  of  evidence  to  go  on  believing  that  [ p ],  S¹  [who  
engages  in  a  twisted  case]  heightens  the  threshold  of  evidence  required  to  
disbelieve  [not -p ].  The  operative  desire  that  [ p ]  is  matched  by  the  resulting  
self-deceptive  belief  that  [not -p ],  though  negatively,  so  as  to  be  thematic,  
thus  satisfying  a  commonly  acknowledged  requirement  for  [self-deception].  
(p.  97)  
  
Second,  Pedrini  (2012)  points  out  that  it  does  not  seem  that  a  want  for  p  being  
true  is  just  a  contingent  (that  is,  unnecessary)  factor  in  cases  of  self-deception,  since  the  
subjects  in  both  straight  and  twisted  cases  are  all  so  interested  in  establishing  that  the  
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reality  is  the  way  they  want.  Pedrini  (2012)  emphasizes  that  one  of  the  most  significant  
features  of  self-deception  is  that  the  involved  subjects  will  “spend  time  and  energy  on  
elaborating  ‘covering  stories’”  to  justify  that  p  and  “typically  struggle  epistemically  
with  evidence  against  p  to  arrive  at  an  explanation  of  why  it  should  not  count  as  
undermining  p ”  (p.  148-149).  This  epistemic  work  should  show  that  the  importance  of  
“believing  that  p ”  is  based  on  the  importance  those  subjects  put  on  “knowing  that  p  is  
true”  (Pedrini,  2012,  p.  148-149).  Moreover,  avoidance  behavior  can  be  explained  as  
avoiding  “contact  with  sources  of  evidence  suggesting  that  the  favored  hypothesis  that  
p  may  be  false”  rather  than  being  indifferent  to  what  the  reality  is  (Pedrini,  2012,  p.  
151).  If  Pedrini  (2012)  is  correct,  the  primary  motivation  of  self-deception  should  be  a  
world-focused  one,  since  the  acquisition  or  the  maintenance  of  the  necessary  attitude(s)  
is  supported  by  the  epistemic  work  motivated  by  a  desire  that  p ,  and  the  self-focused  
desire  merely  occurs  as  the  by-product  of  this  world-focused  desire.  With  this  idea  in  
mind,  once  we  agree  that  an  epistemic  work  may  also  be  involved  in  “indifferent  
self-deception”  cases,  cases  of  this  type  should  not  be  considered  to  be  “indifferent”  
anymore.   23
  
Apart  from  the  ideas  presented  in  the  literature,  it  appears  to  me  that  the  
desire-to-believe  proposal  is  just  another  way  of  saying  that  “the  operative  motivation  
is  a  desire  that  p .”  We  should  note  that  “ p ”  can  be  any  unwarranted  proposition  that  the  
ongoing  self-deception  is  about.  While  “I  believe  in  a  specific  proposition”  can  also  be  
23  It  seems  that  epistemic  work  must  be  presented  in  “indifferent  self-deception”  cases  if  we  
insist  that  the  involved  subjects  sincerely  believe  their  peers’  opinions  to  be  true.  At  least,  for  
example,  when  we  question  why  they  believe  in  their  peers’  opinions  on  a  certain  matter,  they  
may  answer  “Well,  my  friends  are  smart,  so  their  opinions  should  be  correct.  Two  of  them  even 
have  a  Ph.D.  in  the  field  related  to  this  matter.”   
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considered  as  the  proposition  that  the  self-deception  is  about,  it  seems  reasonable  to  
say  a  subject  involved  in  a  twisted  case  does  desire  that  p ,  where  “ p ”  represents  the  
proposition  that  “I  believe  in  a  specific  proposition.”  If  this  is  the  case,  the  difference  
between  the  world-focused  proposal  and  Funkhouser’s  (2005)  proposal  is  not  clear.  
  
At  this  point,  the  representative  ways  of  specifying  the  precise  content  of  the  
motivation-element  other  than  the  world-focused  strategy  have  seemingly  failed.  Are  
there  any  other  possible  ways?  Although  I  do  not  intend  to  solve  the  motivational  
issue,  here  we  can  still  briefly  look  at  why  the  answer  to  this  question  is  probably  “no.”  
Some  philosophers,  like  Galeotti  (2016)  and  Lynch  (2013),  contend  that  the  content  of  
the  necessary  attitude(s)  involved  in  self-deception  should  be  linked  to  the  content  of  
the  motivation-element,  that  is,  if  the  necessary  attitude(s)  has  p  (or  not- p )  in  its  
content,  the  involved  motivation  should  also  have  p  (or  not- p )  in  its  content.  Otherwise,  
the  boundary  between  self-deception  and  certain  types  of  motivated  irrationality,  such  
as  stubborn  beliefs,  will  be  broken  (Galeotti,  2016,  p.  93;  Lynch,  2013).   Therefore,  24
proposals  other  than  these  three  would  not  be  worth  mentioning,  and,  considering  the  
analysis  up  till  now,  our  best  bet  among  the  three  would  be  a  desire  that  p .  However,  as  
mentioned  earlier,  the  suggestion  that  the  primary  motivation  involved  in  
self-deception  is  a  desire  that  p  will  blur  the  boundary  between  self-deception  and  
24  As  Lynch  (2013)  explains,  for  a  person  who  stubbornly  believes  in  something:   
Such  a  person  is  one  who,  after  having  settled  on  some  opinion,  refuses  to  
reconsider  it  and  sticks  to  that  opinion,  when  other  people  are  with  good  reason  
encouraging  him  to  reconsider,  or  when  he  is  confronted  with  evidence  which 
would  warrant  such  a  reconsideration  and  perhaps  rejection  of  that  belief.  The  
stubborn  believer  won’t  be  talked  out  of  his  view,  and  is  unyielding  or  resistant  to  
reasonable  persuasion.  He  clings  to  the  belief,  as  we  say,  stubbornly.  (p.  1340)  
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wishful  thinking.  As  a  result,  the  distinction  problem  has  to  be  solved  by  restricting  the  
other  two  elements.   
  
2.3  Access  to  information  
As  discussed  in  section  1.2.4,  while  theorists  unanimously  assume  that  
self-deceived  subjects  should  have  access  to  evidence  that  provides  greater  warrant  for  
not- p  than  for  p ,  they  have  different  views  on  how  this  access  should  be  represented.  
The  literature  describes  at  least  four  ways  to  address  this  access:   
  
(D)External  access:  one  merely  having  the  available  data  that  can  justify  believing  
that  not -p  without  appraising  it  (Mele,  2001;  Nelkin,  2002;  Noordhof,  2009)  
(E) A  (full)  belief  that  not- p  (Audi,  1982;  Davidson,  2004b;  Funkhouser,  2005;  
Sorensen,  1985)  
(F) A  belief  that  there  is  a  significant  chance  that  not- p  (Mele,  2012)  
(G)Psychological  categories  other  than  “belief,”  such  as  a  suspicion  that  not -p  
(Archer,  2013;  Galeotti,  2016)  
  
Yet,  we  should  be  careful  that  the  assumption  just  mentioned  brings  up  the  following  
two  problems:  (i)  whether  the  available  evidence  must  be  overall  in  favor  of  not- p  and  
(ii)  whether  the  awareness  of  (namely  conscious  access  to)  such  evidence  is  required  in  
the  model  of  self-deception.  These  problems  will  be  dealt  with  in  the  following  section  
before  investigating  those  proposals,  as  they  will  affect  how  we  should  proceed  with  
the  investigation.   
  
2.3.1  Must  a  self-deceived  subject  be  aware  of  the  available  evidence  that  is  overall  in  
favor  of  not -p ?  
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As  mentioned  in  section  1.2.4,  it  is  obvious  that  intentionalists  have  to  agree  
with  both  (i)  and  (ii)  because  of  the  lexical  picture  adopted  by  them.   Now  it  is  worth  25
considering  whether  the  empirical  approach  gives  us  any  reason  for  making  these  
assumptions  too.  Most  non-intentionalists  simply  take  (i)  for  granted  because  ordinary  
people  usually  use  “self-deception”  to  refer  to  the  cases  in  which  there  is  great  
resistance  produced  by  the  available  evidence  to  the  acquisitions  or  the  maintenances  
of  the  necessary  attitudes  (Archer,  2013,  p.  266;  Funkhouser,  2005,  p.  296;  Nelkin, 
2002).   In  this  sense,  if  the  necessary  attitude(s)  involved  in  self-deception  is  assumed  26
to  be  an  attitude  towards  p  that  can  explain  why  one  acts  as  if  p  (such  as  telling  others  
that  p  is  true),  the  available  evidence  should  give  greater  warrant  for  not -p  than  for  p .   
  
Other  theorists,  such  as  Galeotti  (2012,  2016),  who  also  take  the  empirical  
approach,  further  argue  that  the  available  data  should  provide  greater  warrant  for  not -p  
because  it  is  the  reason  why  a  self-deceived  subject  has  to  set  off  self-deceitful  
strategies  at  the  very  beginning.   Undoubtedly,  some  may  insist  that,  even  if  the  27
evidence  is  just  ambiguous,  an  agent  who  is  motivated  to  (at  least  verbally)  endorse  p  
may  also  be  driven  to  search  for  reasons  for  considering  p  as  true  with  the  help  of  
welcoming  yet  trivial  pieces  of  evidence.  However,  this  is  seemingly  not  what  is  
25  Recall  section  1.1.1  and  section  1.2.2  in  which  I  mentioned  that  intentionalists  assume  that  
self-deceived  subjects  already  possess  sufficient  evidence  for  concluding  that  not- p  because  of  
the  lexical  picture  they  adopted.  
26  Recall  those  non-intentionalist  views  introduced  in  the  previous  sections.  Although  not  all  
non-intentionalists  suggest  self-deceived  subjects  must  somehow  be  aware  that  p  is  objectively  
false,  they  unitedly  admit  that  there  should  be  sufficient  evidence  for  the  subjects  to  conclude  
that  not- p  is  more  likely  to  be  true.  This  situation  will  undoubtedly  cause  resistance  to  the 
acquisition  or  the  maintenance  of  any  propositional  attitude  that  can  lead  to  the  (verbal)  
endorsement  of  p  from  the  possessor,  given  that  this  situation  should  lead  to  the  (verbal)  
endorsement  of  not- p  from  a  rational  agent.  
27  Note  that  Galeotti  (2012,  2016)  is  a  supporter  of  the  mixed  strategy,  which  consists  of  both  
intentionalism  and  non-intentionalism.   
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happening  in  the  (alleged)  examples  of  self-deception.  Apart  from  giving  more  weight  
to  the  welcoming  yet  trivial  pieces  of  evidence,  different  types  of  biased  cognition  and  
odd  behaviors  (such  as  avoidance  behavior)  play  roles  in  affecting  the  process  of  
judging  the  truth  in  the  non-intentionalist  model  of  self-deception  (which  can  be  
referred  to  as  self-deceitful  strategies  for  promoting  the  necessary  attitude(s))  (Lynch,  
2017;  Mele,  2001,  2012;  Pedrini,  2012;  Porcher,  2012).   As  Porcher  (2012)  explains:  28
  
Suppose  I  have  a  desire  that  this  paper  be  accepted  for  publication.  Would  
this  suffice  for  me  to  avoid  evidence  that  it  won’t?  No.  In  order  for  that  to  
happen,  I  would  need  a  desire  that  this  paper  be  accepted,  coupled  with  a  
cognitive  representation  (let’s  leave  it  at  that  for  the  time  being)  that  it  
won’t  or  at  least  might  not  be  accepted.  (p.  72)   
  
Admittedly,  if  the  available  evidence  is  not  threatening  in  the  eyes  of  the  involved  
subjects,  why  should  they  be  motivated  to  engage  in  such  onerous  work?    29
  
Regarding  (ii),  I  mentioned  in  section  1.2.4  that  some  theorists  deny  the  need  
for  encoding  the  access-to-information-element  in  one’s  mind  in  terms  of  conscious  
propositional  attitudes  and  hence  no  conscious  access  at  all.  Recall  Mele's  (2001,  2012)  
(original)  deflationary  account  which  suggests  that  the  fourth  condition  for  entering  
self-deception  is  to  possess  evidence  that  can  justify  believing  that  not- p .  Given  that  
Mele’s  (original)  account  does  not  further  require  self-deceived  subjects  to  appraise  the  
natural  implication(s)  of  such  evidence,  the  access-to-information-element  is  nothing  
28  See  Mele  (2012)  for  a  detailed  illustration  of  how  biasing  cognition  sheds  light  on  this  issue.  
In  addition,  for  intentionalists,  self-deceitful  strategies  may  include  various  ways  of  intentional  
manipulation  of  the  evidence  (Bermúdez,  2000;  Sorensen,  1985).   
29  But  note  that  those  strange  behaviors  (such  as  avoidance  behavior)  need  not  be  a  necessary  
factor  in  self-deception.   
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more  than  an  existing  method  or  opportunity  of  getting  near  to  what  the  evidence  
actually  suggests.  On  the  other  hand,  intentionalists,  and  a  few  non-intentionalists  too  
(such  as  Audi  (1982)  and  Rorty  (1988)),  contend  that  even  if  an  involved  subject  is  
mentally  affected  by  the  natural  implication(s)  of  evidence  that  overall  warrants  not- p ,  
this  effect  should  be  encoded  as  a  propositional  attitude(s)  that  she  keeps  hidden  from  
her  awareness  and  puts  into  the  unconscious  mind.  
  
Let  us  first  consider  whether  self-deceived  subjects  should  be  responsive  to  the  
natural  implication  of  the  available  evidence  while  encountering  it.   It  appears  that  30
once  we  admit  that  self-deception  is  not  an  abnormal  psychological  phenomenon,  
namely  a  mental  disease,  we  have  to  acknowledge  that  those  involved  subjects  must  be  
somehow  affected  by  the  power  of  the  available  evidence.  As  Lynch  (2012)  argues,  
self-deception  is  something  that  is  implemented  by  ordinary  people,  who  should  be  
“generally  sensitive  to  the  force  of  good  evidence”  rather  than  fully  insusceptible  to  it  
(p.  442).  Indeed,  if  one  is  entirely  unresponsive  to  the  natural  implication(s)  of  the  
available  evidence,  she  should  be  considered  as  suffering  from  a  certain  kind  of  mental  
dysfunction  or  mental  illness,  such  as  delusional  disorder,  instead  of  self-deceiving.  
Furthermore,  once  we  allow  self-deceived  subjects  to  be  immune  to  the  power  of  the  
available  evidence,  we  just  set  up  an  unfair  situation,  where  the  subjects  are  incapable  
of  being  rational  (in  an  evidentialist  sense)  from  the  very  beginning  and  hence  
inevitably  being  blamed  for  acting  irrational.  
30  If  one  can  never  encounter  the  available  evidence  for  judging  whether  p ,  we  must  say  one  
does  not  have  access  to  information  about  whether  p  or  not- p .  I  argued  in  section  1.2.4  that  the  
access-to-information-element  is  a  necessary  constituent  of  self-deception  and  therefore  we  
have  to  admit  that  one’s  encounter  with  the  available  evidence  is  expected  to  present,  if  not  a  




On  the  problem  of  having  conscious  access,  Galeotti  (2012)  argues  that  the  
claim  that  the  access-to-information-element  is  one  of  the  necessary  constituents  of  
self-deception  already  suggests  that  an  involved  subject  is  aware  of  the  evidence:   
  
If  there  is  no  such  appraisal  of  the  contrary  data,  as  maintained  by  Mele,  
that  implies  that  the  motivationally  relevant  counter-evidence  is  
automatically  shut  off  S’s  awareness  and  stored  in  some  non-conscious  
mind  module;  but  then,  the  relevant  evidence  is  not  available  to  S  --contrary  
to  what  is  stated  in  [the  fourth  condition];  and,  in  the  absence  of  contrary  
evidence,  her  belief-formation  pattern  works  correctly  even  if  it  ends  up  
falsely  believing  that  [ p ].  (p.  49)  
  
Surely,  if  one’s  awareness  can  be  automatically/unconsciously  shut  off  while  
encountering  unwelcoming  pieces  of  evidence,  the  body  of  data  “available”  to  her  
should  be  in  favor  of  p .  Hence  it  is  not  irrational  for  her  to  consciously  endorse  that  p .  
(In  addition,  we  should  doubt  whether  she  is  a  psychologically  healthy  person.)  On  the  
other  hand,  if  the  subject  can  selectively  shut  off  her  awareness  towards  unwelcoming  
pieces  of  evidence,  she  still  needs  to  first  have  a  conscious  appreciation  (no  matter  how  
it  is  encoded  in  her  mind)  of  the  contrary  evidence.  In  fact,  Mele  (2012)  acknowledges  
that  “ S  consciously  believes  at  the  time  that  there  is  a  significant  chance  that  not -p ”  can  
also  count  as  one  of  the  jointly  sufficient  conditions  for  entering  the  phenomenon,  
suggesting  he  agrees  that  self-deceived  subjects  (consciously)  appraise  the  available  
evidence  they  have  (and  hence  form  a  corresponding  belief  based  on  its  natural  




Given  the  points  mentioned  above,  I  think  it  is  fair  to  assume  that  the  available  
evidence  in  cases  of  self-deception  should  sufficiently  warrant  a  belief  that  not- p  or  the  
like,  and  self-deceived  subjects  should  have  conscious  access  to  such  information.  It  is  
clear  now  that  there  is  a  need  to  refine  the  primary  restriction  on  the  
“access-to-information-element”  (which  was  mentioned  in  section  1.2.4).  This  element  
used  to  refer  to  “access  to  evidence  that  provides  greater  warrant  for  not- p  than  for  p ,”  
but  I  will  consider  it  as  “conscious  access  to  (or  an  awareness  of)  evidence  that  overall  
warrants  not- p ”  in  the  remainder  of  this  thesis,  which  means  that  self-deceived  subjects  
must  more  or  less  appraise  the  natural  implication(s)  of  such  evidence.   
  
2.3.2  Wishful  thinking  vs.  Self-deception  
It  is  noteworthy  that  some  theorists  believe  we  can  easily  distinguish  
self-deception  from  wishful  thinking  if  self-deceived  subjects  must  be  aware  of  the  
evidence  that  is  overall  in  favor  of  not -p  (Galeotti,  2012;  Graham,  1986;  Pedrini,  2012;  
Szabados,  1973).  To  start  with,  we  may  first  discuss  whether  there  is  any  theoretical  or  
empirical  reason  to  insist  that  the  evidence  available  to  wishful  thinkers  must  be  in  
favor  of  not- p .  Recall  the  discussion  on  the  psychological  and  philosophical  definition  
of  wishful  thinking  in  section  1.3.  We  should  note  that  even  though  the  primary  reason  
for  a  wishful  thinker  to  insist  that  p  is  true  is  a  wish/desire  that  p ,  this  does  not  entail  
that  the  evidence  she  has  conscious  access  to  must  be  against  p .   Certainly,  this  idea  31
alone  does  not  necessarily  suggest  that  the  evidence  possessed  by  a  wishful  thinker  
must  not  be  against  p .  Nevertheless,  many  theorists  point  out  that  in  (alleged)  cases  of  
31  In  contrast,  in  (alleged)  cases  of  self-deception,  impartial  observers  should  find  a  belief  that  
p  unconvincing  because  the  evidence  that  the  involved  subjects  have  conscious  access  to  
suggests  otherwise  (Galeotti,  2012;  Lynch,  2017;  Pedrini,  2012;  Szabados,  1973).  
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wishful  thinking,  whenever  the  involved  subjects  are  aware  of  the  contrary  evidence,  
they  would  acknowledge  it  as  the  valid  justification  for  not- p  and  simultaneously  stop  
their  wishful  thinking,  rather  than  “pervert  the  procedures  whereby  we  establish  truth  
and  falsehood”  (Szabados,  1973,  p.  205;  see  also  Galeotti,  2012,  p.  49-50;  Graham,  
1986,  p.  224;  Pedrini,  2012).   
  
With  this  in  mind,  let  us  reconsider  the  case  of  “one-sided  love.”  Szabados  
(1973)  suggests  that  we  might  be  unsure  whether  to  count  this  case  as  an  example  of  
wishful  thinking  or  that  of  self-deception  because  we  have  no  obvious  reason  to  insist  
that  the  young  man  possesses  and  is  aware  of  any  definite  contrary  evidence.  And,  
when  we  suspect  that  he  is  actually  aware  of  such  evidence,  it  turns  out  that  we  prefer  
to  consider  him  as  self-deceiving  (Szabados,  1973,  p.  204).  As  Szabados  (1973)  
illustrates:   
  
Consider  now  the  following  additions  and  changes  to  this  story.  Suppose  his  
friend,  sympathetic  but  tough-minded,  says  when  he  hears  this  [situation  of  
the  young  man]  ‘Ah,  that  is  wishful  thinking’.  Suppose  he  continues  by  
pointing  out  that  the  said  young  lady  keeps  frequent  company  with  Z  and  
they  have  been  observed  to  be  quite  intimate.  Our  man  is  quite  unshaken  
and  tells  the  friend  that  surely  this  is  mere  friendship  between  Z  and  Miss  
X.  They  have  probably  been  brought  up  together  and  are  fond  of  each  other.  
Furthermore,  the  said  ‘intimacies’  were  noted  at  parties  where  Miss  X  tends  
to  be  quite  outgoing.  In  any  case,  they  do  not  really  bear  upon  their  
relationship.  He  persists  in  his  belief,  yet  we  detect  signs  of  worry  in  his  
conduct  and  the  occasional  give-away  in  his  conversation;  sometimes  he  is  
on  the  verge  of  coming  to  terms  with  the  mounting  evidence  but  then,  
through  an  effort  of  will,  he  continues  to  explain  it  away  and  reassure  
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himself.  This  [...]  is  a  case  which  is  properly  called  ‘self-deception’  and  not  
simply  wishful  thinking.  (p.  204)  
  
Accordingly,  we  can  distinguish  whether  a  given  case  should  count  as  self-deception  or  
wishful  thinking  by  considering  if  we  can  attribute  an  awareness  of  evidence  that  
overall  supports  not -p  to  the  involved  subject.  It  looks  like  the  distinction  problem  has  
been  solved.  However,  I  will  show  that  there  is  more  to  the  issue  than  that  in  section  
2.3.4.  But  beforehand,  I  would  like  first  to  discuss  how  we  can  encode  this  conscious  
access  in  one’s  mind.   
  
2.3.3  How  should  this  conscious  access  be  encoded?  
To  account  for  the  access-to-information-element,  a  cognitive  attitude(s)  
towards  not -p  must  be  attributed  to  the  involved  subject.  Then  what  kind  of  cognitive  
attitude  should  it  be?  On  the  one  hand,  some  theorists,  like  Porcher  (2012),  propose  
that  conscious  access,  namely  an  awareness,  should  probably  be  encoded  as  a  doxastic  
attitude  (p.  73).  On  the  other  hand,  some,  such  as  Archer  (2013)  and  Galeotti  (2016),  
contend  that  certain  types  of  affective  attitudes  can  play  the  role  successfully.  Yet,  no  
matter  which  option  is  to  be  adopted,  we  can  see  proposal  (D)  should  be  rejected. 
Incidentally,  proposal  (E)  and  proposal  (F)  can  be  classified  as  the  doxastic  approach  
while  proposal  (G)  should  be  categorized  as  the  affective  approach.   Since  most  of  us  32
are  quite  familiar  with  the  idea  of  “full  belief,”  I  am  going  to  focus  on  clarifying  
proposals  (F)  and  (G).  
  
32  Even  though  some  proponents  of  proposal  (E),  such  as  Audi  (1982),  deny  that  self-deceived  
subjects  have  any  conscious  attitude  towards  not- p ,  I  will  consider  the  suggested  “full  belief”  
as  a  conscious  belief,  given  what  I  have  mentioned  in  section  2.3.1.   
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Mele  (2012),  the  leading  proponent  of  proposal  (F),  suggests  that  even  if  the  
access-to-information-element  is  involved  in  a  real  case  of  self-deception,  we  only  
have  to  admit  that  the  involved  subject  holds  a  belief  that  “there  is  a  significant  chance  
that  [not- p ]”  rather  than  a  full  belief  that  not -p  (p.  12).  As  Chan  and  Rowbottom  (2019)  
illustrate,  this  suggestion  can  be  understood  in  two  different  ways  (p.  1206-1207).  The  
first  option  is  to  interpret  this  doxastic  attitude  as  a  degree  of  belief  that  not -p  (D( ~p )).  
This  degree  of  belief  must  be  over  a  certain  threshold  that  makes  it  count  as  believing  
that  not- p ,  since  it  is  required  to  reveal  some  appraisal  of  the  natural  implication(s)  of  
the  available  evidence,  which  overall  warrants  not- p .  I  assume  that  the  threshold  is  0.5  
here.  Hence  D( ~p )  is  restricted  to  be  over  0.5.   The  second  option  is  to  interpret  this  33
as  a  full  belief  that  “‘The  probability  of  not- p  is  greater  than  n ,’  where  n  is  an  
appropriate  threshold”  (Chan  and  Rowbottom,  2019,  p.  1207).  However,  there  is  a  
strong  reason  not  to  choose  the  second  option.  As  Chan  and  Rowbottom  (2019)  note:   
  
In  order  to  have  a  belief  with  the  content  “The  probability  of  not- p  is  
greater  than  n ”  (or  some  appropriate  surrogate),  a  subject  must  grasp  the  
concept  of  probability.  (A  subject  would  also  have  to  grasp  the  more  
specific  concept  of  world-based  or  aleatory  probability  in  order  to  have  a  
belief  concerning  a  chance,  and  so  forth.)  However,  it  is  reasonable  to  think  
that  self-deception  occurred  before  probability,  in  anything  akin  to  the  
modern  sense,  had  been  conceived  of.  It  is  also  plausible  that  children  (and  
others  in  the  modern  world)  who  haven’t  grasped  the  concept  of  probability  
are  capable  of  self-deception.  (p.  1207)  
  
33  Degrees  of  belief  held  by  a  generally  rational  agent  must  obey  the  probability  calculus,  
which  suggests  that  D( p )  +  D( ~p )  is  always  equal  to  1  (Eriksson  and  Hájek,  2007). 
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Thus,  it  should  be  clear  that  proposal  (F)  should  suggest  the  presence  of  a  degree  of  
belief  that  not- p ,  which  is  over  0.5  (D( ~p )  >  0.5).   
  
In  contrast,  other  theorists,  such  as  Archer  (2013)  and  Galeotti  (2016),  suggest  
that  we  should  account  for  the  access-to-information-element  by  the  attribution  of  a  
suspicion  that  not- p ,  combined  with  other  kinds  of  emotion  relevant  to  not- p  (for  
example,  anxiety  that  not -p  or  fear  that  not -p ).  However,  Archer  (2013)  notes  that  “one  
may  insist  that  a  suspicion  that  p  simply  is  or  entails  a  low  degree  of  belief  that  p ”  
since  it  might  just  be  an  attitude  that  falls  short  of  being  a  full  belief  in  a  particular  
proposition  (p.  272).  Even  though  Archer  (2013)  does  not  endorse  this  idea,  she  admits  
that:   
  
[W]e  ought  to  accept  that  a  suspicion  that  p  involves  (although  it  cannot  be  
reduced  to),  at  least,  something  like  the  belief  ‘It  may  be  the  case  that  p ,’  or  
perhaps  even  in  some  cases,  ‘It  is  likely  that  p ’.  (p.  273)  
  
So,  on  Archer’s  (2013)  view,  a  suspicion  that  not -p  entails  many  beliefs  with  not -p  in  
their  content,  such  as  a  full  belief  that  q ,  where  q  refers  to  “It  is  likely  that  not -p ”  or  a  
full  belief  that  n ,  where  n  refers  to  “not -p  is  more  possible  than  p ”  (while  the  ongoing  
self-deception  is  with  respect  to  p ).   
  
We  should  notice  that  Archer  (2013)  still  affirms  that  the  attribution  of  the  two  
main  beliefs,  namely  the  belief  that  p  and  the  belief  that  not -p ,  can  be  excluded  entirely  
in  the  model  of  self-deception  despite  the  need  of  attributing  different  beliefs  with  
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not -p  in  their  content  to  the  involved  subject.  But  just  as  in  the  discussion  of  proposal  
(F),  Chan  and  Rowbottom  (2019)  point  out  that:   
  
For  [a  self-deceived  subject]  to  have  a  belief  like“It  is  possible  that  p ”  or  “It  
is  likely  that  p ”  or  “ p  is  more  possible  than  [not -p ],”  as  Archer  suggests  she  
must  in  order  to  suspect  that  p ,  the  [self-deceived  subject]  must  have  a  
conception  of  possibility  (and  that  it  may  come  in  degrees)  or  of  probability  
(or  some  near  surrogate).  That  is  to  say,  provided  it  is  impossible  for  one  to  
fully  believe  in  a  proposition  without  grasping  that  proposition  in  its  
entirety.  But  it  is  possible  for  people  who  lack  such  concepts  –  such  as  
children  –  to  be  self-deceived.  Thus  requiring  such  beliefs  is  inappropriate.  
Requiring  that  [a  self-deceived  subject]  has  a  degree  of  belief  (or  degree  of  
confidence)  in  a  proposition,  on  the  other  hand,  doesn’t  require  that  the  
[self-deceived  subject]  has  the  concept  ‘degree  of  belief,’  or  even  that  the  
[self-deceived  subject]  is  aware  of  her  own  degrees  of  belief.  (p.  1212)  
  
As  a  result,  we  should  interpret  proposal  (G)  as  the  same  as  proposal  (F),  that  is,  
attribution  of  a  certain  degree  of  belief  that  not -p .  Since  this  attitude  should  reveal  that  
one’s  appraisal  of  the  natural  implication(s)  of  the  available  evidence  that  overall  
warrants  not- p ,  it  should  also  be  restricted  to  be  over  0.5  too.  Now,  it  should  be  clear  
that  when  we  account  for  the  access-to-information-element,  the  attribution  of  doxastic  
attitude  concerning  not- p  is  inevitably  be  introduced  or  involved  even  when  we  try  
hard  to  avoid  the  doxastic  approach  –  of  course,  we  have  two  options  at  hand  –  we  can  
attribute  either  a  full  belief  that  not- p  or  a  degree  of  belief  that  not -p ,  which  is  over  0.5,  
to  the  self-deceived  subject.   
  
2.3.4  Willful  ignorance  vs.  Self-deception  
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It  was  shown  in  the  previous  discussion  that,  by  attributing  a  full  belief  that  
not -p  or  a  degree  of  belief  that  not -p ,  which  is  over  0.5,  to  a  self-deceived  subject,  we  
can  successfully  distinguish  between  wishful  thinking  and  self-deception.  However,  
this  does  not  mean  that  we  have  already  solved  the  distinction  problem.  Even  though  
the  initial  study  of  the  distinction  problem  leads  us  to  attach  great  significance  to  the  
comparison  between  wishful  thinking  and  self-deception,  we  should  not  assume  that  
wishful  thinking  is  the  only  phenomenon  which  may  easily  be  confused  with  
self-deception.  The  fact  is  that  there  is  another  kind  of  motivated  irrationality  that  is 
characterized  by  the  attribution  of  a  suspicion  that  not -p  –  the  phenomenon  of  willful  
ignorance  (also  called  willful  blindness)  (Lynch,  2016).  Thus,  if  we  are  going  to  work  
out  a  thorough  solution  to  the  distinction  problem,  we  have  to  decide  whether  there  is  a  
difference(s)  between  willful  ignorance  and  self-deception.   
  
It  is  easy  to  determine  whether  willful  ignorance  should  be  considered  as  a  kind  
of  self-deception  since  Lynch  (2016)  already  provides  a  detailed  discussion  on  this  
issue.  As  Lynch  (2016)  indicates,  the  phenomenon  of  willful  ignorance  is  a  kind  of  
motivated  irrationality  in  which  the  subject  is  motivated  to  keep  herself  unaware  of  the  
evidence  that  would  lead  her  to  establish  the  truth  of  a  (probably  true)  proposition  that  
not -p .  “Burke”  is  a  standard  case  of  willful  ignorance:   
  
Consider  Burke,  who  believes  he  is  in  good  health,  but  who  one  day  
develops  some  abnormal  physical  symptoms.  He  knows  that  these  
symptoms  can  be  caused  by  condition  A,  which  is  harmless,  or  by  condition  
B,  a  mostly  fatal  disease.  So  his  having  these  symptoms  would  normally  
justify  a  visit  to  the  doctor,  though  condition  B  is  incurable.  Let’s  also  
suppose  that  these  developments  are  not  innocent  at  all.  However,  Burke  
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doesn’t  go,  because  he’d  rather  not  know  that  he  has  condition  B  if  he  does.  
(Lynch,  2016,  p.  506)  
  
Although  the  case  of  “Burke”  might  look  like  an  example  of  self-deception,  it  should  
be  classified  as  willful  ignorance  because  it  is  associated  with  a  limited  range  of  
doxastic  states,  which  is  different  from  those  involved  in  a  real  case  of  self-deception  
(Lynch,  2016).  As  Lynch  (2016)  writes:  
  
Willful  ignorance  and  self-deception  are  associated  with  different  ranges  of  
doxastic  states.  Willful  ignorance  involves  suspecting  that  [not- p ].  
Self-deception  can  involve  suspecting  that  [not- p ]  too,  but  it  can  also  
involve  believing  that  [ p ],  unlike  willful  ignorance.  (p.  552)   34
  
But  what  does  “suspecting”  mean?  Lynch  (2016)  contends  that  a  suspicion  that  
not -p  should  not  be  considered  as  a  (full)  belief  that  not -p ,  even  though  he  admits  that  a  
suspicion  that  not -p  is  (or  at  least  involves)  a  kind  of  belief  similar  to  a  (full)  belief  that  
not -p  might  be  true  (p.  509).  As  we  have  seen  in  the  discussion  of  proposal  (G),  such  
an  acknowledgment  will  eventually  lead  to  the  attribution  of  a  degree  of  belief  that  
not -p  to  the  involved  subject.  Moreover,  given  that  the  subjects  involved  in  cases  of  
willful  ignorance  behave  in  a  way  suggesting  that  not- p  is  likely  to  be  true  (such  as  
avoiding  contact  with  sources  of  evidence  that  can  help  them  to  figure  out  whether  
not- p ),  this  degree  of  belief  seems  to  be  over  0.5  as  well.  Consequently,  if  we  suggest  
that  willful  ignorance  should  not  be  a  form  of  self-deception,  we  will  have  to  discuss  
34  Lynch  (2016)  also  discusses  whether  the  motivation-element  can  help  us  distinguish  
between  willful  ignorance  and  self-deception  in  his  paper.  However,  even  though  Lynch  (2016)  
does  not  consider  a  desire  that  p  to  be  a  necessary  feature  of  willful  ignorance,  he  agrees  that  it  
is  possible  that  the  involved  subject  typically  desires  that  p  in  paradigmatic  willful  ignorance  
(p.  517).  Therefore,  Lynch  (2016)  decides  not  to  distinguish  the  two  phenomena  on  this  point  
(p.  517).   
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further  whether  we  should  restrict  the  unwarranted-attitude-element  of  self-deception  
in  the  way  suggested  by  Lynch  (2016).   
  
Given  Lynch’s  (2016)  argumentation  and  the  previous  discussion,  it  should  be  
evident  that  the  distinction  problem  cannot  be  completely  resolved  without  specifying  
the  access-to-information-element  and  the  unwarranted-attitude-element  together.  
However,  as  we  will  see  in  section  2.6,  many  theorists  have  tried  and  failed  to  account  
for  this  combination  because  they  cannot  solve  the  static  paradox  posed  by  their  
proposals.  Having  said  that,  I  will  also  show  that  even  if  we  figure  out  how  to  address  
this  combination  without  causing  the  static  paradox,  it  does  not  mean  that  our  study  
should  end  there.  For  the  time  being,  though,  I  would  offer  a  brief  synopsis  for  the  
discussion  on  how  to  specify  the  access-to-information-element:  a  certain  kind  of  
doxastic  attitude  towards  not -p  must  be  introduced  or  involved  while  accounting  for  
this  element,  and  this  doxastic  attitude  must  make  one  count  as  being  aware  of  the  
natural  implication(s)  of  the  available  data,  which  provides  greater  warrant  for  not -p  
than  for  p .  
  
2.4  An  unwarranted  attitude(s)  
As  mentioned  in  section  1.2.5,  theorists  think  that  an  unwarranted  attitude(s)  
concerning  p  is  necessarily  involved  in  the  phenomenon  of  self-deception  while  the  
acquisition  or  maintenance  of  this  necessary  attitude(s)  is  based  on,  or  at  least  related  
to,  the  self-deceiving  process.  There  are  at  least  five  proposals  from  the  literature  for  




(H)An  avowal  of  p ,  also  termed  an  avowed  belief  that  p  (Audi,  1982;  Rey,  1988)  
(I) Psychological  categories,  such  as  a  hope  that  p  or  a  desire  to  believe  that  p  
(Archer,  2013)  
(J) A  (full)  belief  that  p  (Bermúdez,  2000;  Davidson,  2004b;  Galeotti,  2016;  
Lynch,  2017;  Mele,  2001;  Sorensen,  1985;  Van  Leeuwen,  2007)  
(K)A  (full)  belief  that  believing  that  p  (Funkhouser,  2005;  Nelkin,  2002)  
(L) The  indeterminate  approach  (Funkhouser,  2009;  Porcher,  2012;  Schwitzgebel,  
2010)   35
  
Note  that  theorists  usually  agree  that  the  necessary  attitude(s)  is  inside  one’s  conscious  
mind,  or  at  least  can  be  easily  drawn  into  conscious  awareness,  although  some  of  them  
think  that  the  possessor  of  this  attitude  might  lack  knowledge  about  its  true  colors.   I  36
agree  with  this  idea,  given  that  one  of  the  phenomenological  features  of  self-deception  
is  the  verbal  behavior  (both  privately  and  publicly)  which  seems  to  suggest  the  
assumption  that  p  (Archer,  2013,  p.  277;  Audi,  1982,  p.  137;  Funkhouser,  2005,  p.  306;  
Galeotti,  2012,  p.  50;  Rorty,  1988,  p.  11;  Szabados,  1973,  p.  205;  Van  Leeuwen,  2007).  
It  is  psychologically  abnormal  for  one  to  consciously  affirm  a  particular  proposition,  
namely  not  just  a  slip  of  the  tongue,  without  consciously  experiencing  a  corresponding  
mental  state  that  encourages  one  to  do  so.  
  
Again,  whether  any  of  those  proposals  can  solve  the  distinction  problem  will  
(primarily)  depend  on  what  the  necessary  attitude(s)  involved  in  wishful  thinking  is.  
35  But  I  think  proponents  of  proposal  (L)  would  probably  tend  not  to  use  the  term  “necessary  
attitude(s)”  in  order  to  avoid  misunderstanding,  given  that  they  do  not  view  the  idea  of  
“propositional  attitude  (particularly,  beliefs)”  in  a  usual  way.  I  will  replace  “necessary  
attitude(s)”  with  the  word  “product”  (which  is  a  term  adopted  by  Funkhouser  (2009))  when  I  
discuss  the  indeterminate  approach.  More  details  of  this  view  will  be  presented  in  section  2.4.4.   
36  Once  again,  since  proponents  of  proposal  (L)  have  new  ideas  on  what  a  “propositional  
attitude”  is,  it  is  hard  to  say  whether  they  think  that  one  can  be  “conscious”  or  “unconscious”  
of  a  certain  propositional  attitude.  
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We  have  already  determined  that  the  necessary  attitude  involved  in  wishful  thinking  is  
a  belief  that  p ,  but  we  need  to  be  careful  that  this  belief  needs  not  be  restricted  as  a  full  
one,  as  long  as  it  can  count  as  believing  that  p .  Therefore,  the  positive  attitude  towards  
p  acquired  by  a  wishful  thinker  can  be  a  belief  that  p  or  a  degree  of  belief  that  p ,  which  
is  over  0.5.  Hence  it  is  clear  that  proposal  (J)  should  be  disqualified.   
  
2.4.1  An  avowal  of  p ,  or  an  avowed  belief  that  p  
Both  Audi  (1982)  and  Rey  (1988)  argue  for  a  behavioral  approach  to  account  
for  the  unwarranted-attitude-element,  which  suggests  attributing  an  avowal  of  p ,  or  an  
avowed  belief  that  p ,  to  self-deceived  subjects.   I  prefer  the  term  “avowal”  to  avoid  37
misunderstanding,  but  we  should  be  careful  that  we  are  now  considering  a  particular  
attitude  towards  p  rather  than  only  what  an  agent  says.  As  Van  Leeuwen  (2007)  
concludes,  for  both  Audi  and  Rey,  an  avowal  is  a  positive  attitude  towards  p  that  makes  
one  have  “a  disposition  to  affirm  a  proposition  to  oneself  and  others  with  ‘sincerity,’  
but  which  lacks  deep  connections  to  action”  (p.  426;  see  also  Audi,  1982,  p.  138).  The  
possessor  of  an  avowal  of  p  is  capable  of  consciously  reflecting  on  her  verbal  
endorsement  of  p  and  considering  it  as  a  sincere  conviction,  namely  not  a  lie  (or  the  
37  Some  might  wonder  why  we  should  consider  “an  avowal  of  p ”  as  the  necessary  attitude  
involved  in  self-deception,  since  its  acquisition  or  maintenance  does  not  seem  to  necessarily  be  
related  to  the  occurrence  of  the  self-deceiving  process  at  first  glance.  Yet,  Audi  (1982)  clearly  
indicates  that  one  is  in  self-deception  with  respect  to  p  when  one  is  motivated  to  put  one’s  
belief  that  not- p  into  the  unconscious  mind  and  be  disposed  to  avow  p  because  of  a  certain  
want(s)  (p.  137).  While  the  (unconscious)  belief  that  not- p  is  an  evidence-warranted  attitude  
representing  the  access-to-information-element,  the  disposition  implies  the  acquisition  of  an  
avowal  of  p .  In  this  sense,  in  the  phenomenon  of  self-deception,  the  acquisition  of  an  avowal  of  
p  is  precisely  caused  by  the  operative  motivation(s)  involved  in  the  phenomenon,  in  which  
some  sort  of  cognitive  process  must  be  involved  (namely,  the  self-deceiving  process).  In  
addition,  we  should  note  that  an  avowal  of  p  is  not  a  kind  of  attitude  that  can  be  immune  to  the  
power  of  evidence,  as  Audi  (1982)  acknowledges  that  evidence  supporting  not- p  could  threaten  
the  maintenance  of  this  avowal  (p.  137).  
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like)  (Audi,  1982,  p.  140).   However,  such  a  sincere  avowal  can  never  be  a  cause  of  38
non-verbal  action  in  the  way  that  doxastic  attitudes  are,  and  it  does  not  entail  any  
corresponding  doxastic  attitude  (Audi,  1982,  p.  138).   Audi  (1982)  and  Rey  (1988)  39
think  that,  in  a  typical  case  of  self-deception,  the  involved  subject  should  verbally  
endorse  p ,  whereas  her  non-verbal  behavior  cannot  support  the  attribution  of  a  belief  
that  p .  Accordingly,  they  both  argue  that  such  an  inconsistency  reveals  that  the  
involved  subject  holds  an  avowal  of  p  rather  than  a  belief  that  p .   
  
Van  Leeuwen  (2007)  points  out  at  least  two  reasons  why  the  avowal  view  is  
flawed.  First,  there  is  no  theoretical  or  example-based  reason  for  supposing  a  
restriction  on  the  connections  between  the  necessary  attitude(s)  involved  in  
self-deception  and  non-verbal  behavior  in  the  way  described  by  this  view  (Van  
Leeuwen,  2007).  Second,  Van  Leeuwen  (2007)  asserts  that  by  referring  to  (alleged)  
cases  of  self-deception,  we  can  see  that  the  necessary  attitude(s)  is  probably  
context-independent  in  character.  If  this  is  the  case,  it  suggests  that  this  attitude  is  not  
likely  to  be  an  avowal,  as  an  avowal  can  only  manifest  itself  in  a  limited  range  of  
situations.  
38  According  to  the  avowal  view,  a  self-deceived  subject  should  lack  the  knowledge  of  what  
kind  of  positive  attitude  towards  p  she  actually  holds.  Despite  this,  I  believe  it  is  reasonable  to  
assume  that  an  avowal  of  p  is  not  stored  in  one’s  unconscious  mind,  by  comparing  it  to  Audi’s  
idea  of  “unconscious  belief.”  As  Audi  (1982)  explains,  his  idea  of  “unconscious  belief”  is  very  
much  like  that  of  a  conscious  one  since  it  can  also  manifest  itself  in  a  subject’s  consciousness  
and  (both  verbal  and  non-verbal)  behavior  (p.  137).  However,  the  verbal  evidence  of  an  
unconscious  belief  is  limited  to  be  some  kind  of  slips  of  the  tongue  only  (Ibid.).  More  
importantly,  when  that  unconscious  belief  does  manifest  itself  in  the  subject's  consciousness  
and  behavior,  she  is  very  unlikely  to  consciously  attribute  such  manifestations  to  her  or  
consider  that  belief  as  the  cause  of  her  actions,  unless  she  gets  extra  help  (Ibid.).  Given  that  an  
avowal  of  p  is  precisely  related  to  one’s  conscious  verbal  endorsement,  I  do  not  see  the  reason  
for  insisting  that  it  should  be  put  inside  one’s  unconscious  mind.  




Van  Leeuwen  (2007)  elaborates  on  the  first  flaw  by  referring  to  the  following  
(alleged)  case  of  self-deception,  herein  named  the  case  of  “business  crisis”:   
  
Let’s  consider  a  business  owner.  Her  business  has  been  successful  until  a  
year  ago,  but  has  been  running  at  a  bad  loss  and  shows  no  sign  of  getting  
better.  [...]  Nevertheless,  she  wants  badly  for  her  business  to  succeed  and  
insists  that  it  will  turn  around.  She  has  the  opportunity  to  sell  off  her  current  
assets  for  a  considerable  sum.  Instead,  she  takes  out  loans  against  those  
assets  such  that  everything  will  go  to  the  bank  if  the  business  fails.  [...]  If  
she  doesn’t  actually  believe  her  business  will  turn  around,  how  does  it  come  
about  that—at  the  very  time  it  would  be  best  to  cut  losses—she  takes  out  a  
loan  to  save  the  business?  [...]  We  can  contrast  the  self-deceived  business  
woman  with  another  person  we  might  call  merely  flaky  or  superficial.  
Imagine  a  business  woman  whose  business  is  failing  in  like  fashion  to  that  
of  the  self-deceived  business  woman.  This  one,  however,  doesn’t  take  out  
the  loans  or  attempt  to  save  the  business  in  any  way,  despite  insisting  that  
she  can  turn  the  business  around.  The  business  woman  who  doesn’t  take 
action  is  just  being  flakey,  talking  one  way  and  acting  in  a  way  that  
indicates  contrary  beliefs.  (p.  423-432)  
  
Indeed,  there  is  something  unexplained  in  the  case  of  “business  crisis”  if  the  necessary  
attitude  involved  in  self-deception  is  an  avowal  of  p ,  which  cannot  generate  non-verbal  
actions.  As  Van  Leeuwen  (2007)  contends,  even  if  the  evidence  of  the  necessary  
attitude(s)  often  consists  of  verbal  behavior  in  many  alleged  cases  of  self-deception,  we  
do  not  have  to  assume  that  this  attitude  must  lack  a  connection  with  non-verbal  
behavior  (p.  431-432).  Given  this,  it  will  be  wrong  to  think  that  the  necessary  attitude  




Regarding  the  second  flaw,  Van  Leeuwen  (2007)  states  that,  even  though  
cognitive  attitudes  other  than  beliefs  may  also  play  a  role  in  the  constitution  of  actions,  
only  beliefs  can  causally  affect  one’s  actions  in  a  way  that  is  independent  of  contexts.   40
Hence  if  the  necessary  attitude  affects  the  constitution  of  actions  in  a  way  that  seems  
not  to  be  limited  to  specific  contexts,  the  necessary  attitude  should  be  a  doxastic  one.  In  
view  of  this  idea,  Van  Leeuwen  (2007)  reconsiders  the  case  of  “business  crisis”:   
  
It  is  clear  that  her  action  of  taking  out  loans  to  keep  the  business  afloat  is  
driven  to  a  great  extent  by  her  self-deception.  But  is  the  cognitive  attitude  
underlying  this  action  context  sensitive,  i.e.,  only  psychomechanically  
effective  in  certain  kinds  of  context?  It  is  more  likely  that  its  influence  on  
action  pervades  many  contexts,  such  as  speech,  planning  various  endeavors,  
taking  out  loans,  and  considering  whether  to  quit.  If  this  is  the  case,  then  
the  product  of  her  self-deception  forms  the  default  for  action  relative  to  the  
other,  context-sensitive  cognitive  attitudes.  (p.  435-436)  
  
If  Van  Leeuwen  (2007)  is  right,  the  necessary  attitude  is  more  likely  to  be  a  doxastic  
attitude  that  can  make  a  given  subject  count  as  believing  that  p ,  namely  a  full  belief  
that  p  or  a  degree  of  belief  that  p  which  is  over  0.5.   But  then,  it  turns  out  that  the  41
discussion  of  the  avowal  view  has  led  us  to  say  the  necessary  attitude  involved  in  
self-deception  is  identical  to  the  one  involved  in  wishful  thinking.  
40  We  can  compare  “imagination”  with  “beliefs”  to  demonstrate  the  difference.  “Imagination”  
can  only  cause  actions  in  the  context  of  making-believe,  while  beliefs  are  the  default  
background  for  the  constitution  of  actions  under  various  contexts  (Van  Leeuwen,  2007,  p.  434).  
For  example,  my  belief  that  I  am  a  female  can  causally  affect  many  of  my  actions  in  different  
contexts.  When  I  am  reporting  my  gender,  I  will  say  “female.”  When  I  am  deciding  what  to  
wear  to  a  wedding,  I  will  immediately  look  for  a  long  dress  rather  than  a  suit  for  men.  When  I  
am  trying  to  imagine  myself  as  the  opposite  gender,  I  will  imagine  that  “I  am  a  male.”   
41  If  the  given  subject  should  not  count  as  believing  that  p ,  then  why  does  she  behave  as  if  she  




2.4.2  Psychological  categories,  such  as  a  hope  that  p  or  a  desire  to  believe  that  p   
In  an  attempt  to  account  for  the  unwarranted-attitude-element  by  taking  the  
affective  approach,  Archer  (2013)  contends  that  there  is  no  explanatory  need  to  
attribute  a  belief  that  p  or  a  degree  of  belief  that  p  to  self-deceived  subjects,  since  their  
hope  that  p  or  desire  to  believe  that  p  (or  some  other  affective  attitudes  similar  to  the  
two)  can  successfully  explain  why  they  (internally  and  externally)  behave  as  if  p  (p.  
277).   Yet,  apart  from  just  being  the  manifestation  of  the  necessary  attitudes,  Archer  42
(2013)  also  points  out  that  this  “as-if- p ”  behavior  itself  also  helps  to  further  generates  
“evidence”  that  can  maintain  one’s  hope  that  p  (or  the  like)  in  the  face  of  contrary  
evidence,  such  as  “social  evidence”  (p.  277).    43
  
42  According  to  Archer  (2013),  this  “as-if- p ”  behavior  refers  to  one’s  verbal  behavior  that  
seemingly  suggests  a  belief  that  p  (p.  277).  In  addition  to  telling  others  that  p  is  true,  
self-deceived  subjects  also  continually  tell  themselves  that  p  is  true  when  they  engage  in  such  a  
kind  of  acting  as-if  (Ibid.).  In  this  sense,  in  Archer’s  (2013)  view,  a  hope  that  p  (or  the  like)  is  
very  similar  to  an  avowal  of  p ,  although  Archer  does  not  explicitly  require  the  possessor  of  a  
hope  that  p  (or  the  like)  to  avow  p  with  sincerity.  Yet,  given  what  was  mentioned  in  section  
2.4.1,  we  should  note  that  the  evidence  of  the  necessary  attitude(s)  should  not  be  considered  as  
verbal  behavior  only.   
43  As  Archer  (2013)  admits,  the  “as-if- p ”  behavior  is  a  kind  of  self-deceitful  strategy  adopted  
by  self-deceived  subjects  (namely  a  part  of  the  self-deceiving  process/cognition)  (note.  16).  
Also,  we  can  infer  from  Archer's  (2013)  idea  that  evidence  in  favor  of  not- p  does  threaten  the  
maintenance  of  those  suggested  affective  attitudes,  which  reveals  that  they  are  able  to  be  
properly  affected  by  the  power  of  evidence  in  ideal  circumstances.  Recall  that  the  necessary  
attitude(s)  has  to  be  an  unwarranted  attitude(s)  with  its  acquisition  or  maintenance  grounded  in,  
or  at  least  related  to,  the  self-deceiving  process.  Now  we  can  see  why  those  affective  attitudes  
suggested  by  Archer  (2013)  should  be  treated  as  the  necessary  attitudes  involved  in  
self-deception.  First,  given  that  the  available  evidence  must  be  overall  in  favor  of  not- p  in  cases  
of  self-deception,  their  maintenance  necessarily  relies  on  the  occurrence  of  the  self-deceitful  
strategies  (such  as  the  performance  of  “as-if- p ”  behavior).  Second,  following  the  above  idea,  
we  can  say  they  are  “unwarranted”  in  the  sense  that  they  fail  to  be  properly  affected  by  the  
power  of  the  available  evidence.   
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However,  Chan  and  Rowbottom  (2019)  argue  that,  once  Archer  admits  that  a  
suspicion  that  p  entails  beliefs  with  p  in  their  contents,  the  idea  seems  to  hold  for  other  
affective  attitudes  as  well:   
  
For  example,  having  a  hope  that  p  or  an  anxiety  that  p  appears  to  entail  
having  a  non-zero  degree  of  belief  that  p  is  true  or  a  belief  (or  reasonably  
high  degree  of  belief)  that  p  is  epistemically  possible.  One  does  not  hope  to  
win  the  first  and  second  prizes  in  a  lottery  when  one  is  certain  that  one  only  
has  one  lottery  ticket  and  that  each  ticket  can  only  win  one  prize.  (p.  1211)  
  
As  mentioned  in  section  2.3.3,  a  belief  with  a  particular  proposition  in  its  content  
would  better  be  interpreted  as  a  degree  of  belief  in  that  proposition.  In  addition,  Archer  
(2013)  acknowledges  that,  in  paradigm  cases  of  self-deception,  self-deceived  subjects  
behave  as  if  they  assume  that  p  is  true,  which  is  consistent  with  the  general  agreement  
among  other  theorists  who  are  interested  in  the  study  of  self-deception  (p.  276-278).  
For  example,  the  involved  subjects  may  strongly  defend  p  against  criticisms.  As  a  
result,  it  turns  out  that  the  affective  approach  suggests  the  necessary  attitude  involved  
in  self-deception  should  be  (or  at  least  necessarily  entail)  a  degree  of  belief  that  p ,  
which  should  make  a  given  subject  count  as  believing  that  p .  If  this  is  the  case,  this  
approach  also  fails  to  specify  the  unwarranted-attitude-element  of  self-deception  as  
something  different  from  that  of  wishful  thinking.  
  
2.4.3  A  (full)  belief  that  believing  that  p  
  Since  both  the  behavioral  approach  and  the  affective  approach  turn  out  to  blur  
the  boundary  between  self-deception  and  wishful  thinking,  maybe  we  should  consider  
the  issue  in  a  doxastic  way.  Some  philosophers,  like  Funkhouser  (2005),  argue  that  we  
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should  shift  the  content  of  the  necessary  attitude  involved  in  self-deception  to  the  
second-order  level  and  attribute  a  false  belief  that  “I  believe  that  p ”  to  self-deceived  
subjects.  On  Funkhouser’s  (2005)  view,  such  second-order  beliefs  help  their  possessors  
with  four  abilities  (p.  305-306).  The  agents  will  then  be  able  to  report  that  p  both  
publicly  and  privately,  use  such  second-order  beliefs  in  practical  reasoning,  and  
integrate  into  theoretical  reasoning  the  embedded  first-order  belief  that  p  (Ibid.).  
Funkhouser  (2005)  also  emphasizes  that  the  last  two  abilities  do  not  hold  when  the  
relevant  second-order  belief  is  false  (p.  306).  Therefore,  since  the  belief  that  “I  believe  
that  p ”  introduced  in  Funkhouser’s  (2005)  model  of  self-deception  should  be  a  false  
one,  this  belief  can  only  cause  the  involved  subject  to  avow  that  p  publicly  or  privately  
but  lack  connections  with  her  planning  of  further  actions  and  inner  deliberation.  If  
Funkhouser  (2005)  is  right,  the  necessary  attitude  involved  in  self-deception  should  be  
self-focused  rather  than  world-focused.  As  the  necessary  attitude  involved  in  wishful  
thinking  is  supposed  to  be  a  world-focused  one,  the  second-order  proposal  could  be  
useful  for  solving  the  distinction  problem.   
  
However,  there  are  at  least  three  reasons  to  reject  this  second-order  proposal.  
First,  it  suggests  a  dual  model  of  self-deception.  As  Archer  (2018)  asserts,  “[a]ccording  
to  ‘transparency’  theorists  about  self-knowledge,  the  question  whether  I  believe  that  p  
is  transparent  to  the  question  whether  p ”  (p.  3044).  That  is  to  say,  when  an  agent  
considers  whether  she  believes  p ,  what  she  has  in  her  mind  should  be  the  question  
whether  she  takes  p  to  be  true.  Following  this  idea,  in  order  to  acquire  the  false  
second-order  belief  that  p ,  the  subject  must  first  prompt  self-deceitful  strategies  for  
acquiring  the  first-order  belief  that  p .  If  this  is  the  case,  the  success  of  this  second-order  
73  
  
model  of  self-deception  actually  depends  on  whether  the  subject  can  make  herself  
self-deceive  that  p .  Incidentally,  if  a  given  subject  succeeds  in  deceiving  herself  into  
acquiring  a  belief  that  p ,  it  does  not  seem  to  be  wrong  to  obtain  further  a  belief  that  “I  
believe  that  p ”  since  it  is  actually  a  true  belief  based  on  her  introspection.   
  
Maybe  we  could  assume  that  the  “transparency”  theory  is  not  applicable  to  the  
study  of  self-deception.  However,  the  second-order  proposal  is  still  problematic  
because  there  is  just  no  reason  to  limit  the  connections  between  the  necessary  attitude  
and  non-verbal  behavior  in  the  way  described  by  the  second-order  proposal.  As  we  
have  seen  in  the  previous  discussion  of  the  avowal  view,  if  a  particular  kind  of  
motivated  irrationality  can  only  affect  one’s  non-verbal  actions,  it  should  better  be  
classified  as  “flakiness”  (Van  Leeuwen,  2007,  p.  432).  So,  it  is  fair  to  say  we  should  not  
restrict  the  relations  between  the  second-order  belief  that  p  and  the  possessor’s  
non-verbal  actions  in  the  way  described.  Now,  let  us  assume  that  the  second-order  
proposal  is  right  for  the  sake  of  argument.  If  there  is  no  such  limitation  in  these  
relations,  all  the  four  abilities  of  the  second-order  belief  should  remain  fully  functional.  
Based  on  Funkhouser’s  (2005)  idea,  such  a  situation  will  probably  suggest  that  the  
possessor  of  this  second-order  belief  that  p  does  hold  the  corresponding  first-order  
belief  that  p .   Given  that  the  available  evidence  must  overall  warrant  not- p  in  cases  of  44
self-deception,  this  first-order  belief  that  p  involved  in  the  phenomenon  has  to  be  
generated  through  the  self-deceiving  process  as  well.  Accordingly,  proponents  of  this  
proposal  then  face  a  dilemma  if  they  refuse  to  accept  that  the  
44  Funkhouser  (2005)  does  not  explain  whether  there  is  an  exceptional  case  in  which  the  
involved  second-order  belief  is  false,  but  all  the  four  abilities  still  function.  So,  I  would  assume  
that  there  is  no  such  case.   
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unwarranted-attitude-element  should  primarily  be  represented  by  a  belief  that  p .  This  
proposal  suggests  either  a  dual  model  of  self-deception,  which  would  be  a  less  
economical  strategy,  or  an  unreasonable  idea  that  an  agent  still  has  to  “deceive”  herself  
into  acquiring  a  belief  that  “I  believe  that  p ”  even  if  she  does  hold  the  corresponding  
first-order  belief  that  p .  
  
Finally,  it  seems  that  “a  belief  that  ‘I  believe  that  p ’”  is  just  a  variant  of  “a  
belief  that  p .”  Recall  that  p  can  represent  any  unwarranted  proposition  that  the  ongoing  
self-deception  is  about.  Similar  to  the  counter-argument  we  have  seen  in  section  2.2.2,  
I  do  not  see  the  reason  why  a  subject  cannot  be  in  self-deception  with  respect  to  the  
proposition  “I  believe  in  a  specific  proposition.”  Unless  someone  offers  a  convincing  
reason  for  rejecting  such  a  situation,  the  difference  between  proposal  (J)  and  the  
second-order  belief  proposal  is  uncertain.   
  
If  any  of  the  above  three  counter-arguments  is  acceptable,  it  will  turn  out  that  
the  second-order  proposal  leads  us  to  attribute  a  first-order  belief  that  p  to  a  
self-deceived  subject.  Thus,  the  second-order  proposal  fails  to  address  the  difference  
between  the  unwarranted-attitude-element  of  self-deception  and  that  of  wishful  
thinking.  
  
2.4.4  The  indeterminate  approach 
I  am  going  to  discuss  the  last  option  for  specifying  the  content  of  the  
unwarranted-attitude-element,  namely  the  indeterminate  proposal.  This  approach  is  
developed  in  view  of  the  idea  that  sometimes  it  is  indeterminate  as  to  what  a  given  
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subject  believes  with  regard  to  a  particular  proposition,  since  “believe”  is  just  a  “vague  
predicate”  (Funkhouser,  2009;  Porcher,  2012;  Schwitzgebel,  2010).   Proponents  of  45
this  idea  view  “belief”  as  a  folk-psychological  term  merely  used  to  conclude  the  overall  
status  of  a  particular  group  of  cognitive  states,  or  dispositions,  possessed  by  a  given  
subject.  Thus,  they  contend  that  it  is  wrong  to  talk  of  indicators  of  one’s  “belief  state,”  
as  there  is  nothing  like  that  from  the  very  beginning.  For  instance,  while  we  usually  
think  that  “consciously  regarding  p  as  true  in  one’s  reasoning”  is  a  significant  piece  of  
evidence  supporting  the  attribution  of  a  belief  that  p ,  they  only  consider  such  a  
situation  as  one  of  the  many  conditions  that  help  us  to  decide  whether  one  meets  the  
folk-psychological  stereotype  for  “believing  that  p .”   If  we  want  to  develop  more  46
informative  explanations  to  some  complex  cases  (like  self-deception),  we  should  shift  
from  talking  about  a  simple  attribution  (or  denial)  of  a  vague  predicate(s)  to  careful  
descriptions  of  cognitive  states,  or  dispositions,  concerning  p  possessed  by  the  
involved  subjects.  There  are  at  least  two  ways  to  apply  this  idea  to  the  framework  of  
self-deception.   
  
First,  as  I  have  mentioned  in  section  1.1.2.2,  Funkhouser  (2009)  focuses  on  
studying  a  particular  type  of  self-deception  that  is  called  “deeply  conflicted  
45  As  Schwitzgebel  (2010)  illustrates,  “tall”  is  another  example  of  vague  predicates:  
Is  a  man  tall  if  he’s  five  foot  eleven  inches?  In  some  contexts  a  simple  yes  or  no  
may  suffice,  but  a  more  careful  ascription  will  instead  clarify  with  specific  detail:  
‘Well,  he’s  five-eleven.’  (p.  535)  
46  In  this  sense,  it  is  hard  to  tell  whether  one  is  conscious  of  one’s  “belief  that  p ”  since  “belief”  
is  not  something  in  one’s  mind  but  a  folk-psychological  concept  only.  Following  this  idea,  the  
discussion  of  the  unwarranted-attitude-element  of  self-deception  is  actually  the  study  of  
whether  self-deceived  subjects  fit  the  stereotype  for  “believing  that  p .”  Incidentally,  the  
conditions  for  meeting  the  folk-psychological  stereotype  for  “believing  that  p ”  should  involve  
both  conscious  and  unconscious  behavior.   
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self-deception.”   In  the  light  of  the  inconsistency  presented  in  deeply  conflicted  cases,  47
Funkhouser  (2009)  suggests  that  the  failure  of  various  views  which  are  aimed  at  
explaining  such  cases  “is  not  due  to  our  limited  epistemic  perspective,  rather  it  is  a  real  
indeterminacy  in  the  world,”  namely  a  real  indeterminacy  in  the  concept  of  “(full)  
belief”  in  folk-psychology  (p.  10).   
  
Owing  to  this  idea,  Funkhouser  (2009)  contends:  
  
[A]  person’s  beliefs  are  constituted  by  their  status  with  respect  [to]  […]  
different  regarding-as-true  stances,  rather  than  these  being  mere  indicators  
or  evidence  of  their  belief  state.  In  this  sense,  [...]  belief  reduces  to,  or  is  
nothing  over  and  above,  these  regarding-as-true  stances  (p.  9).   
  
Therefore,  Funkhouser  (2009)  thinks  that  when  we  consider  deeply  conflicted  cases,  
“we  must  descend  to  a  lower-level  (i.e.  the  component  regarding-as-true  stances)  in  
order  to  adequately  characterize  the  cognitive  states  of  at  least  some  of  the  
self-deceived  [subject],”  or  we  can  say  “It  is  simply  indeterminate  what  the  person  
believes  [with  respect  to  p ]  in  these  situations”  (p.  12).   Funkhouser  (2009)  also  48
clearly  indicates  that  self-deceived  subjects  are  motivated  to  acquire  “specific  values  
for  one  or  more  of  the  component  regarding-as-true  stances”  towards  p  through  the  
self-deceiving  process,  rather  than  a  particular  belief  simpliciter  (p.  13).  So,  for  
detailedly  explaining  the  direct  result  of  the  self-deceiving  process,  which  is  also  
47  We  might  refer  to  the  case  of  “Nicole”  mentioned  in  section  1.1.2.2  for  understanding  the  
idea  of  “deeply  conflicted  self-deception.”   
48  We  should  note  that  “being  indeterminate  what  one  believes  with  respect  to  p ”  is  not  a  
specific  kind  of  mental  state  that  one  can  be  determinately  in,  but  a  brief  description  used  to  
express  the  situation  that  one  fails  to  appropriately  match  or  mismatch  the  folk-psychological  
concept  of  “believing  that  p. ”  
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termed  the  product  of  self-deception  by  Funkhouser  (2009),  in  deeply  conflicted  
self-deception,  we  should  make  a  list  of  regarding-as-true  stances  concerning  p  owned  
by  the  involved  subject  (p.  9).  For  example,  as  Funkhouser  (2009)  explains,  in  the  case  
of  “Nicole,”  Nicole  is  motivated  to  at  least  “regard  p  as  true  in  internal  and  external  
reporting  senses”  (and  obtain  the  disposition  to  do  so)  (p.  13).  In  addition,  Funkhouser  
(2009)  notes  that  self-deception  does  not  produce  a  common  product  since  there  can  be  
“many  possible  forms  that  deeply  conflicted  self-deception  can  take”  (p.  9).  Hence  
Funkhouser  (2009)  thinks  that  the  study  should  also  be  developed  on  a  case-by-case  
basis.   
  
Second,  Schwitzgebel  (2010),  along  with  Porcher  (2012),  states  that  we  should  
take  a  dispositionalist  approach  to  the  issue  and  then  consider  cases  of  self-deception  to  
be  “in-between”  cases  of  believing.  The  “in-between”  view  (as  one  version  of  
dispositionalism  about  beliefs)  suggested  by  Schwitzgebel  (2001,  2010)  is  conceived  
based  on  the  observation  that  there  are  a  number  of  cases  in  which  a  direct  “yes”  or  
“no”  to  the  question  “whether  the  involved  subject  believes  that  p ”  seems  to  be  
unsuitable  (at  least  at  first  sight).  Given  this  observation,  Schwitzgebel  (2002)  infers  
that  “beliefs”  should  be  dispositional  in  character  and  “to  believe  that  P  […]  is  nothing  
more  than  to  match  to  an  appropriate  degree  and  in  appropriate  respects  the  
dispositional  stereotype  for  believing  that  P”  (p.  253).  In  this  sense,  it  is  no  surprise  
that  “there  will  be  in-betweenish  cases  in  which  the  relevant  disposition  or  dispositions  
are  only  partly  possessed”  (Schwitzgebel,  2010,  p.  535).  Schwitzgebel  (2001)  quotes  
Ryle  in  order  to  demonstrate  his  idea,  discussing  what  it  is  “to  believe  that  the  ice  is  




[It  is]  to  be  unhesitant  in  telling  oneself  and  others  that  it  is  thin,  in  
acquiescing  in  other  people’s  assertions  to  that  effect,  in  objecting  to  
statements  to  the  contrary,  in  drawing  consequences  from  the  original  
proposition,  and  so  forth.  But  it  is  also  to  be  prone  to  skate  warily,  to  
shudder,  to  dwell  in  imagination  on  possible  disasters  and  to  warn  other  
skaters.  It  is  a  propensity  not  only  to  make  certain  theoretical  moves  but  
also  to  make  certain  executive  and  imaginative  moves  as  well  as  to  have  
certain  feelings.  (as  cited  in  p.  81)  
  
Schwitzgebel  (2010)  briefly  mentions  that  he  prefers  to  handle  the  doxastic  issue  of  
self-deception  by  the  in-betweenish  treatment  although  he  does  not  provide  a  detailed  
account  of  this.   
  
Porcher  (2012)  further  explores  the  “in-between”  view  and  discusses  whether  it  
is  useful  for  the  study  of  the  unwarranted-attitude-element  of  self-deception.  To  start  
with,  Porcher  (2012)  points  out  that  it  seems  to  be  theoretically  impossible  for  us  to  
account  for  the  inconsistency  manifested  by  the  behavior  of  self-deceived  subjects  with  
the  folk-psychological  concept  of  (full)  beliefs.  Porcher  (2012)  demonstrates  his  idea  
by  quoting  a  case  of  a  cancer  victim,  which  is  a  famous  example  of  self-deception  
originally  asserted  by  Rorty  (1988).  As  Rorty  (1988)  writes:  
  
Dr.  Laetitia  Androvna  [...]  [is  a]  specialist  in  the  diagnosis  of  cancer,  whose  
fascination  for  the  obscure  does  not  usually  blind  her  to  the  obvious,  she  
has  begun  to  misdescribe  and  ignore  symptoms  that  the  most  junior  
premedical  student  would  recognize  as  the  unmistakable  symptoms  of  the  
late  stages  of  a  currently  incurable  form  of  cancer.  Normally  introspective,  
given  to  consulting  friends  on  important  matters,  she  now  
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uncharacteristically  deflects  their  questions  and  attempts  to  discuss  her  
condition.  Nevertheless,  also  uncharacteristically,  she  is  bringing  her 
practical  and  financial  affairs  into  order:  though  young  and  by  no  means  
affluent,  she  is  drawing  up  a  detailed  will.  Never  a  serious  correspondent,  
reticent  about  matters  of  affection,  she  has  taken  to  writing  effusive  letters  
to  distant  friends  and  relatives,  intimating  farewells,  and  urging  them  to  
visit  her  soon.  (p.  11)  
  
Let  p  be  “I  have  a  currently  incurable  form  of  cancer.”  It  is  noticeable  that  neither  the  
attribution  of  a  (full)  belief  that  p  nor  the  attribution  of  a  (full)  belief  that  not- p  seems  
to  describe  the  overall  behavior  of  Dr.  Androvna  accurately.  Porcher  (2012)  indicates  
that  this  explanatory  failure  actually  reveals  “unrealistic  assumptions  about  the  limits  
of  folk  psychology”  (p.  79).  Given  this  doubt  of  the  adequacy  of  folk  psychological  
concepts,  for  explaining  the  phenomenon  of  self-deception,  Porcher  (2012)  contends:   
  
[We  should]  set  off  from  an  account  that  identifies  believing  with  being  
disposed  to  act  and  react  in  various  ways  in  various  circumstances.  Better  
yet:  an  account  which  is  built  upon  a  broad  dispositional  base.  [...]  After  
descending  to  a  lower  level  of  description  than  that  of  “believes  that  p ,”  and  
articulating  the  subject’s  dispositional  structure  in  the  finest  possible  detail  
we  can,  we  may  complement  our  description  by  matching  certain  
dispositional  patterns  with  certain  belief  stereotypes,  or  by  investigating  the  
etiology  of  the  relevant  phenomenon  to  propose  an  answer  as  to  why  and  
how  the  mixed  set  of  dispositions  is  acquired,  etc.  (p.  79-80)  
  
It  appears  that  the  indeterminate  approach  can  provide  us  with  an  innovative  
method  of  viewing  self-deception  without  losing  the  diversity  of  it.  According  to  this  
approach,  we  should  withhold  the  attribution  and  denial  of  a  “belief  that  p ”  to  
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self-deceived  subjects  since  they  only  partly  meet  the  folk-psychological  stereotype  for  
“believing  that  p. ”   As  we  agree  that  wishful  thinkers  determinately  believe  that  p ,  49
namely,  fit  the  stereotype  for  “believing  that  p ,”  the  indeterminate  approach  seems  to  
be  able  to  solve  the  distinction  problem  in  a  peculiar  manner.  
  
  However,  it  is  doubtful  that  this  approach  can  account  for  the  irrational  nature  
of  self-deception.  As  mentioned  previously,  the  irrationality  of  self-deception  depends  
on  whether  the  involved  subject  behaves  in  a  way  that  is  contradictory  to  what  the  
available  evidence  actually  warrants,  namely  not -p .  This  criterion  suggests  the  
access-to-information-element,  which  means  that  the  subject  must  be  aware  of  this  
evidence  and  its  natural  implication(s)  (as  I  have  discussed  in  section  2.3.1).  Yet  it  is  
unclear  how  we  could  address  the  access-to-information-element  with  Funkhouser’s  
(2009)  idea  or  the  “in-between”  view  without  causing  a  problem.  If  the  indeterminate  
approach  is  true,  self-deceived  subjects  will  have  to  appropriately  fit  the  
folk-psychological  stereotype  for  “believing  that  not- p ”  in  order  to  count  as  being  
aware  of  the  natural  implication(s)  of  the  available  evidence  (that  overall  supports  
not- p ).  This  entails  that  a  determinate  answer  to  whether  one  believes  that  not- p  can  be  
offered.  But,  as  Schwitzgebel  (2010)  contends,  the  conditions  for  meeting  the  
folk-psychological  stereotype  for  “believing  that  not- p ”  necessarily  conflict  with  the  
49  Recall  that  the  available  evidence  must  warrant  not- p  in  cases  of  self-deception.  If  a  subject  
successfully  behaves,  or  is  disposed  to  behave,  in  a  way  that  generally  agrees  with  the  available  
evidence  which  overall  warrants  not- p ,  she  should  sufficiently  fit  the  folk-psychological  
stereotype  for  “believing  that  not- p .”  However,  since  Schwitzgebel  (2010)  points  out  that  the  
conditions  for  meeting  the  folk-psychological  stereotype  for  “believing  that  not- p ”  must  
conflict  with  the  conditions  for  meeting  the  folk-psychological  stereotype  for  “believing  that  
p ,”  I  take  it  that  one  cannot  determinately  believe  that  not- p  without  determinately  failing  to  
believe  that  p  at  the  same  time.  Accordingly,  since  self-deceived  subjects  do  not  determinately  
fail  to  meet  the  folk-psychological  stereotype  for  “believing  that  p, ”  we  can  say  they  are  
irrational  in  an  evidentialist  sense.  
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conditions  for  meeting  the  folk-psychological  stereotype  for  “believing  that  p ”  (p.  544). 
  If  this  is  the  case,  a  determinate  positive  answer  to  whether  one  believes  that  not- p  50
can  entail  a  determinate  negative  answer  to  whether  one  believes  that  p .   Hence  51
proponents  of  this  approach  face  a  dilemma,  namely,  either  the  
access-to-information-element  can  be  addressed  in  a  way  that  a  determinate  positive  
answer  to  whether  self-deceived  subjects  believe  that  not- p  is  not  needed,  or  there  can  
be  both  a  determinate  and  an  indeterminate  answer  to  whether  one  believes  that  p  in  
cases  of  self-deception.   
  
Furthermore,  even  if  we  assume  that  the  indeterminate  approach  is  acceptable  
and  different  “beliefs”  can  be  reduced  to  different  groups  of  regarding-as-true  stances  
or  dispositions,  this  does  not  entail  that  a  determinate  answer  to  the  doxastic  issue  can  
never  be  provided.  As  a  start,  Rowbottom  (2016)  already  demonstrates  how  degrees  of  
belief,  which  are  not  kinds  of  vague  belief,  can  co-exist  with  the  assumption  that  
beliefs  are  dispositional  in  character  (p.  735-736).   Then,  since  both  Funkhouser  52
(2009)  and  Porcher  (2012)  are  optimistic  about  the  prospect  of  developing  an  
explanatory  account  of  self-deception  by  listing  how  an  involved  subject  behaves  or  is  
disposed  to  behave  under  different  circumstances,  I  will  assume  that  the  list  should  
contain  a  finite  number  of  conditions  for  fitting  the  stereotype  for  “believing  that  p ”  
50  That  is  to  say,  suppose  the  conditions  for  fitting  the  folk-psychological  stereotype  for  
“believing  that  not- p ”  are  A,  B,  C,  and  D,  then  a  person  who  determinately  “believes”  that  
not- p  cannot  simultaneously  fulfill  the  conditions  for  fitting  the  stereotype  for  “believing  that  
p ,”  namely,  not-A,  not-B,  not-C,  and  not-D.     
51  Since  proponents  of  the  indeterminate  approach  do  not  specify  whether  self-deceived  
subjects  need  to  constantly  fail  to  appropriately  fit  the  stereotype  for  “believing  that  p ”  during  
their  whole  self-deception,  I  will  just  assume  that  self-deceived  subjects  constantly  fail  to  do  
so.   
52  But  we  should  also  notice  that  we  do  not  have  to  accept  dispositionalism  about  belief  in  
order  to  argue  for  the  idea  of  “degrees  of  belief”  (Rowbottom,  2016,  p.  733).  
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(regardless  of  how  difficult  this  task  may  be).  Suppose  there  are  a  hundred  conditions  
for  fitting  the  stereotype  for  “believing  that  p ”  and  you  fulfill  more  than  50  %  of  them  
(without  being  affected  by  other  psychological  factors  or  involving  behavior  that  is  
aimed  at  trying  your  luck).   As  I  see  it,  there  is  no  reason  to  deny  that  you  hold  a  53
certain  degree  of  belief  that  p  with  its  value  over  a  particular  threshold  that  makes  it  
count  as  believing  that  p .   
  
Admittedly,  it  is  extremely  challenging  to  list  out  all  the  conditions  for  meeting  
the  folk-psychological  stereotype  for  “believing  that  p ,”  and  the  numerical  attributions  
of  degrees  of  belief  are  often  inadequate.  But  these  two  concerns  do  not  suggest  that  a  
determinate  answer  to  the  doxastic  issue  concerning  p  is  theoretically  impossible  even  
if  we  assume  that  the  indeterminate  approach  is  acceptable.  Besides,  some  theorists  
already  suggest  that  the  inconsistency  present  in  self-deception  gives  grounds  for  
reconceptualizing  the  necessary  attitude(s)  in  terms  of  degrees  of  belief  (or  degrees  of  
conviction)  instead  of  full  beliefs  (Chan  and  Rowbottom,  2019;  Lynch,  2012).  Then  
again,  if  the  indeterminate  approach  somehow  allows  us  to  attribute  a  degree  of  belief  
that  p  (with  a  value  that  makes  it  count  as  believing  that  p )  to  self-deceived  subjects,  
this  implies  that  this  approach  also  fails  to  locate  the  difference  between  self-deception  
and  wishful  thinking.   
  
2.5  Options  outside  the  framework  
53  Some  may  argue  that  the  relevant  conditions  could  have  different  weights.  But  Funkhouser  
(2009)  rejects  such  an  idea  as  he  thinks  that  the  failure  of  explaining  self-deception  already  
implies  “there  is  no  privileged  weighting  of  these  [conditions]  that  determines  ‘real  belief’”  (p.  
11).   
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If  it  turns  out  that  none  of  the  three  basic  elements  listed  in  the  “vague  
consensus”  can  cast  light  on  how  to  solve  the  distinction  problem,  some  may  wonder  if  
this  situation  suggests  that  there  should  be  a  fourth  element  (or  even  more).  There  is  at  
least  one  existing  option  for  how  to  restrict  the  definition  of  self-deception  by  appeal  to  
a  feature  outside  the  current  framework:  
  
(M) Self-knowledge  (Mele,  2012;  Nelkin,  2002;  Noordhof,  2009;  
Scott-Kakures,  2002)  
  
However,  the  problem  with  such  an  appeal  is  that  the  necessity  of  the  new  element  
suggested  is  not  guaranteed  by  the  consensus  in  the  literature.  Therefore,  proponents  of  
any  option  outside  the  framework  have  to  provide  a  reason  for  its  necessity.  Next,  I  am  
going  to  examine  whether  the  supporters  of  proposal  (M)  succeed  in  doing  so.   
  
2.5.1  Self-knowledge  
The  proponents  of  proposal  (M)  contend  that  for  locating  the  essential  feature  
of  self-deception,  we  have  to  pay  attention  to  the  issue  of  self-knowledge.  While  some  
of  them,  such  as  Nelkin  (2002)  and  Noordhof  (2009),  think  that  a  lack  of  
self-knowledge  should  be  included  as  one  of  the  essential  conditions  for  becoming  
self-deceived,  the  others,  such  as  Mele  (2012)  and  Scott-Kakures  (2002),  contend  that  a  
failure  in  self-knowledge  is  necessary  for  the  phenomenon  to  be  possible.  It  is  
noteworthy  that  a  lack  of  self-knowledge  is  quite  different  from  a  failure  in  
self-knowledge.  A  failure  in  self-knowledge  involves  an  obvious  mistake  about  
oneself,  but  a  lack  of  self-knowledge  may  merely  be  ignorance  about  a  certain  aspect  




We  have  already  looked  at  a  proposal  which  argues  that  a  failure  in  
self-knowledge  is  necessary,  namely  the  second-order  proposal  presented  in  section  
2.4.3.  The  supporters  of  the  second-order  proposal  take  a  firm  stand  on  the  issue  by  
proposing  the  necessary  attitude  involved  in  self-deception  is  precisely  the  doxastic  
attitude  that  reveals  such  a  failure  in  self-knowledge.  Nevertheless,  we  do  not  need  to  
defend  this  restriction  on  the  necessary  attitude  even  if  we  agree  that  there  is  a  failure  
in  self-knowledge  occurring  in  self-deception.  For  example,  Scott-Kakures  (2002),  
who  does  not  accept  the  second-order  proposal,  suggests  that  a  self-deceived  subject  
must  have  a  misconception  about  what  prompts  her  relevant  cognitive  activities  in  
order  to  make  the  self-deceitful  project  possible  (p.  599).  Indeed,  we  can  easily  
imagine  that  if  one  could  always  effectively  estimate  the  role  played  by  motivation  in  
one’s  daily  cognition,  one  would  not  be  liable  to  self-deception  (Scott-Kakures,  2002,  
p.  584).  But  how  should  we  address  this  misconception?  It  seems  to  me  that  a  doxastic  
attitude  is  at  hand,  and  Scott-Kakures  (2002)  also  agrees:   
  
[The  subject]  believes  [...]  that  her  embrace  of  a  conclusion  is  the  result  of  
her  epistemic  evaluations  of  what  her  reasons  recommend.  In  fact,  her  
doxastic  activity  is  [...]  shaped  by  desire  and  interest.  She  believes  that  her  
inquiry  and  her  reaching  of  her  conclusion  are  guided  by  her  epistemic 
appraisals  or  judgments.  She  is  in  error  about  what  animates  her  
investigations.  (p.  595;  italics  added)  
  
Incidentally,  Mele  (2012)  also  accepts  this  idea  and  agrees  that  the  following  condition  
could  count  as  one  of  the  (jointly)  sufficient  conditions  for  a  subject  S  to  be  
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self-deceived:  “ S ’s  acquiring  the  belief  that  p  is  a  product  of  ‘reflective,  critical  
reasoning,’  and  S  is  wrong  in  regarding  that  reasoning  as  properly  directed”  (p.  12).   
  
However,  it  appears  that  Scott-Kakures’s  (2002)  idea  will  lead  to  an  infinite  
model  of  self-deception.  Apart  from  acquiring  the  necessary  attitude  towards  p ,  this  
idea  requires  a  self-deceived  subject  to  obtain  further  a  false  belief  that  q ,  where  q  
stands  for  “my  attitude  towards  p  is  a  product  of  proper  reasoning.”  Although  it  is  
unclear  whether  Scott-Kakures  treats  this  false  belief  that  q  as  a  random  error  or  a  
resulting  attitude  of  irrational  cognition,  I  believe  neither  of  these  options  is  acceptable  
to  choose.  If  the  false  belief  that  q  is  just  a  random  error,  the  necessary  attitude  towards  
p  should  also  be  a  mere  mistake  since,  according  to  Scott-Kakures  (2002),  the  
acquisition  of  the  necessary  attitude  depends  on  whether  the  involved  subject  can  
successfully  obtain  the  false  belief  that  q .  If  the  false  belief  that  q  is  caused  by  some  
kind  of  irrational  cognition,  it  seems  that  it  should  be  a  product  of  self-deception  as  
well.  Then,  based  on  Scott-Kakures’s  (2002)  idea,  for  making  possible  the  acquisition  
of  the  false  belief  that  q ,  the  subject  has  to  hold  a  false  belief  that  n  concerning  why  she  
gets  the  belief  that  q .  Once  again,  for  making  possible  the  acquisition  of  the  false  belief  
that  n ,  the  subject  has  to  hold  a  false  belief  that  o  concerning  why  she  gets  the  belief  
that  n .  Such  a  kind  of  regression  can  proceed  ad  infinitum .  Hence  a  self-deceived  
subject  has  to  acquire  countless  false  beliefs  for  making  her  self-deception  with  respect  
to  p  possible,  which  makes  the  whole  idea  unconvincing.  
  
On  the  other  hand,  Nelkin  (2002)  and  Noordhof  (2009)  think  it  is  far  too  strong  
to  suggest  that  a  failure  in  self-knowledge  is  necessary  for  self-deception  since  a  lack  
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of  self-knowledge  will  be  enough  for  making  the  phenomenon  to  be  possible.  Nelkin  
(2002)  suggests  that  a  lack  of  awareness  of  the  self-deceiving  motivation  behind  one’s  
cognition  might  be  psychologically  necessary  for  the  self-deceitful  strategies  to  occur  
(p.  395).  Based  on  this  suggestion,  Noordhof  (2009)  further  asserts  that  ignorance  
about  “some  element  of  the  psychological  history  characteristic”  behind  the  acquisition  
of  the  necessary  attitude  is  essential  if  we  would  like  to  have  a  real  case  of  
self-deception  (p.  62).  Noordhof  (2009)  argues  for  his  idea  by  sketching  examples  in  
which  the  subjects  do  not  seem  to  be  self-deceived  while  fulfilling  all  the  basic  
elements  of  self-deception.  Noordhof  (2009)  writes:   
  
[T]here  are  those  who  self-consciously  take  their  belief  in  God  to  involve  a 
leap  in  faith  not  supported  by  the  evidence.  They  may  also  appreciate  that  
their  belief  in  God  stems  from  the  way  their  motivational  states  influence  
their  belief-forming  processes.  They  are  happy  to  recognize  this  because  
fundamentally  they  approve  of  their  belief  in  God.  It  seems  to  them  
psychologically  and  spiritually  the  right  thing  to  believe.  Indeed,  the  
possibility  of  treating  the  evidence  relating  to  God’s  existence  as  just  
evidence  to  be  assessed  in  disinterested  terms  seems  to  fail  to  capture  the  
importance  of  this  belief  for  them.  (p.  60-61) 
  
As  Noordhof  (2009)  explains,  subjects  who  believe  in  God  in  the  way  described  do  not  
seem  to  be  self-deceived  since  there  is  something  significantly  different  between  this  
case  of  religious  beliefs  and  (allegedly)  cases  of  self-deception  –  “the  subjects  in  
question  may  know  precisely  how  their  motivational  states  affect  their  beliefs  and  yet  
accept  it”  (p.  61).  Thus,  a  lack  of  self-knowledge  should  be  one  of  the  essential  




I  am  not  going  to  deny  that  a  lack  of  self-knowledge  should  be  included  as  one  
of  the  elements  of  self-deception.  But  I  am  afraid  that  it  is  normal  for  us  to  find  this  
element  present  in  various  types  of  cognition  other  than  self-deception,  including  
those  that  are  unbiased.  In  fact,  this  is  the  very  reason  why  Scott-Kakures’s  (2002)  
argues  for  the  failure  in  self-knowledge  proposal:   
  
Such  a  lack  of  knowledge  about  the  various  causal  influences  upon  the  
shape  or  direction  of  our  cognitive  activities  would  appear  to  be  far  from  
exceptional.  Indeed,  one  of  the  chief  conclusions  of  Nisbett  and  Wilson’s  
important  and  influential  1977  study  is  that  we  are  quite  typically  unaware  
of  the  causal  role  played  by  various  factors  in  the  formation  of  our  attitudes  
and  judgments.  If  this  is  on  the  mark,  such  a  failure  of  self-knowledge  –  
where  by  this  we  mean  a  lack  of  a  true  account  of  the  causal  histories  of  our  
attitudes  –  will  be  far  from  distinctive  of  self-deception.  (p.  598)  
  
To  demonstrate  this  idea,  Scott-Kakures  (2002)  offers  some  examples  which  
involve  a  lack  of  self-knowledge  yet  do  not  seem  to  be  cases  of  self-deception.  
Scott-Kakures  (2002)  argues  that  the  case  of  “the  dog  owner,”  which  originates  in  
Frederick  Siegler’s  1968  work,  is  one  of  the  classic  examples  of  this  sort:  
  
[I]f  A  simply  mistakes  my  dog  for  his,  even  if  this  could  be  due  to  a  desire  
that  the  dog  be  his  dog  and  when  he  fears  and  suspects  that  it  might  be  
mine,  it  is  difficult  to  think  of  such  a  case  as  one  of  self-deception,  and  this  
is  because  when  one’s  desires  and  fears  distort  perception  we  are  inclined  to  
think  of  there  being  a  psychological  distortion  which  results  in  a  mistake  of  
which  the  person  himself  normally  is  not  aware.  (as  cited  in  p.  586;  see  also  




Furthermore,  Scott-Kakures  (2002)  also  cites  some  psychological  studies  showing  that  
one  can  be  unaware  of  the  causal  role  played  by  extra-epistemic  factors  in  the  
formation  of  one’s  judgment  even  when  one  does  not  have  any  personal  stake  in  the  
matter  and  also  be  forewarned  about  the  possibility  of  misjudging  (p.  592-593).   
  
To  be  brief,  I  accept  that  a  lack  of  self-knowledge  may  typically  be  present  in  
the  phenomenon  of  self-deception.  After  all,  the  very  reason  why  intentionalists  adopt  
the  idea  of  “partitioning”  or  the  primary  motivation  for  non-intentionalists  to  define  the  
phenomenon  as  a  purely  causal  mechanism  is  that  we  do  not  want  to  suggest  that  an  
agent  could  be  knowingly  deceived  by  herself.  But,  as  Scott-Kakures  (2002)  argues,  the  
fact  is  that  a  lack  of  self-knowledge  pervades  many  cases  of  daily  cognition,  including  
both  motivated  and  unmotivated  irrationality.  Recall  that  the  purpose  of  the  current  
study  is  to  find  the  difference(s)  between  self-deception  and  other  nearby  phenomena. 
Since  it  is  fair  to  assume  that  such  a  lack  of  self-knowledge  may  also  typically  be  
present  in  the  phenomena  similar  to  self-deception,  proposal  (M)  does  not  seem  very  
promising.   
  
2.6  The  combination  of  access  to  information  and  an  unwarranted  attitude(s)  
concerning  p  
As  mentioned  at  the  end  of  section  2.3.4,  the  distinction  problem  can  likely  be  
solved  completely  by  specifying  the  combination  of  the  access-to-information-element  
and  the  unwarranted-attitude-element  properly.  Previous  discussions  have  already  
provided  advice  on  how  to  specify  the  two  elements  separately.  However,  the  task  of  
putting  the  two  together  is  not  as  straightforward  as  it  seems.  Many  theorists  who  also  
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see  the  need  to  address  the  combination  insist  that  this  combination  is  supposed  to  
account  for  some  sort  of  “tension”  (Archer,  2013;  Funkhouser,  2005;  Graham,  1986;  
Lynch,  2012;  Rorty,  1988).  Therefore,  we  need  first  to  find  out  what  this  tension  is  
before  we  continue  the  discussion.  
  
2.6.1  Tension  
A  number  of  philosophers  take  for  granted  that  a  certain  “tension”  at  the  
behavioral  level  should  be  present  in  paradigm  cases  of  self-deception  since  this  is  
what  the  empirical  evidence  shows  (Archer,  2013,  p.  265;  Audi,  1982,  p.  138;  
Funkhouser,  2005,  p.  302;  Pedrini,  2012;  Porcher,  2012,  p.  68).  As  Porcher  (2012)  
indicates:   
  
[M]any  times  the  verbal  behavior  of  the  self-deceived  will  indicate  that  they  
believe  that  p  and  their  nonverbal  behavior  will  indicate  that  they  believe  
that  not- p  [...]  [but]  in  some  cases  the  nonverbal  behavior  as  a  whole  will  be  
inconsistent.  (p.  68)  
  
Such  tension  may  be  referred  to  as  “behavioral”  tension  (Funkhouser,  2005,  p.  296).  
According  to  Lynch  (2012),  the  precise  definition  of  behavioral  tension  is  “being  
inclined  to  act  in  some  ways  that  seem  more  consistent  with  believing  that  p  and  in  
others  that  seem  more  consistent  with  believing  that  not- p ”  (p.  436).  Admittedly,  it  is  
quite  natural  for  ordinary  people  to  behave  inconsistently  during  the  transition  from  a  
particular  consideration  to  the  drawing  of  the  conclusion  relevant  to  that  consideration.  
However,  many  theorists  still  find  the  distinctive  pattern  of  behavior  involved  in  
self-deception  very  interesting  since  it  continues  to  persist  even  after  the  self-deceiving  
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conclusion  has  already  been  drawn  (namely,  formed  the  necessary  attitude(s)).  Recall  
the  case  of  “Nicole.”  Nicole  has  “successfully”  been  motivated  to  verbally  endorse  the  
claim  that  Tony  is  a  faithful  husband  ( p ),  and  yet  she  still  avoids  contact  with  sources  of  
evidence  which  may  suggest  the  contrary.  In  order  to  explain  this  kind  of  unusual  
behavior  found  in  many  alleged  cases,  theorists  generally  struggle  to  make  the  
combination  be  able  to  generate  behavior  that  looks  inconsistent  as  a  whole  (Archer,  
2013;  Funkhouser,  2005;  Graham,  1986;  Rorty,  1988).  Similarly,  I  agree  that  special  
attention  should  be  paid  to  the  behavioral  tension  that  occurs  after  the  self-deceiving  
conclusion,  and  I  will  tend  to  refer  to  it  as  the  “expected  behavioral  tension.”  
  
Some  theorists,  such  as  Funkhouser  (2005),  further  elaborate  on  this  idea  and  
illustrate  that  the  “tension”  involved  should  be  divided  into  “behavioral”  and  
“cognitive”  parts  (p.  296).  Surely,  it  is  reasonable  to  think  that  such  a  behavioral  
inconsistency  should  be  accompanied  by  a  corresponding  mental  experience,  if  not  a  
manifestation  of  this  mental  experience.   As  such,  besides  behavioral  tension,  54
self-deceived  subjects  are  supposed  to  also  experience  cognitive  tension  (also  called  
“mental  discomfort”)  (Funkhouser,  2005,  p.  296;  Graham,  1986,  p.  228;  Lynch,  2012,  
p.  440).  Graham  (1986)  explains  that  this  sort  of  tension  can  be  understood  as  “the  
feelings  of  ‘discomfort’  or  ‘restlessness’,”  such  as  “qualms,  suspicions,  misgivings,  and  
the  like”  (p.  226).  Undoubtedly,  it  is  not  surprising  that  normal  people  should  feel  
discomfort  when  they  are  aware  of  pieces  of  evidence  that  threaten  their  desirable  
proposition  (except  for  people  getting  temporal  help,  such  as  those  taking  psychiatric  
drugs),  regardless  of  whether  they  are  then  motivated  to  engage  in  an  irrational  
54  If  someone  is  engaging  in  such  inconsistency  but  is  unresponsive  to  it,  we  should  doubt  
whether  she  is  a  psychologically  healthy  person.  
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cognition.   In  addition,  it  is  typical  for  one  to  feel  “in  the  middle”  when  one  is  in  the  55
process  of  considering  the  truth  and  falsehood  of  some  statements.  Nevertheless,  what  
makes  theorists  fascinated  is  the  empirical  fact  that  in  cases  of  self-deception,  those  
uncomfortable  feelings  continue  to  exist  after  the  subjects  have  drawn  the  
self-deceiving  conclusion  (namely,  formed  the  necessary  attitude(s)).  Likewise,  I  
contend  that  we  should  not  omit  the  cognitive  tension  that  occurs  after  the  
self-deceiving  conclusion,  hereafter  called  the  “expected  cognitive  tension.”    56
  
Graham  (1986)  argues  that  the  source  of  the  expected  cognitive  tension  is  the  
dissatisfaction  with  a  clash  between  the  awareness  of  contrary  evidence  and  the  attitude  
that  one  has  been  motivated  to  possess  (namely  the  necessary  attitude(s))  (p.  228).  With  
Graham’s  (1986)  idea  in  mind,  my  view  of  the  expected  cognitive  tension  is  that  it  
involves  negative  feelings  generated  when  one  is  aware  of  contrary  evidence  and  then  
recognizes  that  this  threatens  the  maintenance  of  the  necessary  attitude(s)  while  
(mentally)  resisting  to  accept  such  a  situation.  Such  resistance  can  easily  be  explained  
as  the  product  of  the  awareness  of  contrary  evidence  combined  with  the  fact  that  one  
has  a  stake  in  the  issue  (namely  the  motivation-element).  This  resistance  will  manifest  
itself  in  specific  actions,  such  as  avoidance  behavior.   As  Lynch  (2012)  puts  it,  57
“mental  tension  is  the  experiential  accompaniment  for  those  cases  in  which  behavioral  
tension  is  present  or  liable  to  occur”  (p.  435).   
55  In  other  words,  such  discomfort  can  be  understood  as  one’s  negative  emotional  response  to  
the  situation  that  there  is  a  conflict(s)  between  the  available  evidence  and  one's  desire  or  want  
(or  the  like).   
56  I  will  just  use  the  term  “expected  tension”  when  I  refer  to  both  the  expected  behavioral  
tension  and  the  expected  cognitive  tension.  
57  As  Funkhouser  (2005)  argues,  avoidance  behavior  reveals  that  the  involved  subject  already  
possesses  sufficient  information  for  concluding  that  not- p ,  and  hence,  conflicts  with  the  




Some  might  wonder  if  it  is  necessary  to  address  such  tension  (including  the  
expected  tension),  considering  what  we  have  just  seen  is  based  on  empirical  findings  of  
self-deception.  Let  us  first  consider  the  tension  that  occurs  during  the  transition  from  
the  consideration  of  whether  p  or  not- p  to  the  drawing  of  the  self-deceiving  conclusion. 
  I  assume  that  the  cognitive  tension  should  at  least  be  present  at  some  point  during  the  58
transition  since  self-deceived  subjects  must  be  aware  of  the  available  evidence  that  
overall  supports  not- p  for  setting  off  the  self-deceiving  process  (as  mentioned  in  section  
2.3.1).   I  propose  naming  this  the  “necessary  cognitive  tension.”   On  the  other  hand,  59 60
since  theorists,  such  as  Funkhouser  (2005)  and  Lynch  (2012),  generally  consider  the  
behavioral  tension  as  a  conflict(s)  between  one’s  observable  actions,  it  does  not  seem  
right  to  require  that  it  must  exist  during  the  transition.  This  is  because  it  is  reasonable  to  
think  that  physically  disabled  people  (like  stroke  patients)  are  capable  of  self-deception.  
In  short,  I  hold  that  the  combination  must  be  specified  in  a  way  that  can  address  the  
necessary  cognition  tension,  and  I  believe  this  task  can  easily  be  done,  given  that  the  
access-to-information-element  is  a  necessary  feature  of  self-deception.   61
  
58  The  transition  involved  in  the  phenomenon  of  self-deception  should  be  understood  as  the  
self-deceiving  process.  I  believe  it  is  evident  that  such  a  transition  is  a  necessary  part  of  
self-deception.  
59  I  do  not  intend  to  argue  that  the  mentioned  awareness  (and  also  the  cognitive  tension)  must  
constantly  exist  during  self-deception.  
60  This  necessary  cognitive  tension  is  also  a  manifestation  of  the  psychology  of  one  who  is  
motivated  to  engage  in  the  self-deceiving  process.  We  should  note  that,  even  if  one  is  aware  of  
the  contrary  evidence,  one  needs  not  to  struggle  to  explain  it  away  (for  finding  a  peace  of  
mind)  when  one  is  totally  comfortable  with  such  a  situation.  
61  Recall  that  the  cognitive  tension  occurring  during  the  transition  is  causally  related  to  an  
awareness  of  evidence  that  threatens  the  proposition  that  one  has  a  stake  in.  
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Before  considering  the  expected  tension,  I  would  like  to  briefly  explain  whether  
the  necessary  cognitive  tension  can  be  eliminated  completely  through  the  
self-deceiving  process,  given  that  this  process  should  help  the  involved  subject  to  
mediate  between  the  threat  posed  by  the  contrary  evidence  and  her  desire/want  (or  the  
like).  Some  theorists,  like  Lynch  (2012),  think  that  this  tension  can  be  reduced,  but  not  
thoroughly  removed,  through  the  process.  As  Lynch  (2012)  illustrates,  while  
self-deceived  subjects  put  great  efforts  into  the  epistemic  work  to  “construct  
justifications  for  their  preferred  positions”  during  the  self-deceiving  process,  their  
concerted  efforts  are  still  “constrained  by  considerations  of  plausibility”  (p.  440).  
Undoubtedly,  with  this  understanding,  we  cannot  completely  rule  out  the  possibility  
that  a  self-deceived  subject  might  successfully  explain  away  all  the  contrary  evidence  
at  the  moment  when  they  draw  the  self-deceiving  conclusion  (Lynch,  2012,  p.  442).  
However,  Lynch  (2012)  also  argues  that  “self-deceivers  are  generally  rational  beings  
who  are  generally  sensitive  to  the  force  of  good  evidence,  and  that  is  not  a  contingent  
truth  about  self-deceivers”  (p.  442).   Following  this  idea,  it  should  be  a  conceptual  62
truth  about  self-deception  that  self-deceived  subjects  cannot  be  fully  convinced  that  p  
as  if  the  available  evidence  is  actually  in  favor  of  p ,  even  if  they  are  also  affected  by  the  
self-deceiving  process.   
  
Finally,  let  us  consider  the  expected  tension.  Since  self-deception  needs  not  be  
continued  after  the  self-deceiving  conclusion  has  been  drawn,  this  sort  of  tension  
should  not  be  a  necessary  factor  of  self-deception.  Admittedly,  many  classic  examples  
of  self-deception  are  lengthy  (like  the  case  of  “Nicole”).  Nevertheless,  theorists  
62  If  self-deceived  subjects  are  not  normal  people,  self-deception  should  actually  be  classified  
as  a  psychologically  abnormal  phenomenon,  just  like  delusion.    
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generally  accept  that  once  the  relevant  conclusion  is  drawn,  the  involved  subject  can  
already  count  as  “being  self-deceived.”  For  example,  Mele  (2012)  suggests  that  the  
“proto-analysis”  of  being  self-deceived  is  to  “acquire  the  belief  [that  p ]  in  a  suitably  
biased  way,”  where  the  belief  that  p  refers  to  the  self-deceiving  conclusion  (p.  2).  
However,  although  the  expected  tension  does  not  necessarily  occur  in  cases  of  
self-deception,  the  idea  of  the  expected  tension  itself  is  still  very  essential  to  the  study  
of  the  distinction  problem.  Recall  that  theorists  suggest  that  self-deception  is  a  unique  
phenomenon  because  it  is  associated  with  a  wide  range  of  doxastic  states  (as  mentioned  
in  section  2.3.4).  We  should  note  that  what  happens  during  the  transition  from  the  
consideration  of  whether  p  or  not- p  to  the  corresponding  conclusion  is  only  one  part  of  
the  whole  idea.  Many  theorists  think  that  the  expected  tension  is  the  by-product  of  the  
manifestation  of  those  doxastic  states  (Funkhouser,  2005,  p.  302;  Graham,  1986; 
Porcher,  2012,  p.  68).  In  other  words,  when  self-deception  is  temporally  extended,  the  
expected  tension  can  give  grounds  for  attributing  a  wide  range  of  doxastic  states  to  the  
involved  subject  (Graham,  1986,  p.  228).  This  is  precisely  why  self-deception  (and  the  
combination)  must  be  analyzed  in  a  way  that  can  leave  room  for  the  expected  tension  to  
be  present  if  self-deception  is  temporally  extended.   63
  
2.6.2  Accounting  for  the  combination  
Some  theorists  insist  that  the  best  way  to  account  for  the  tension  (including  the  
expected  tension)  is  to  attribute  a  pair  of  contradictory  beliefs  that  p  and  not- p  to  the  
self-deceived  subject  (Graham,  1986;  Rorty,  1988):   
  




(N)A  full  belief  +  a  contradictory  full  belief  
  
The  biggest  obstacle  with  proposal  (N)  is  the  static  paradox,  which  was  mentioned  
briefly  in  section  2.2.1  while  examining  the  intentional  proposal.  According  to  Mele  
(2001),  the  contradictory  (full)  beliefs  proposal  suggests  an  impossible  state  of  mind  in  
the  sense  that  “the  very  nature  of  belief”  precludes  such  a  state  (p.  6-7).   
  
Some  may  wonder  why  we  must  not  believe  p  and  not -p  simultaneously,  
although  the  two  beliefs  are  logically  conflicting.  Indeed,  Makinson  (1965)  points  out  
that  we  are  sometimes  justified  to  hold  logically  incompatible  beliefs.  To  argue  for  this,  
Makinson  (1965)  suggests  the  case  of  “the  paradox  of  the  preface,”  in  which  it  seems  
rational  for  the  involved  subject  to  hold  both  the  belief  that  “each  assertion  I  made  is  
true”  and  the  belief  that  “at  least  one  assertion  in  the  book  is  false,”  though  the  two  
beliefs  should  be  logically  contradictory.   Nevertheless,  Bordes  (2001)  asserts:  64
  
[T]he  preface’s  author  does  not  believe  that  the  same  specific  sentence  is  
both  false  and  true:  he  does  not  simultaneously  believe  that  p  and  not- p ,  but  
in  the  truth  of  each  of  the  specific  sentences  of  his  doxastic  web  and  in  the  
generic  sentence  expressing  the  metabelief,  unaware  of  the  specific  
sentences  which  contradict  it.  [...]  Unlike  the  preface  case,  in  self-deception  
64  Makinson  (1965)  notes  that  many  authors  of  academic  books  tend  to  admit  in  the  preface  
that  there  may  be  errors  in  the  books,  even  though  they  should  believe  that  the  arguments  in  the  
book  are  correct,  as  he  puts  it:  
Suppose  that  in  the  course  of  his  book  a  writer  makes  a  great  many  assertions,  
which  we  shall  call  s 1 ,  .  .  .  ,  s n .  Given  each  one  of  these,  he  believes  that  it  is  true.  
If  he  has  already  written  other  books,  and  received  corrections  from  readers  and  
reviewers,  he  may  also  believe  that  not  everything  he  has  written  in  his  latest  book  
is  true.  His  approach  is  eminently  rational;  he  has  learnt  from  experience.  The  
discovery  of  errors  among  statements  which  previously  he  believed  to  be  true  
gives  him  good  ground  for  believing  that  there  are  undetected  errors  in  his  latest  
book.  (p.  205)  
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inconsistency  is  not  between  generic  and  specific  sentences,  but  between  
two  specific  sentences.  (p.  11)  
  
The  idea  is  that  the  preface's  author  can  hold  a  pair  of  logically  incompatible  beliefs  
because  the  two  concern  sentences  that  are  of  different  types  technically,  given  that  the  
author  does  not  believe  that  a  particular  assertion  he  made  is  both  true  and  false.  Yet,  
since  proposal  (N)  suggests  two  contradictory  beliefs  that  involve  two  specific  
sentences,  the  idea  underlying  “the  paradox  of  the  preface”  is  inapplicable  to  the  study  
of  self-deception,  and  we  still  have  to  find  a  way  to  address  the  combination  without  
causing  the  static  paradox.   
  
As  discussed  in  the  previous  sections,  there  are  many  other  proposals  for  
addressing  the  two  elements  other  than  proposal  (N),  though  all  these  proposals  end  up  
lending  support  to  the  doxastic  approach.  Thus,  based  on  previous  discussions,  I  
suggest  two  more  proposals  for  further  discussion:    65
  
(O)A  full  belief  +  a  degree  of  belief  >  0.5  
(P) A  degree  of  belief  >  0.5  +  a  contrary  degree  of  belief  >  0.5  
  
I  argued  that  Mele’s  (2012)  account  actually  implies  the  attribution  of  a  degree  
of  belief  that  not-p ,  which  is  over  0.5,  in  section  2.3.3.  By  putting  this  idea  and  his  
whole  view  together,  it  turns  out  that  his  view  suggests  we  should  attribute  the  
conjunction  of  a  degree  of  belief  that  not- p ,  which  is  over  0.5,  and  a  full  belief  that  p  to  
65  The  reason  why  those  suggested  degrees  of  belief  have  to  be  over  0.5  was  discussed  in  
section  2.3.1  and  section  2.4.  
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the  self-deceived  subject.  Hence  we  have  proposal  (O).  But  Porcher  (2012)  casts  some  
doubt  on  this  attribution:  
  
[H]ow  can  someone  hold  a  belief  that  p  and  a  belief  that  not- p  (albeit  of  
different  degrees  of  confidence)  at  the  same  time?  (p.  76)  
  
The  idea  is  that,  although  the  level  of  confidence  in  not -p  is  reduced,  the  static  paradox  
remains  since  the  possessor  still  counts  as  believing  the  two  contrary  beliefs  
simultaneously.   
  
Then,  recall  the  previously  discussed  Archer’s  view,  which  I  argued  that  it  
suggests  the  attribution  of  D( p )  and  also  the  attribution  of  D( ~p )  to  self-deceived  
subjects.  By  putting  the  two  together,  we  have  a  prototype  of  proposal  (P).  But  it  
appears  that  this  approach  will  create  its  version  of  static  paradox.  For  the  moment,  let 
us  assume  that  this  proposal  is  acceptable.  On  the  one  hand,  in  order  to  explain  the  
actions  which  seem  to  suggest  the  belief  that  p  (for  example,  verbal  expression  of  huge 
support  for  p ),  we  have  to  attribute  corresponding  affective  attitudes,  such  as  a  strong  
hope  that  p ,  which  entail  a  high  degree  of  belief  that  p  and  a  low  degree  of  belief  that  
not- p  to  the  self-deceived  subject.   On  the  other  hand,  to  explain  why  the  subject  66
consciously  avoids  the  unwelcome  evidence  (which  shows  the  subject  possesses  
sufficient  information  for  concluding  that  not- p ),  we  need  to  attribute  other  affective  
attitudes,  such  as  a  strong  suspicion  that  not -p ,  which  entail  a  low  degree  of  belief  that  
p  and  a  high  degree  of  belief  that  not -p  to  the  subject.   This  leads  to  an  obvious  67
66  Recall  that  verbal  endorsement  of  p  is  one  of  the  phenomenological  features  of  
self-deception.   
67  More  importantly,  self-deceived  subjects  are  required  to  be  aware  of  the  evidence  that  
overall  warrants  that  not- p ,  which  already  suggests  a  high  degree  of  belief  that  not- p .  
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problem  that,  if  we  are  required  to  attribute  both  a  high  degree  of  belief  that  p  and  a  
high  degree  of  belief  that  not -p  to  the  subject,  we  will  then  be  forced  to  suggest  an  
impossible  state  of  mind,  which  leads  to  the  static  paradox  again.   
  
2.6.3  The  strategy  of  temporal  partitioning  
Another  attempt  to  dispose  of  the  static  paradox  would  be  to  invoke  the  strategy  
of  “temporal  partitioning,”  which  suggests  that  a  self-deceived  subject  can  hold 
contradictory  beliefs  consecutively.   If  we  accept  that  a  doxastic  attitude  towards  p  68
can  change  from  the  state  of  disbelieving  to  the  state  of  believing  as  time  goes  on,  the  
problem  of  simultaneously  holding  contrary  beliefs  will  disappear,  and  the  static  
paradox  would  be  solved.  Nevertheless,  the  strategy  of  temporal  partitioning  is  flawed  
because  of  two  problems.  First,  recall  that  we  touched  on  the  case  of  “rich  life”  when  
introducing  the  strategy  in  section  2.2.1.  If  we  compare  this  case  with  other  cases  we  
have  discussed,  we  will  see  that  “rich  life”  is  not  a  usual  representation  of  
self-deception.  In  particular,  the  success  of  Sammy’s  self-deceitful  project  relies  on  
some  special  mechanisms  which  are  rarely  found  in  other  cases,  for  example,  long  
processing  time,  completely  fake  pieces  of  evidence,  and  suffering  from  Alzheimer's  
disease.  More  importantly,  there  is  no  reason  to  think  that  there  is  room  for  the  
expected  tension  to  be  present  if  the  case  of  “rich  life”  is  temporally  extended.  When  
Sammy  obtains  the  necessary  attitude,  he  already  forgot  the  truth  (and  his  self-deceitful  
project),  and  his  evidence  as  a  whole  is  in  favor  of  p  (despite  being  fake).  In  this  sense,  
he  will  never  be  able  to  recognize  a  clash  between  the  evidence  and  the  necessary  
68  See  section  2.2.1  for  more  details  on  this  strategy.  
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attitude  after  the  acquisition  of  that  necessary  attitude  even  if  his  self-deception  is  
temporally  extended.   
  
2.6.4  The  shifting  view  
Chan  and  Rowbottom  (2019)  argue  that  the  failure  of  proposal  (O)  and  proposal  
(P)  provides  support  to  the  shifting  view  of  degrees  of  belief,  which  seems  to  offer  a  
more  plausible  explanation  of  the  mechanisms  behind  self-deception.  The  shifting  view  
of  degrees  of  belief  suggests:  
  
[T]here  are  situations  in  which  individuals’  degrees  of  belief  are  highly  
sensitive  to  relatively  subtle  changes  in  context  [...]  Thus  a  person  might  
profess  belief  in  a  proposition  in  one  class  of  contexts  because  she  believes  
it  in  those  contexts,  and  behave  as  if  she  doesn’t  believe  it  in  another  class  
of  contexts  because  she  doesn’t  believe  it  in  those  contexts  …  High  
confidence  might  be  apparent  in  assertion,  and  middling  confidence  might  
be  apparent  in  action,  for  instance.  (Chan  and  Rowbottom,  2019,  p.  
1204-1205)   
  
It  should  not  sound  odd  to  any  of  us  that  beliefs  may  change  in  response  to  changes  in  
context,  for  example:   
  
As  I  type,  I  am  highly  confident  that  the  Earth  will  not  be  destroyed  in  the  
next  decade.  But  if  I  were  shortly  to  see  on  the  news  that  a  moon-sized  
asteroid  is  set  to  collide  with  Earth  in  the  next  year—it  is  not  April  1!—then  
my  confidence  in  Earth’s  survival  past  ten  years  into  the  future  would  drop  




Following  this  idea,  we  can  assert  that  in  a  case  of  self-deception,  a  belief  (or  degree  
thereof)  that  p  and  a  belief  (or  degree  thereof)  that  not- p  might  shift  in  one  way  and  
another  between  0  and  1,  so  that  the  involved  subject  can  hold  the  two  beliefs  
consecutively.   Proposal  (P)  would  then  be  characterized  by  the  following  69
attributions:  
  
I. A  self-deceived  subject  believes  that  p  with  a  degree  of  confidence  that  can  
shift  between  0  and  1.  
II. A  self-deceived  subject  believes  that  not- p  with  a  degree  of  confidence  that  can  
shift  between  0  and  1.  
  
As  this  does  not  require  a  self-deceived  subject  to  believe  both  p  and  not- p  at  the  same  
time,  no  static  paradox  arises.    70
  
However,  solving  the  static  paradox  does  not  imply  solving  the  distinction  
problem,  which  is  our  original  goal.  In  fact,  the  mentioned  attributions  can  also  exist  in  
the  model  of  willful  ignorance  or  wishful  thinking,  since  proposal  (P)  does  not  require  
69  The  sum  of  this  combination  must  be  equal  to  1  at  any  time  (Eriksson  and  Hájek,  2007).  
70  According  to  Lynch  (2012),  the  notion  of  “degrees  of  belief”  can  be  understood  as  “a  datum  
that  there  are  such  things,  represented  as  they  are  in  such  everyday  locutions  as  when  we  claim  
to  be  or  feel  fully  convinced  or  certain,  very  convinced,  fairly  convinced,  not  very  convinced,  
not  at  all  convinced,  etc.,  that  p ”  (p.  438).  Note  that  we  need  not  accept  that  beliefs  must  come 
in  degrees  for  defending  that  beliefs  may  shift  because  of  changes  in  context.  One  can  reject  
the  idea  that  there  is  something  like  a  continuum  between  fully  believing  p  and  fully  believing  
not- p  while  still  asserting  that  beliefs  may  be  context-sensitive.  Yet,  there  is  a  conceptual  
reason  why  the  study  of  self-deception  should  probably  be  grounded  in  the  assumption  that  
attitudes  (such  as  beliefs)  may  come  in  degrees,  which  is  related  to  what  we  have  seen  in  
section  2.6.1.  As  Lynch  (2012)  illustrates,  self-deceived  subjects  should  more  or  less  be  
affected  by  the  force  of  good  evidence  when  they  encounter  it,  since  they  are  normally  rational  
beings  (p.  442).  Accordingly,  it  is  unreasonable  to  think  that  they  can  be  fully  convinced  that  p  
(namely,  form  a  full  belief  that  p )  as  if  the  evidence  is  actually  in  favor  of  p ,  given  that  the  
available  evidence  actually  suggests  not- p  in  cases  of  self-deception.  Incidentally,  even  if  it  
turns  out  that  we  should  not  follow  the  doxastic  approach,  Lynch  (2016)  states  that  other  
propositional  attitudes  such  as  suspicion  also  come  in  degrees  (p.  509).  
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that  a  subject’s  degrees  of  belief  will  (or  are  liable  to)  shift  dramatically  from  believing  
to  disbelieving  during  the  phenomenon.   And  so,  the  distinction  problem  remains.  As  71
mentioned  in  section  2.3.4,  the  distinction  problem  should  be  solved  by  restricting  the  
combination  of  the  access-to-information-element  and  the  
unwarranted-attitude-element  in  a  suitable  way.  Recall  previous  discussions  in  which  
we  find  that  the  combination  has  to  be  specified  as  the  conjunction  of  a  belief  (or  
degree  thereof)  that  p  and  a  belief  (or  degree  thereof)  that  not- p .  Thus,  it  is  necessary  to  
clearly  indicate  that  the  two  degrees  of  belief  will  be  over  0.5  consecutively  during  
self-deception  in  order  to  address  the  two  elements  properly.   Therefore,  I  propose  we  72
further  restrict  the  attributions,  as  follows:  
  
III. A  self-deceived  subject  believes  that  p  with  a  degree  of  confidence  that  shifts  
between  0  and  1,  and  there  will  be  occasions  during  the  phenomenon  when  the  
value  is  over  0.5.   
IV. A  self-deceived  subject  believes  that  not- p  with  a  degree  of  confidence  that  
shifts  between  0  and  1,  and  there  will  be  occasions  during  the  phenomenon  
when  the  value  is  over  0.5.  
  
Nevertheless,  something  is  still  missing  from  the  conjunction  of  III  and  IV.  
Since  the  conjunction  does  not  explicitly  require  the  expected  tension  to  occur  when  
self-deception  is  temporally  extended,  it  can  also  be  attributed  to  Sammy  in  the  case  of  
“rich  life.”  Yet,  the  case  of  “rich  life”  is  grounded  in  a  flawed  view  about  
self-deception,  so  the  conjunction  must  not  be  attributable  to  Sammy.  It  seems  that  the  
71  That  is  to  say,  proposal  (P)  does  not  require  that  a  subject  must  believe  that  p  and  not- p  
consecutively.  In  this  sense,  we  can  also  attribute  the  conjunction  of  I  and  II  to  a  wishful  
thinker,  though  she  never  believes  that  not- p  during  her  wishful  thinking.  




conjunction  of  III  and  IV  is  not  enough  for  solving  the  issue  at  hand.  Hence  it  appears  
that  we  have  to  deal  with  the  issue  by  directly  appealing  to  the  idea  of  the  expected  
tension.  But  this  might  lead  to  the  failure  of  avoiding  to  turn  the  expected  tension  into  a  
necessary  factor.  Some  might  even  suspect  that  the  adoption  of  the  shifting  view  must  
cause  a  loss  of  the  expected  cognitive  tension  since  it  leaves  no  room  for  a  direct  clash  
between  the  awareness  of  contrary  evidence  and  the  necessary  attitude(s).  However,  I  
believe  that  the  conjunction  of  III  and  IV  is  still  useful  in  providing  an  initial  idea  for  
solving  the  distinction  problem.  As  such,  it  will  be  further  elaborated  and  ameliorated  
in  chapter  3.  
  
2.7  Lessons  learned  
The  failure  of  the  many  available  proposals  introduced  in  this  chapter  has  shed  
light  on  how  to  look  at  the  whole  issue  in  a  new  way.  The  most  important  outcome  of  
this  chapter  is  that  we  have  come  up  with  an  initial  scheme  and  drawn  some  useful  
conclusions:   
  
(a) We  should  capture  what  makes  self-deception  a  unique  phenomenon  by  
specifying  the  combination  of  the  access-to-information-element  and  the  
unwarranted-attitude-element.   
(b) The  aforementioned  combination  should  be  explained  in  terms  of  doxastic  
attitudes.  
(c) The  combination  has  to  make  room  for  the  expected  tension  to  occur  without  
turning  it  into  a  necessary  factor  in  the  phenomenon.   
(d) We  can  solve  the  static  paradox  by  appeal  to  the  idea  that  a  certain  belief  (or  




I  suggest  that  we  continue  our  study  by  further  ameliorating  the  conjunction  of  III  and  
IV  while  keeping  these  conclusions  in  mind.  Furthermore,  I  would  like  to  put  forward  
two  suggestions  that  are  grounded  in  previous  discussions:   
  
(e) Maybe  we  could  solve  the  issue  by  a  straightforward  assertion  that  the  
combination  is  characteristic  of  a  special  kind  of  instability.  
(f) It  may  be  possible  that  III  and  IV  should  be  combined  to  form  one  single  
attitude  that  shifts  between  two  ends.   
  
A  possible  problem  with  (f)  is  that  it  seemingly  implies  that  one  of  the  two  elements  
should  be  eliminated.  If  this  were  the  case,  a  strong  reason  would  be  needed  to  justify  
the  decision,  which  will  be  discussed  in  chapter  3.  Inspired  by  the  conjunction  of  III  
and  IV,  I  will  be  developing  a  view  aimed  at  highlighting  the  unstable  nature  of  
self-deception,  as  revealed  by  the  combination  of  the  two  elements,  in  the  next  chapter.  
Hopefully,  my  view  can  solve  the  distinction  problem  while  allowing  for  the  diversity  
of  self-deception.  
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CHAPTER  III  -  SOLVING  THE  DISTINCTION  PROBLEM  WITH  THE  
INSTABILITY  VIEW  
3.1  Moving  forward  to  the  discussion  of  the  necessary  attitude(s)  involved  in  
self-deception   
Studying  self-deception  has  led  us  to  the  investigation  of  the  difference(s)  
between  self-deception  and  other  similar  phenomena  and  hence  the  distinction  
problem.  In  chapter  2,  we  examined  in  detail  different  proposals  for  solving  the  
distinction  problem  and  developed  several  guiding  principles  for  how  to  tackle  the  
problem.  First,  in  order  to  establish  self-deception  as  a  unique  phenomenon,  we  need  to  
find  a  suitable  way  to  restrict  the  combination  of  the  access-to-information-element  and  
the  unwarranted-attitude-element.  Second,  in  light  of  the  failure  of  various  suggestions  
on  how  to  specify  the  two  elements,  we  learned  that  we  should  account  for  the  
combination  by  the  attribution  of  contradictory  doxastic  attitudes.  Third,  the  static  
paradox  brought  by  this  contradictory-beliefs  proposal  could  be  solved  by  the  shifting  
view.  Finally,  the  combination  is  required  to  manifest  some  sort  of  tension  (including  
the  expected  tension)  without  making  the  expected  tension  to  be  a  necessary  factor  in  
the  phenomenon.   
  
A  tentative  plan  to  solve  the  distinction  problem  has  been  sketched  out  in  
section  2.6.4,  but  some  concerns  remain.  The  relatively  pressing  issue  is  that  even  if  we  
can  account  for  the  combination  without  generating  the  static  paradox,  we  might  lose  
the  expected  cognitive  tension  that  is  supposed  to  be  present  if  self-deception  is  
temporally  extended.  Besides,  some  may  wonder  if  there  is  a  more  concise  way  to  
address  the  combination.  I  propose  that  these  two  issues  are  closely  related  to  a  
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particular  misconception  concerning  how  to  arrange  the  basic  structure  of  
self-deception,  which,  when  clarified,  will  be  able  to  provide  a  solid  argument  that  the  
static  paradox  is  just  a  “red  herring.”  And  as  such,  the  idea  of  cognitive  tension  has  to  
be  understood  in  a  new  fashion.  Moreover,  these  findings  will  indicate  that  the  unstable  
nature  of  the  necessary  attitude(s)  is  closely  related  to  the  study  of  the  distinction  
problem.  
  
3.1.1  The  static  paradox  and  the  idea  of  cognitive  tension  
Some  might  worry  that  if  we  want  to  address  the  combination  by  the  attribution  
of  a  pair  of  contradictory  doxastic  attitudes  without  omitting  the  expected  (cognitive)  
tension,  we  will  follow  the  footsteps  of  intentionalists  and  end  in  deadlock.  This  worry  
is  not  baseless.  Theorists  who  attempt  to  maintain  this  expected  (cognitive)  tension  
have  eventually  been  led  to  attribute  a  pair  of  simultaneous  contradictory  beliefs  to  the  
self-deceived  subject  (Graham,  1986,  p.  228).   Given  what  we  have  seen  in  section  73
1.2  and  section  2.6,  this  simultaneous  contradictory-beliefs  proposal  seems  likely  to  
make  us  either  suggest  a  paradoxical  model  of  self-deception  or  reject  it  flatly  by  
turning  to  non-intentionalist  approaches  (which  do  not  agree  to  make  such  attribution).  
But  I  am  afraid  this  deadlock  is  merely  caused  by  a  misconception  about  the  basic  
structure  of  self-deception,  which  has  led  to  the  static  paradox  becoming  so  challenging  
for  intentionalists,  non-intentionalists,  or  proponents  of  a  mixed  strategy  alike.  
73  Even  if  one  agrees  to  attribute  a  pair  of  contradictory  doxastic  attitudes  to  the  self-deceived  
subject,  one  needs  not  be  an  intentionalist  when  one  disagrees  to  introduce  “an  intention  to  
deceive”  into  the  model  of  self-deception.  However,  one  cannot  be  a  non-intentionalist  when  
one  argues  for  such  attribution,  given  that  one  of  the  main  claims  made  by  non-intentionalists  
is  the  opposition  to  such  attribution.  
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Incidentally,  we  will  also  find  the  shifting  view  to  be  more  convincing  after  rearranging  
the  basic  structure.  
  
Previous  discussions  reveal  that  theorists  tend  to  presume  that  the  awareness  of  
the  available  evidence  and  the  necessary  attitude(s)  should  be  considered  to  be  
independent  from,  and  without  direct  connection  between,  each  other.  For  
intentionalists,  this  presumption  may  stem  from  them  considering  a  subject,  who  
engages  in  self-deception,  as  a  conjunction  of  a  deceiver  and  a  deceived  (though  one  
does  not  have  to  insist  on  such  a  presumption  to  defend  intentionalism).  Recall  that  
intentionalists  argue  that  in  a  real  case  of  self-deception,  the  involved  subject  has  a  
belief  that  not- p  and  an  intention  to  deceive  herself  and  thus  engages  in  an  irrational  
cognition  that  will  eventually  make  her  acquire  a  belief  that  p .  Concerning  how  to  
arrange  the  two  beliefs  in  question,  intentionalists  normally  suppose  that  the  two  are  
separately  held  by  two  conceptually  different  “agents”  during  the  phenomenon  of  
self-deception  (Bermúdez,  2000;  Davidson,  2004b;  Rorty,  1988;  Sorensen,  1985).  
Based  on  this  perspective,  it  seems  natural  for  them  to  infer  that  there  might  be  no  
direct  connection  between  the  two  beliefs.   As  mentioned  in  section  1.1.1  and  section  74
2.2.1,  different  versions  of  intentionalism  can  be  divided  into  two  subgroups.  And,  for  
those  who  adopt  the  psychological  strategy,  they  unanimously  accept  that  the  
awareness  of  the  available  evidence  (which  overall  warrants  that  not- p )  will  not  be  
affected  by  the  acquisition  or  the  maintenance  of  the  necessary  attitude  (Davidson,  
74  I  do  not  intend  to  imply  that  social  factors  cannot  affect  one’s  changes  in  beliefs  (and  other  
propositional  attitudes).  But  it  is  hard  to  imagine  a  situation  in  which  there  is  a  necessary  
connection  between  A’s  degree  of  belief  that  p  and  B’s  degree  of  belief  that  not- p ,  and  thus,  the  
former's  loss  is  the  later’s  gain  (and  vice  versa).  
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2004b;  Rorty,  1988).   Accordingly,  the  intentionalist  model  proposed  by  these 75
theorists  allows  a  belief  that  not- p  to  coexist  with  a  belief  that  p ,  and  this  is  how  the  
static  paradox  is  generated  (see  Figure  1).  
  
  
75  We  should  note  that  even  if  we  adopt  the  strategy  of  temporal  partitioning,  this  does  not  
suggest  that  we  agree  that  the  acquisition  of  the  necessary  attitude  must  lead  to  loss  of  the  
awareness  of  the  available  evidence.  In  fact,  the  leading  proponents  of  this  strategy,  Bermúdez  
(2000)  and  Sorensen  (1985),  do  not  intend  to  assert  that  a  self-deceived  subject  must  lose  her  
belief  that  not- p  when  she  obtains  a  belief  that  p .  While  both  Bermúdez  (2000)  and  Sorensen  
(1985)  contend  that  we  should  not  require  a  self-deceived  subject  to  constantly  hold  a  pair  of  
contradictory  beliefs  during  self-deception,  their  model  still  allows  the  possibility  that  the  






At  the  same  time,  non-intentionalists  also  take  the  presumption  for  granted,  
even  though  the  primary  motivation  for  adopting  non-intentionalist  approaches  is  to  
completely  reject  the  interpersonal  model  (thus  avoid  the  two  paradoxes  thoroughly).  
This  structural  uniformity  allows  the  non-intentionalist  picture  of  self-deception  to  fit  
in  very  well  with  the  one  provided  by  intentionalists.  To  illustrate,  let  us  take  Archer’s  
(2013)  non-doxastic  view  as  a  representative  of  non-intentionalist  views  to  determine  
whether  it  fits  the  intentionalist  model  of  self-deception  mentioned  above.   
  
As  discussed  in  section  1.1.2.2,  Archer  (2013)  specifies  the  content  of  the  basic  
elements  of  self-deception  by  appeal  to  psychological  categories  other  than  “belief.”  In  
Archer’s  (2013)  view,  a  suspicion  that  not- p  represents  the  awareness  of  the  available  
evidence,  while  a  hope  that  p  acts  for  the  necessary  attitude.  We  should  also  note  that  
the  degrees  (or  strength)  of  these  two  propositional  attitudes  have  to  be  high  enough  in  
order  to  reveal  the  nature  of  the  available  evidence  and  explain  the  “as-if- p ”  behavior  
of  self-deceived  subjects  (see  section  2.3.3  and  section  2.4.2  for  more  details).  Given  
these  points,  in  Archer’s  (2013)  non-doxastic  model  of  self-deception,  the  combination  
of  a  (strong)  suspicion  that  not- p  and  a  desire  to  believe  that  p  causes  an  involved  
subject  to  engage  in  a  biased  cognition,  in  which  a  (strong)  hope  that  p  can  thus  be  
acquired  (or  retained)  in  the  teeth  of  contrary  evidence  (p.  279).  It  is  noteworthy  that  
although  the  access-to-information-element  is  a  causal  condition  of  the  
unwarranted-attitude-element,  there  is  no  sign  that  it  will  be  affected  by  the  production  
or  maintenance  of  the  necessary  attitude(s)  in  this  non-doxastic  model.  Archer  (2013)  
even  affirms  that  the  two  elements  coexist  during  self-deception  (p.  279).  Now,  it  
should  be  evident  that  the  structure  of  Archer’s  non-doxastic  model  is  the  same  as  that  
110  
  
of  intentionalist  models.  In  fact,  the  situation  will  be  the  same  even  if  we  take  other  
non-intentionalist  views  for  comparison.  See  Figure  2  for  the  model  of  Archer’s  






Typically,  non-intentionalists  who  presuppose  this  structural  pattern  have  been  
restricted  to  deal  with  the  static  paradox  created  by  the  (simultaneous) 
contradictory-beliefs  proposal  in  restricted  ways,  namely,  those  related  to  the  content  of  
the  basic  elements  only.  However,  the  question  that  can  be  raised  here  is  whether  such  
a  restriction  is  unnecessary.  The  fact  is  that  neither  the  “vague  consensus”  nor  the  
relevant  empirical  evidence  provides  a  reason  to  think  that  a  self-deceived  subject  will  
somehow  keep  the  awareness  of  the  available  evidence  apart  from  the  production  or  
maintenance  of  the  necessary  attitude(s)  constantly  during  her  self-deception.  The  
structural  pattern  suggested  becomes  even  more  problematic  when  we  consider  that  the  
awareness  of  the  available  evidence  and  the  necessary  attitude(s)  are  supposed  to  be  
inside  a  single  agent’s  (conscious)  mind  (see  section  2.3.1  for  a  discussion  on  why  the  
access-to-information-element  cannot  be  separated  from  the  subject’s  conscious  mind).  
The  idea  is  that,  when  one  is  engaging  in  a  particular  cognitive  process  for  promoting  
the  acquisition  or  maintenance  of  a  belief  that  p ,  one  is  simultaneously  undermining  
one’s  reason  for  believing  that  not- p .  It  sounds  abnormal  to  say  one  still  retains  a  belief  
that  not- p  when  one  has  already  succeeded  in  obtaining  a  belief  that  p ,  given  that  the  
falsehood  of  not- p  should  have  already  been  established  at  that  time.   
  
Here,  I  suggest  that  a  more  intuitive  description  of  how  the  two  beliefs  are  
affected  by  the  self-deceiving  process  is  as  follows:  the  self-deceiving  process  weakens  
a  belief  that  not- p  and  the  belief  that  not- p  finally  becomes  a  disbelief  that  not- p  at  the  
conclusion  section  of  the  process  (which  is  identical  to  a  belief  that  p ).  This  description  
is  more  intuitive  in  the  sense  that  we  should  be  familiar  with  cases  where  people  
change  their  minds  when  there  are  changes  in  the  situation  (see  section  2.6.4  for  an  
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example).  With  this  description  in  mind,  we  have  no  reason  to  maintain  that  the  
awareness  of  the  available  evidence  and  the  necessary  attitude(s)  must  coexist.  
Additionally,  if  we  already  know  that  one  cannot  believe  both  p  and  not- p ,  why  should  
we  presume  a  structural  pattern  that  allows  such  a  situation  to  happen?  Even  if  we  
insist  on  following  the  affective  approach  suggested  by  Archer  (2013),  for  example,  the  
same  situation  will  still  emerge  because  it  is  also  implausible  for  one  to  strongly  hope  
that  p  while  at  the  same  time  strongly  suspect  that  not- p  is  true  (Chan  and  Rowbottom,  
2019,  p.  1211).    76
  
Thus,  through  a  rearrangement  of  the  structure,  the  true  face  of  the  phenomenon  
of  self-deception  is  unveiled.  Specifically,  it  is  not  a  phenomenon  in  which  a  subject  is  
motivated  to  engage  in  an  irrational  cognition  for  forming  (or  retaining)  the  necessary  
attitude(s)  that  independent  from,  and  without  direct  connection  with,  the  awareness  of  
the  available  evidence  (which  overall  warrants  not- p ).  Rather,  a  minimal  account  of  
self-deception  makes  it  a  cognitive  process  in  which  the  awareness  is  transformed  into 
the  necessary  attitude(s).  In  this  sense,  the  awareness  and  the  necessary  attitude(s)  are  
not  allowed  to  coexist  since  the  loss  (or  the  transformation)  of  the  awareness  should  be  
a  necessary  accompaniment  for  the  gain  (or  regainment)  of  necessary  attitude(s)  (see  
Figure  3).   
76  Some  may  insist  that  it  is  possible  for  one  to  (strongly)  hope  that  p  even  if  one  is  aware  that  
the  reality  is  quite  otherwise.  I  do  not  intend  to  assert  that  it  is  impossible  for  people  to  strongly  
hope  that  p  at  T 2   despite  being  aware  of  the  strong  evidence  to  the  contrary  at  T 1 .  After  all,  a  
fast  shifting  from  despair  to  hope  may  occur  when  changes  in  other  propositional  attitudes  are  
triggered.  However,  I  do  not  think  it  is  possible  for  one  to  have  a  strong  hope  that  p  is  true  at  






However,  some  may  question  whether  the  expected  cognitive  tension  will  be  
omitted  from  the  basic  structure  of  self-deception  mentioned  above,  since  the  shifting  
nature  inherent  in  the  structure  does  not  allow  the  two  elements  to  coexist  when  
self-deception  is  temporally  extended.  As  mentioned  in  section  2.6.1,  the  origin  of  the  
expected  cognitive  tension  is  dissatisfaction  caused  by  the  gap  between  the  “reality”  
(which  refers  to  one’s  understanding  of  what  the  world  is  based  on  the  evidence  one  
possesses)  and  a  belief  that  p  (or  any  attitude  that  can  roughly  play  the  role  of  a  belief  
that  p ).  Some  regard  this  as  a  solid  foundation  for  suggesting  a  direct  clash  within  the  
simultaneous  existence  of  contradictory  attitudes  (Graham,  1986,  p.  228).  Conversely,  I  
find  it  more  compelling  to  suggest  that  such  dissatisfaction  implies  a  sharp  shift  from  
“believing  that  p ”  to  “disbelieving  that  p .”  It  is  important  to  note  that  a  recognition  of  
the  gap  does  not  require  one  to  have  the  belief  that  p  at  the  very  moment  of  having  that  
recognition.  Rather,  when  one  recognizes  that  the  available  evidence  is  inconsistent  
with  what  one  is  motivated  to  endorse,  one  already  establishes  the  falsehood  of  the  
proposition  that  one  has  (mistakenly)  supported,  namely  p ,  and  thus  disbelieves  that  p  
(or  believes  that  not- p ).  In  this  sense,  it  turns  out  that  the  idea  of  the  expected  cognitive  
tension  probably  indicates  the  occurrence  of  a  sharp  shift(s)  in  one’s  doxastic  state.   
  
Now  we  might  put  all  these  ideas  together.  We  have  already  seen  that  the  
access-to-information-element  is  a  causal  condition  of  the  acquisition  (or  regainment)  
of  the  unwarranted-attitude-element,  and  the  two  elements  are  directly  connected  but  
not  allowed  to  coexist.  Hence  Bermúdez  (2000)  mentions  that  “it  seems  plausible  that  
[a  self-deceived  subject’s]  confidence  in  p  will  be  inversely  proportional  to  [her]  
confidence  in  non- p ”  (p.  313).  In  other  words,  the  two  elements  might  be  closely  
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connected  in  the  sense  that  one’s  loss  could  be  another’s  gain,  and  vice  versa.  But  it  
seems  to  me  that  Bermúdez’s  (2000)  idea  is  too  weak.  Given  the  aforementioned  basic  
structure  of  self-deception,  I  think  it  is  not  only  plausible,  but  in  fact  necessary,  to  
consider  the  two  elements  as  an  integrated  entity  that  switches  from  one  end  to  the  
other  –  which  already  indicates  the  adoption  of  a  shifting  view  (see  section  2.6.4  for  an 
explanation  of  the  shifting  view  about  degrees  of  belief),  despite  the  limited  frequency  
of  switching.  Nevertheless,  there  is  no  theoretical  reason  to  impose  such  a  restriction  
on  the  integrated  entity.  Thus,  in  order  to  leave  room  for  the  expected  tension  to  occur,  
we  can  simply  affirm  that  the  necessary  attitude(s)  should  be  able  to  shift  again  when  






In  summary,  through  reconsidering  the  basic  structure  of  self-deception,  we  
have  clarified  the  relation  between  the  two  elements  and  their  characteristic.  Now  it  
should  be  clear  that  there  is  no  way  for  us  to  simultaneously  attribute  two  contradictory  
cognitive  representations  to  a  self-deceived  subject  during  the  whole  self-deceiving  
process,  regardless  of  how  they  are  encoded  in  the  mind  of  the  subject.  Hence  the  static  
paradox  is  just  a  “red  herring.”  Furthermore,  given  the  revised  structural  pattern  of  
self-deception,  “shifting”  is  not  merely  an  ad  hoc  cure  for  the  static  paradox  but  plays  
an  essential  role  in  this  phenomenon.   
  
3.1.2  The  necessary  attitude(s)  involved  in  self-deception  and  its  characteristic  
At  this  point,  we  have  established  that  the  two  elements  should  be  construed  as  
an  integrated  entity  that  is  liable  to  shift  back  and  forth  between  two  ends.  Hence  we  do  
not  need  to  address  this  combination  by  deliberately  attributing  the  conjunction  of  two  
distinct  beliefs  to  the  self-deceived  subject.  Instead,  we  only  have  to  assign  a  full  belief  
concerning  p  or  a  degree  of  belief  concerning  p ,  which  is  liable  to  dramatically  shift  
back  and  forth  between  “believing  p ”  and  “disbelieving  p ,”  to  the  subject  (while  
keeping  in  mind  that  a  belief  that  p  and  a  disbelief  that  not- p  are  two  sides  of  the  same  
coin).  
  
Nevertheless,  the  conclusion  drawn  from  the  discussion  of  the  structure  of  
self-deception  is  more  sophisticated  than  we  initially  thought.  Given  that  we  are  
concerned  with  the  distinction  problem,  this  conclusion  actually  leads  us  to  emphasize  
the  unstable  nature,  rather  than  the  precise  content,  of  the  integrated  entity.   Recall  77
77  Yet,  some  cases  involving  such  instability  are  not  examples  of  self-deception,  so  long  as  
other  basic  elements  of  self-deception  are  absent.  Recall  that  our  study  of  the  distinction  
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that  we  have  to  address  what  makes  self-deception  unique  by  specifying  this  integrated  
entity  in  a  way  that  makes  the  involved  subject  believe  p  and  not- p  consecutively  
during  self-deception.  As  mentioned  in  section  2.6.4,  we  cannot  fulfill  this  task  by  
appeal  to  the  idea  of  “shifting  degrees  of  belief”  only  since  this  idea  does  not  require  
one’s  belief  to  be  liable  to  shift  dramatically.   Admittedly,  even  if  we  consider  the  78
integrated  entity  to  be  a  degree  of  belief  concerning  p  that  can  shift  between  the  two  
ends,  the  entity  should  be  relatively  stable  (namely  not  liable  to  shift)  when  the  
available  evidence  does  support  the  disbelief  that  p .  Yet,  in  the  phenomenon  of  
self-deception,  this  integrated  entity  is  dramatically  unstable  in  the  sense  that  it  has  to  
shift  substantially  during  the  transition  from  the  consideration  section  to  the  conclusion  
section,  and  it  is  liable  to  shift  again  (for  one  or  more  times)  if  self-deception  is  
temporally  extended.  Accordingly,  our  focal  point  should  be  the  fact  that  this  entity  is  
characteristic  of  a  special  kind  of  instability  since  this  is  what  makes  it  possible  for  the  
subject’s  belief  concerning  p  to  be  liable  to  shift  back  and  forth.  More  importantly,  by  
giving  weight  to  the  characteristic  of  this  entity  instead  of  the  content  of  it,  we  can  
successfully  address  the  expected  tension  without  turning  it  into  a  necessary  factor  of  
self-deception.  
  
Following  from  the  above,  I  contend  that  we  should  not  accord  equal  
importance  to  the  two  elements  that  constitute  the  integrated  entity.  As  mentioned  in  
section  1.2.5,  the  unwarranted-attitude-element  indicates  the  necessary  attitude(s),  
problem  aims  at  finding  the  difference(s)  between  self-deception  and  other  phenomena  that  
have  significant  commonalities.  What  I  intend  to  argue  is  that,  if  all  basic  elements  and  this  sort  
of  instability  are  present  in  a  particular  case,  it  is  an  example  of  self-deception.  
78  Even  if  self-deception  is  not  temporally  extended,  the  involved  subject  must  believe  p  and  
not- p  consecutively  during  self-deception  in  order  to  account  for  the  
access-to-information-element  and  the  unwarranted-attitude-element.   
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namely  an  unwarranted  attitude(s)  concerning  p  (while  its  acquisition  or  maintenance  is  
grounded  in,  or  at  least  related  to,  the  self-deceiving  process).  We  used  to  think  that  the  
unwarranted  nature  of  a  certain  attitude  can  only  be  addressed  by  restricting  the  content  
of  it.   Yet,  I  believe  this  unwarranted  nature  can  also  be  addressed  by  specifying  the  79
nature  of  that  particular  attitude.  Let  us  assume  that  the  available  evidence  supports  
not- p  (which  is  one  of  the  necessary  conditions  for  the  occurrence  of  self-deception).  
Under  this  circumstance,  if  an  attitude  concerning  p  is  affected  by  the  power  of  such  
evidence  properly,  it  should  be  relatively  stable  in  character.  For  example,  if  it  is  a  
degree  of  belief  that  p ,  its  value  will  only  alternate  between  0  and  0.5  (except  being  
affected  by  other  psychological  factors  or  the  like),  which  makes  it  count  as  
disbelieving  that  p  at  all  times.  In  contrast,  if  a  particular  attitude  concerning  p  is  
unstable  in  character  (which  means  it  is  liable  to  shift  dramatically  for  one  or  more  
times),  it  is  fair  to  consider  it  as  displaying  a  notable  difference  from  what  the  available  
evidence  warrants,  namely  being  unwarranted.   
  
Thus,  I  suggest  that  we  should  adopt  a  new  understanding  of  the  idea  of  “the  
necessary  attitude(s),”  namely,  once  the  integrated  entity  has  been  given  an  unstable  
nature  through  the  self-deceiving  process,  we  can  say  it  already  counts  as  the  necessary  
attitude(s)  involved  in  self-deception,  regardless  of  its  current  content.   In  other  80
words,  the  unwarranted-attitude-element  should  be  considered  to  be  prevalent  
79  Suppose  the  available  evidence  supports  not- p .  We  used  to  think  that  if  a  particular  attitude  
is  unwarranted,  we  have  to  specify  the  content  of  it  as  something  incompatible  with  the  
available  evidence,  such  as  “a  disbelief  that  not- p .”   
80  I  do  not  mean  that  an  attitude  can  only  be  given  such  an  unstable  nature  through  a  
self-deceiving  process.  Surely,  other  kinds  of  cognition  can  also  lead  to  this  result.  But  I  
believe  that  it  is  impossible  for  those  phenomena  that  share  significant  commonalities  with  
self-deception  to  influence  their  necessary  attitudes  in  this  way.  
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throughout  the  temporally  extended  part  of  self-deception,  even  though  it  is  liable  to  
shift  back  and  forth  between  “believing  that  p ”  and  “disbelieving  that  p ”  persistently  in  
this  part.  This  is  because  even  when  the  content  of  the  necessary  attitude  shifts  into  
“disbelieving  that  p ”  at  some  point  in  time  during  the  reconsideration  section,  this  
attitude  has  already  been  given  an  unstable  nature  in  the  sense  that  it  is  destined  to  shift  
back  into  “believing  that  p ”  again.  Otherwise,  we  have  to  say  the  involved  subject, 
namely  the  possessor,  has  already  stopped  her  self-deception  at  the  very  moment  when  
she  regains  a  disbelief  that  p ,  or  D( p )  <  0.5.  (Depending  on  the  existence  of  the  
access-to-information-element  in  the  beginning,  we  can  even  doubt  whether  it  is  a  case  
of  self-deception  to  begin  with.)  See  Figure  5  for  an  illustration  of  the  situation  where  
D( p )  <  0.5  does  not  shift  back  to  D( p )  >  0.5.    81
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Here,  I  would  like  to  offer  a  short  summary  of  my  findings  to  this  point.  I  have  
clarified  the  basic  features  of  the  phenomenon  of  self-deception,  which  in  turn  can  help  
us  shape  a  final  scheme  to  solve  the  distinction  problem.  In  particular,  we  have  been  
led  to  focus  on  the  characteristic  of  the  necessary  attitude(s)  involved  in  self-deception.  
In  the  following  section,  I  am  going  to  elaborate  on  a  solution  that  emphasizes  the  
characteristic  of  the  necessary  attitude(s).  I  will  call  this  solution  the  instability  view .  
  
3.2  The  instability  view  
The  central  theme  of  the  instability  view  is  that  a  special  kind  of  instability  
inherent  in  the  necessary  attitude(s)  involved  in  self-deception  can  help  us  distinguish  
the  phenomenon  from  other  nearby  phenomena.  As  mentioned  previously,  since  the  
available  evidence  should  support  not- p  in  a  real  case  of  self-deception,  the  involved  
subject’s  attitude  towards  p  should  overall  be  relatively  stable,  that  is,  it  should  count  
as  disbelieving  that  p  at  all  times  (except  being  affected  by  other  psychological  factors  
or  the  like).  But  this  attitude  is  endowed  with  an  unstable  nature  through  the  
self-deceiving  process  and  thus  is  liable  to  shift  back  and  forth  between  the  two  
extremes  of  “believing  that  p ”  and  “disbelieving  that  p .”  It  is  not  difficult  for  us  to  find  
examples  in  which  this  kind  of  instability  plays  a  decisive  role  in  determining  whether  
a  given  case  should  count  as  self-deception.  Recall  that  when  the  young  man  in  the  
case  of  “one-sided  love”  appears  to  be  continuously  sliding  between  believing  p  and  
not- p  in  the  face  of  evidence  supporting  not- p ,  we  tend  to  consider  him  as  




We  should  note  that  this  unstable  nature  has  to  be  grounded  in  how  the  
relationship  between  one’s  motivational  state  and  the  threatening  data  affects  one’s  
attitude  towards  a  particular  proposition.  Thus,  some  prerequisites  have  to  be  fulfilled  
to  enable  an  attitude  to  become  unstable  in  character.  First,  an  involved  subject  has  to  
be  a  generally  rational  being,  who  is  susceptible  to  what  the  natural  implications  of  the  
available  evidence  are.  As  mentioned  earlier,  self-deception  should  not  involve  
abnormal  psychology.  Accordingly,  any  subject  who  is  involved  in  self-deception  must  
be  ordinary  people  who  are  “in  general,  intellectually  able  and  rational,  and  are  
consequently  not  completely  immune  to  the  force  of  good  evidence  when  they  
encounter  it”  (Lynch,  2012,  p.  442).  Second,  the  subject  has  to  have  a  subjective  
reason(s)  (i.e.  a  motivation(s))  that  can  cause  her  to  embrace  a  particular  proposition  
( p ).   This  is  manifested  as  the  motivation-element  in  self-deception,  as  we  have  seen  82
in  section  1.2.3  and  section  2.2.  Third,  the  available  evidence  must  give  greater  warrant  
for  not- p  than  for  p ,  and  therefore  the  subject  has  an  epistemic  reason  not  to  embrace  p .  
Given  that  the  available  evidence  must  support  not- p  in  self-deception,  it  is  easy  to  see  
that  the  third  prerequisite  can  be  fulfilled  by  the  phenomenon  of  self-deception.  The  
combination  of  these  three  prerequisites  provides  a  situation  in  which  the  subject’s  
attitude  towards  p  is  apt  to  vacillate  between  two  ends.  Once  a  subject  engages  in  a  
particular  process  of  irrational  cognition  under  this  situation,  it  is  very  likely  that  she  is  
self-deceiving  herself.   
  
82  Since  I  do  not  intend  to  solve  the  motivational  issue,  I  will  not  specify  what  this  “subjective  
reason”  is.  We  can  just  assume  that  any  reason  that  can  act  as  the  motivation-element  of  
self-deception  will  do  (see  section  1.2.3  for  a  discussion  of  the  motivation-element).  Still,  I  
tend  to  think  that  it  is  a  desire  that  p  (see  section  2.2  for  a  discussion  of  how  to  specify  the  
content  of  the  motivation-element).   
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3.2.1  The  ontology  of  the  instability  view  
The  instability  view  is  based  on  several  assumptions  concerning  the  definition  
of  self-deception  and  the  notion  of  propositional  attitude,  which  have  been  discussed  in  
detail  in  the  previous  sections.  Yet  a  brief  synopsis  of  them  should  be  useful  for  
articulating  the  view.  The  conditions  are  as  follows:  
  
1. The  vast  majority  of  theories  available  in  the  literature  of  self-deception  
target  the  same  kind  of  phenomenon,  despite  misconceptions  about  its  
precise  description.  
2. If  1  is  right,  there  should  be  some  commonalities  among  these  theories,  
which  work  as  a  common  ground  for  any  theoretical  question  arising  
about  “self-deception.”  I  call  this  common  ground  the  “vague  consensus.”  
3. The  content  of  the  “vague  consensus”  is  as  follows:   
3.A. Self-deception  is  a  real  kind  of  motivated  (human)  
irrationality.   83
3.B. The  combination  of  three  basic  elements  constitutes  this  
irrationality.   
3.C. These  elements  are  “motivation,”  “access  to  
information,”  and  “unwarranted  attitude.”  
4. The  motivation-element  should  be  specified  as  a  subjective  reason(s)  for  
one  to  engage  in  the  phenomenon.   84
5. The  access-to-information-element  should  be  specified  as  an  awareness  
of  the  available  evidence,  which  overall  warrants  that  not- p ,  and  it  must  
be  represented  in  terms  of  propositional  attitudes.  
6. The  unwarranted-attitude-element  should  be  specified  as  an  unwarranted  
attitude(s)  towards  p  necessarily  involved  in  self-deception  while  its  
83  Note  also  that  this  implies  that  self-deception  is  not  a  phenomenon  of  abnormal  psychology  
(namely  unmotivated  irrationality),  and  thus,  any  subject  involved  in  it  should  be  a  generally  
rational  being.   
84  This  element  can  also  be  understood  as  the  motivation  that  makes  one  try  hard  to  embrace  p .  
126  
  
acquisition  or  maintenance  is  grounded  in,  or  at  least  related  to,  the  
cognitive  process  involved  in  the  phenomenon.   
7. The  awareness  of  the  available  evidence  and  the  unwarranted  attitude(s)  
towards  p  can  be  considered  as  one  integrated  entity.   
8. This  integrated  entity  is  not  inside  of  one’s  unconscious  mind.  
9. This  integrated  entity  becomes  unstable  in  character  through  the  
self-deceiving  process,  and  thus,  is  liable  to  shift  back  and  forth  between  
two  ends  when  one  changes  context.  
10. Once  the  integrated  entity  is  endowed  with  an  unstable  nature,  we  can  
directly  consider  it  as  an  unwarranted  attitude(s)  towards  p  necessarily  
involved  in  self-deception,  regardless  of  its  current  precise  content.   
  
Note  that  we  need  not  insist  that  10  has  to  be  right  for  the  instability  view  to  work  in  
practice.  We  might  adopt  a  broader  approach  as  long  as  we  can  still  lay  emphasis  on  
the  unstable  nature.  Furthermore,  although  the  instability  view  is  developed  from  an  
initial  scheme  suggesting  that  the  integrated  entity  should  be  explained  in  terms  of  
doxastic  attitudes,  it  turns  out  that  the  view  can  accommodate  other  approaches  on  how  
to  address  the  integrated  entity.  This  entity  can  be  defined  in  terms  of  other  kinds  of  
propositional  attitudes  (such  as  affective  attitudes)  as  long  as  it  can  remain  unstable  in  
character.  Admittedly,  if  the  access-to-information-element  and  the  
unwarranted-attitude-element  were  allowed  to  be  explained  in  terms  of  propositional  
attitudes  other  than  beliefs,  we  would  have  more  than  one  reasonable  solution  to  the  
distinction  problem.  However,  for  the  purpose  of  this  study,  my  intention  is  to  argue  
that  the  instability  view  is  a  promising,  rather  than  the  only,  solution.   
  
3.2.2  The  advantage  of  the  instability  view  
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In  the  previous  section,  I  noted  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  insist  on  the  doxastic  
approach  in  defending  the  instability  view  (although  I  do  insist  on  following  the  
doxastic  approach  for  addressing  the  exact  content  of  the  two  elements).  This,  in  fact,  
highlights  the  primary  advantage  of  the  instability  view,  namely,  it  can  characterize  the  
uniqueness  of  self-deception  without  limiting  its  generality,  thus  leaving  room  for  
future  research  on  other  aspects  of,  and  theoretical  questions  stemming  from,  
self-deception.  
  
Despite  some  prerequisites,  the  instability  view  does  not  impose  any  strict  
restriction  on  the  content  of  the  three  basic  elements  of  self-deception.  The  view  still  
works  even  if  both  the  awareness  of  the  available  evidence  and  the  necessary  
attitude(s)  need  not  be  understood  in  terms  of  doxastic  attitudes.  To  illustrate,  suppose  
the  integrated  entity  must  be  explained  with  the  avowal  view,  which  suggests  
attributing  the  conjunction  of  an  avowal  of  p  and  a  belief  that  not- p  to  a  self-deceived  
subject  (Audi,  1982).   Given  that  a  belief  that  not- p  can  also  guide  both  a  subject’s  85
verbal  and  non-verbal  actions,  there  is  a  conflict  between  these  two  attitudes  (albeit  
maybe  in  a  less  extreme  sense).   We  can  then  combine  these  two  attitudes  into  an  86
integrated  entity  that  is  liable  to  switch  between  two  ends,  as  in  the  doxastic  approach.  
Once  the  two  attitudes  are  construed  as  an  integrated  entity,  we  can  easily  apply  the  
instability  view  to  the  framework.   
85  Audi  (1982)  tries  to  limit  the  connection  between  verbal  behavior  and  this  belief  that  not- p  
by  understanding  the  belief  as  an  unconscious  one.  But  I  have  already  argued  that  the  
awareness  of  the  available  evidence  should  not  be  outside  of  a  self-deceived  subject’s  
conscious  mind  (as  stated  in  section  2.3.1).  Hence  I  will  not  consider  it  to  be  unconscious.  
86  Undoubtedly,  the  (empirical)  evidence  of  the  awareness  of  the  available  evidence  is  largely  
non-verbal  behavior.  But  there  is  no  theoretical  reason  to  limit  its  connection  with  verbal  
behavior  if  it  is  represented  by  a  (conscious)  belief  that  not- p .  It  is  possible  for  a  self-deceived  




The  same  is  true  even  if  we  replace  the  avowal  view  with  other  views,  such  as  
the  indeterminate  approach.  If  we  follow  the  indeterminate  approach,  the  product  of  
self-deception  will  then  be  the  partial  fulfillment  of  the  conditions  for  fitting  the  
folk-psychological  stereotype  for  “believing  that  p ”  (Funkhouser,  2009;  Porcher,  2012;  
Schwitzgebel,  2010).   In  this  sense,  we  can  only  provide  an  indeterminate  answer  to  87
whether  self-deceived  subjects  believe  that  p .  But  note  that  even  though  this  is  called  
the  indeterminate  approach,  a  determinate  answer  to  whether  self-deceived  subjects  
believe  that  not- p  is  still  required  for  representing  the  access-to-information-element.  
Recall  that  self-deceived  subjects  should  sufficiently  meet  the  folk-psychological  
stereotype  for  “believing  that  not- p ”  for  fulfilling  the  requirement  of  “being  aware  of  
the  natural  implication(s)  of  the  available  evidence  that  overall  supports  not- p. ”  In  
other  words,  a  total  unfulfillment  of  the  conditions  for  fitting  the  folk-psychological  
stereotype  for  “believing  that  p ”  is  required  to  address  the  
access-to-information-element,  given  that  Schwitzgebel  (2010)  clearly  states  that  the  
conditions  for  counting  as  “believing  that  not- p ”  necessarily  conflict  with  the  
conditions  for  counting  as  “believing  that  p ”  (p.  544).  So,  it  is  fair  to  say  we  can  still  
understand  the  access-to-information-element  and  the  unwarranted-attitude-element  as  
an  integrated  entity  that  is  liable  to  switch  between  two  ends  in  the  context  of  the  
87  As  mentioned  in  section  2.4,  since  proponents  of  the  indeterminate  approach  do  not  view  the  
idea  of  “belief”  in  a  usual  way,  I  assume  that  they  tend  to  replace  “necessary  attitude(s)”  with  




indeterminate  approach.   Once  again,  when  the  two  elements  are  construed  as  an  88
integrated  entity,  we  can  easily  apply  the  instability  view  to  the  framework.   
  
Moreover,  as  mentioned  in  section  1.3,  some  theorists  suggest  that  there  is  more  
than  one  type  of  self-deception.  The  fact  that  the  instability  view  neither  relies  on  
restricting  the  content  of  elements  of  self-deception  nor  precludes  any  particular  type(s)  
of  self-deception,  such  as  twisted  cases  and  indifferent  cases,  is  very  beneficial  for  
ensuring  the  diversity  in  the  phenomenon.  Incidentally,  the  view  is  compatible  with  the  
assumption  that  the  case  of  “Joey”  is  a  genuine  example  of  self-deception  (although  I  
have  expressed  some  doubt  as  to  the  validity  of  such  an  assumption).  
  
3.2.3  The  mechanisms  behind  
If  we  accept  that  the  future  of  the  instability  view  looks  very  promising,  an  
explicit  explanation  of  the  mechanisms  behind  is  crucial  for  complementing  the  view.  
To  ensure  a  thorough  explanation,  I  will  include  the  tension  (including  the  expected  
tension)  and  also  the  temporally  extended  part  in  the  illustration.  At  the  same  time,  to  
avoid  any  misunderstanding,  the  idea  of  “integrated  entity”  will  not  be  mentioned.  
However,  it  is  important  to  note  that,  once  the  attitude  concerning  p  becomes  unstable  
in  character  and  is  liable  to  switch  back  and  forth  between  two  ends,  we  can  consider  it  
as  the  necessary  attitude  involved  in  self-deception,  regardless  of  its  current  content.   
  
88  Admittedly,  in  the  context  of  the  indeterminate  approach,  the  precise  content  of  these  two  
elements  will  be  much  more  sophisticated  than  we  initially  thought.  Yet,  this  will  not  be  an  
obstacle  to  the  formation  of  the  integrated  entity  since  the  instability  view  does  not  require  us  
to  specify  the  exact  content  of  these  two  elements.  
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Regarding  real  cases  of  “self-deception,”  my  observation  is  as  follows:  a  
subject  is  aware  that  the  available  data  provides  greater  warrant  for  not- p .  
Nevertheless,  the  subject  has  a  particular  motivation,  which  makes  it  hard  for  her  to  
accept  this  situation.   At  the  same  time,  cognitive  tension  is  supposed  to  be  generated  89
because  of  this  uncomfortable  situation.  The  interaction  between  the  awareness  and  the  
motivation  causes  the  subject  to  act  in  a  certain  way  to  promote  holding  a  particular  
unwarranted  attitude(s)  concerning  p .   During  this  process,  since  the  level  of  the 90
awareness  of  the  available  data  is  still  high,  the  subject  might  behave  in  a  way  that  
looks  more  consistent  with  the  attribution  of  a  belief  that  not- p  (or  the  like).   For  91
example,  she  could  consciously  avoid  encountering  sources  of  evidence  suggesting  that  
not- p .   When  the  subject  successfully  makes  her  attitude(s)  towards  p  unstable  in  92
character  through  the  promoting  process,  the  awareness  of  the  available  evidence  will  
be  able  to  switch  into  an  unwarranted  attitude(s)  towards  p  (namely  a  belief  that  not- p  
or  the  like)  at  the  conclusion  section.  Once  the  awareness  is  transformed  into  the  
necessary  attitude(s)  involved  in  self-deception,  cognitive  tension  will  be  reduced  
correspondingly.  At  that  moment,  she  might  start  to  act  in  a  way  suggesting  a  belief  
that  p  (or  the  like).   
  
89  Some  might  think,  and  I  agree,  that  the  strength  of  this  motivation  is  proportional  to  the  
level  of  awareness  of  contrary-evidence.  However,  it  is  not  necessary  to  include  this  into  the  
system.  
90  There  is  much  more  to  be  said  about  how  one  can  self-deceive  oneself,  so  much  that  it  
would  require  another  thesis.  I  tend  to  prefer  a  mixed  strategy.  For  example,  Galeotti  (2012)  
argues  that  self-deception  could  be  “an  unintended  outcome  of  intentional  steps”  taken  by  the  
subject  (p.  42).  In  other  words,  one  could  intentionally  seek  for  considerations  supportive  of  p  
without  aiming  at  deceiving  oneself.  
91  When  the  level  of  the  awareness  of  the  available  data  is  low  enough,  it  switches  into  an  
unwarranted  attitude(s)  towards  p .   
92  As  Funkhouser  (2005)  contends,  such  avoidance  behavior  shows  that  the  agent  already  
possesses  sufficient  information  for  concluding  that  not- p .  
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After  drawing  the  conclusion,  if  the  subject  reconsiders  the  old  evidence  or 
encounters  new,  unwelcoming  pieces  of  evidence,  the  necessary  attitude(s)  will  switch  
back  into  an  awareness  of  contrary  evidence.  This  awareness  will  interact  with  the  
motivation  and  lead  to  the  promoting  process  again.  Meanwhile,  the  expected  tension  
(a  term  I  used  to  refer  to  the  tension  that  occurs  after  the  conclusion  section)  will  
emerge  until  the  subject  regains  the  necessary  attitude(s)  involved  in  self-deception.  In  
addition,  the  subject  might  behave  as  if  not- p  during  this  reconsidering  process.  When  
impartial  observers  view  these  events  as  a  whole,  they  will  likely  be  confused  by  the  
“shifting”  aspect  in  the  behavior  involved,  leading  them  to  mistakenly  believe  that  the  
subject  is  holding  two  conflicting  attitudes  simultaneously.  See  Figure  6  for  an  









The  task  of  this  study  is  to  determine  the  difference(s)  between  self-deception  
and  other  nearby  phenomena,  especially  wishful  thinking  and  willful  ignorance,  which  
I  termed  the  distinction  problem,  and  hence  establish  a  firm  foundation  for  future  
research.  In  chapter  1,  I  introduced  the  distinction  problem  as  an  essential  yet  unsolved  
issue,  and  emphasized  the  need  for  establishing  the  boundary  of  self-deception,  lest  we  
risk  taking  specious  cases  or  claims  into  consideration  while  developing  a  detailed  
analysis  of  self-deception.  This  was  followed  by  a  review  of  the  current  literature  on  
self-deception,  in  which  myriads  of  theories  exist.  Despite  this,  I  proposed  that  a  
“vague  consensus”  is  present,  albeit  not  fully  sufficient  for  solving  the  distinction  
problem.   
  
With  that  in  mind,  I  attempted  to  seek  a  reasonable  solution  to  the  distinction  
problem  by  examining  proposals  described  in  the  literature  in  chapter  2.  Although  
many  of  these  fail  to  settle  the  problem,  they  are  able  to  provide  insight  for  solving  it.  
Based  on  the  findings,  it  was  determined  that  the  doxastic  approach  is  the  most  
appropriate  for  addressing  the  exact  content  of  both  the  access-to-information-element  
and  the  unwarranted-attitude-element.  To  be  more  precise,  I  discovered  that  we  should  
specify  the  combination  in  a  way  that  makes  one  count  as  believing  that  p  and  not- p .  
The  problem  with  this  specification,  which  is  also  the  biggest  obstacle  to  the  final  
scheme,  is  that  it  can  cause  a  variant  of  the  static  paradox,  which  concerns  an  
impossible  state  of  mind.  To  deal  with  this,  I  proposed  an  initial  scheme  based  on  the  
shifting  view  about  degrees  of  belief.  Since  the  shifting  view  allows  one  to  slide  
between  “believing  that  p ”  and  “disbelieving  that  p ,”  no  static  paradox  will  arise.  The  
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downside  of  this  scheme,  though,  is  that  it  seemingly  fails  to  address  the  expected  
tension  that  is  liable  to  be  present  when  self  deception  is  temporally  extended,  leading  
to  some  doubts  about  the  application  of  the  shifting  view.   
  
In  the  final  chapter,  I  developed  a  view  which  highlights  the  unstable  nature  of  
self-deception  revealed  by  the  combination  of  the  access-to-information-element  and  
the  unwarranted-attitude-element.  By  rearranging  the  basic  structure  of  self-deception,  
I  showed  that  the  combination  should  be  considered  to  be  an  integrated  entity  that  is  
unstable  in  character,  and  only  calls  for  the  attribution  of  a  doxastic  attitude  concerning  
p  but  not  two  distinct  beliefs.  Based  on  this  finding,  I  pointed  out  that  the  shifting  view  
is  not  just  an  ad  hoc  cure  but  an  essential  concept  in  the  study  of  self-deception.  I  also  
stated  that  the  idea  of  “(expected)  cognitive  tension”  should  be  understood  in  a  way  
that  does  not  require  the  simultaneous  attribution  of  contradictory  beliefs.  Then,  I  
further  elaborated  on  the  idea  and  argued  that  by  placing  emphasis  on  the  nature  of  this  
integrated  entity,  a  new  understanding  of  the  idea  of  “the  necessary  attitude(s)  involved  
in  self-deception”  will  appear.  Based  on  this  new  understanding,  I  argued  that  the  
unwarranted  nature  of  the  necessary  attitude(s)  will  be  represented  by  the  unstable  
nature  of  an  attitude(s)  concerning  p  (which  makes  it  possible  that  the  attitude(s)  is  
liable  to  switch  between  two  ends)  instead  of  the  current  content  of  that  attitude(s).  At  
the  end  of  chapter  3,  I  articulated  the  content  of  the  instability  view  and  the  ontology  of  
it.  I  also  specified  the  advantage  of  the  view  and  the  mechanisms  behind.  Undoubtedly,  
many  theoretical  questions  regarding  different  aspects  of  self-deception  still  remain.  
The  aim  of  this  thesis,  nevertheless,  is  to  build  a  solid  foundation  for  future  studies,  
rather  than  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  phenomenon.  Hopefully,  the  instability  view  
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(combined  with  the  “vague  consensus”)  can  serve  as  the  starting  point  for  future  
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